


# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



## THESIS

**TURKEY TOWARD THE 21st CENTURY**

by

**Hakan Zeren**

June, 1995

Thesis Co-Advisors:

**Bertrand M. Patenaude  
Glenn E. Robinson**

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Hakan Zeren  
B.S., The Middle East Technical University, 1989

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
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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis to analyze the effects of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism on Turkey's long-standing regional and international strategic role/importance and its foreign and security policies. After providing the reader with the background information about the foundation of the republic and the evolution of its foreign and security policies throughout the Cold War years, the thesis asserts that Turkey has attempted to adjust to the changes that the end of Cold War introduced into international relations by pursuing two complementary objectives: (1) to preserve and further strengthen the old ties and relationships that it built during the Cold War years with the West, which meant largely Western Europe and the United States; (2) to limit the damage that regional conflicts might eventually inflict on its own domestic stability and welfare. Following the analysis of whether or not Turkey has been able to achieve its objectives, this thesis concludes that Turkey does not see either Central Asia or the Middle East as a real alternative to the West despite all the exclusionary signs that it receives from Europe and the strained relations with the United States, and that Turkey still needs the military, economic and political cooperation and assistance of the West to overcome the challenges that are awaiting it in the next decade which will carry it into the 21st century. And the West has compelling reasons to provide the assistance and cooperation that Turkey seeks.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Turkey has been one of those countries that has been deeply affected by the sweeping changes that the passing of the Cold War and bipolarity have introduced into international relations. With the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the communist threat of the Cold War era has vanished, creating a completely new security environment. The initial optimism for a more peaceful international order and hopes for lasting peace quickly proved to be short-lived as conflicts and wars have broken out even in the center of Europe. In this new security environment, it can be said that Turkey has become a unique country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because no other ally is surrounded by three of the world's unstable and conflict-ridden regions at the same time: i.e., the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. Therefore, the primary purpose of this thesis is to analyze: (1) how the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism have affected Turkey's long-standing regional and international strategic role/importance; (2) the changes that the passing of the bipolarity has introduced into Turkey's foreign and security policies.

This thesis asserts that Turkey has attempted to adjust to this new external environment and the changes that the end of the Cold War introduced into international relations by pursuing two complementary objectives. Turkey's first objective has been to preserve and further strengthen the old ties and relationships that it built during the Cold War years with the West. With the above-mentioned dramatic changes, Turkey's security and foreign policies have also evolved to take a far greater account of regional consideration and, thus, Turkey's second objective has been to limit the damage that regional conflicts might eventually inflict on its own domestic stability and welfare. In the pursuit of this



objective, Turkey has undertaken broadly linked political, cultural and economic initiatives to spread Turkish influence and win many points of influence or leverage in the conflict-ridden regions stretching from eastern and southern Europe through the Black Sea region to Central Asia.

Before moving to the analysis of Turkey's position in the post-Cold era, the study also aims at providing the reader with background information about the foundation of the republic with particular emphasis on the evolution of Turkish foreign and security policies throughout the Cold War years. Therefore, the next part of the thesis, Chapter II, is devoted to a discussion of the evolution of Turkey's foreign and security policies over a time period stretching from the foundation of the republic in 1923 to the late 1980s, which witnessed the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, from the military and ideological competition with the West and the consequent demise of the Cold War. After providing the reader with information about Turkey's foreign and security policies throughout the Cold War years, Chapter III focuses on the evolution of Turkey's relations with West in the post-Cold War era, and gives an assessment of whether or not Turkey's first policy objective, elevating the relations with the West, has been realized. Particular attention shall be given to Turkey's relations with the European Union (EU) and the United States in this chapter. Considering the geostrategic position of Turkey and its centrality to the volatile and instable regions such as the Balkans and the Transcaucasus, Turkey's relations with the two collective security organizations that have great importance in Turkey's security calculations, i.e., NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), are also discussed in Chapter III. Chapter IV is devoted to an assessment of the regional policies that Turkey has pursued toward Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans.

It is a fact that the ability of Turkey to achieve both of the objectives that it has pursued in the post-Cold War era, depends not only on external factors, such as the evolution of the American and Western Europeans policies toward Turkey, but also on domestic factors such as the continuation of the ability of Turkey's mainstream secular parties, which have governed the country since the foundation of the republic, to mobilize the Turkish society along Western ideas and ideals. Therefore, Chapter III also analyzes domestic situation of Turkey in order to understand the compatibilities and incompatibilities between Turkey's policy options and the country's internal environment. Particular attention is given to the following issues: the transformation that the Turkish economy underwent throughout the 1980s and the structural problems of the economy which caused Turkey to fall into a severe economic crisis in 1994 despite the unprecedented economic growth of 1980s; the place of Islam in domestic politics and the recent success of the Welfare Party, the main political movement of the religious right, in the March 1994 general elections, exacerbating the fears of rising Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey; and Turkey's prolonged Kurdish problem, which became a serious threat not only to the territorial integrity and domestic stability of Turkey, but also to its overall objective of elevating relations with its Western allies.

The topics covered throughout this study are selected and discussed in a manner that will provide, hopefully, the reader with an understanding of the most important challenges that are waiting for Turkey in the next decade that will carry it into the 21st century and answer the question that began to be widely discussed upon the 1989 rejection of Turkey's membership application to the EU and the emergence of the Central Asian republics on the international scene with a vast territory inhabited by some 150 million fellow Muslim Turkic-speakers: Will Turkey turn its back on Europe and focus on

developing relations in Central Asia and the Middle East? This thesis concludes, in Chapter V, that Turkey does not see either Central Asia or the Middle East as a real alternative to the West, but rather a complementary factor to further its national interests, and that it still needs the military, economic and political cooperation and assistance of the West in order to overcome the challenges that are waiting for it in the next decade that will carry it into the 21st century, of which the most important one is to maintain the Turkish people's commitment to the basic goals of modernization and their loyalty to the Western ideas and ideals.

## II. TURKEY'S TRADITIONAL FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

### A. BACKGROUND

The Republic of Turkey was found on October 29, 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, known as Ataturk-the Father Turk<sup>1</sup>. The republic was proclaimed following the four-year War of Independence (1919-1922) which had been fought against the World War I Allied powers that wanted to partition the Ottoman Empire.

After its entry into World War I on November 5, 1914, on the side of the Central Powers, the Ottoman army of 800,000 men was engaged in a four-front war with the Allied troops. [Ref 1:p.40] Facing the Allied offensives in multiple fronts, Ottoman resistance was exhausted in the Autumn of 1918 and an Allied-dictated armistice was signed by the Ottoman government on October 30, 1918 at Mudros. [Ref 2:p.31] Following the Mudros armistice, Allied warships passed through the Dardanelles and anchored off Constantinople (present day Istanbul) on November 1918. [Ref 1:p.42] The Allied plans for the partitioning of Anatolia or Asia Minor, the only remaining homeland for Turks from vast territories of the Ottoman Empire, was put into implementation.<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime, a Turkish nationalist movement was being organized in Anatolia by Mustafa Kemal, who recognized the intentions of the Allied Powers under the terms and conditions of the armistice. A national congress that convened in the Anatolian cities of Erzurum and, later, in Sivas in 1919, adopted the National Pact, the political document that defined the task of national resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal:

---

<sup>1</sup> "Ataturk" is the surname given to Mustafa Kemal by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1934 following the adoption of Law of Surnames

<sup>2</sup> Under the conditions of the armistice, Allied Powers were free to intervene in areas where their interests appeared to be threatened

Preserving all of the Ottoman territory that lay within the armistice lines of 1918, as an independent Turkish state. [Ref 2:p.31] Upon dismissal of Ottoman parliament following the occupation of public buildings in Istanbul by Allied troops in January 1920, nationalist congress again convened in Ankara under the name of "Grand National Assembly" ("Buyuk Millet Meclisi") and elected Mustafa Kemal as the first president of assembly in April 23, 1920.

The National Pact that was adopted in Sivas, did not only define and declare the territorial boundaries of the new political entity that Mustafa Kemal was determined to found but, it also implied the renunciation of the Arab provinces, inherited from the Ottoman Empire and of the policies of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism (envisioning to unite all the Turkic people in the world in one state). Mustafa Kemal, referring to Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism, said:

Instead of increasing the pressure of our enemies by pursuing these ideals, which we never achieved and never could achieve, let us be sensible. Let us know our limitations. [Ref 2:p.31]

He narrowed the focus of his nationalist movement to the Turks of Turkey and the territorial principles of the National Pact were established largely on the basis of Turkish-speaking population concentrations in Anatolia. Thus, the War of Independence was a struggle for the survival of the Turkish nation, and of the Anatolia -the Turkish homeland that was under the threat of occupation by the Allied Powers under the terms of the Sèvres Peace Treaty of 1920, signed between Ottoman Empire and the Allies. In an attempt to mobilize the popular support for the struggle against the external enemy and to consolidate the power of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara against the legacy of the Ottoman past, Mustafa Kemal employed Turkish nationalism as the instrument for building the new and modern Turkish state.

Following the four-year War of Independence in which Turkish nationalist army succeeded in driving the French, Italian and Greek occupation forces out of Anatolia, an international peace conference was convened in Lausanne in November 1922. [Ref 1:p.48] After seven months of negotiations between Allied and Turkish governments, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923, delineating and codifying the territorial boundaries of the new Turkish state. [Ref 1:p.49] The Grand National Assembly, on October 29, 1923, proclaimed the Republic of Turkey and Mustafa Kemal was elected by the assembly as the first president of the republic on the same day.

Under the Lausanne Treaty, the territorial goals outlined in the National Pact were largely attained. Only two districts lying within the 1918 armistice lines were withheld from Turkey. The question of Mosul-Kirkuk, one of these two territories, was taken to the League of Nations, but in the face of continuous British opposition against Turkish claims, this territory was awarded to Iraq by the Permanent Court of International Justice's decision in 1926. [Ref 3:p.22] The other territory, the Sanjak of Hatay, acceded to Turkey in 1939, a process facilitated by France, then League of Nations mandatory power for Syria.

Both issues, that caused bitter controversy at the time, continue to be a source of resentment and suspicion against Turkey on the part of these two Arab states.

## **B. KEMALIST IDEOLOGY AND THE EARLY YEARS**

When the new Turkish state came into being on October 29, 1923 it was encircled by the states, whose memories were dominated with hostility toward Turks -their former rulers. The wide range of potential sources of conflict with neighboring countries inherited from the Ottoman past, like territorial issues and continuing historical enemy images, made it impossible for Turkey to relegate the question of

physical security to background. Therefore, since its foundation as a modern state in 1923 on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the paramount goal of Turkey has been the protection of the country against potential or actual threats endangering or violating its territorial integrity and independence, especially those originating in the immediate surroundings. For this task to be achieved, Mustafa Kemal offered peace. The principle formulated by Mustafa Kemal: "Peace at home, peace abroad" became the cornerstone of Turkey's conduct in external relations. This implied a policy based on the maintenance of the status quo, established by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, and on the survival of a relatively homogeneous nation state with a clear Turkish identity. [Ref 4:p. 294]

Turkish foreign policy in the formative years of the 1920s and 1930s relied heavily on diplomatic and political tools to foster a secure environment based on neutralism, and committed itself to correct diplomatic relations with European powers and to the establishment of friendly relations with its neighbors, including the Soviet Union. By the end of 1925, friendship treaties had been negotiated with 15 states. [Ref 1:p. 53] In 1925 Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression with the Soviet Union, in 1930 it initiated a successful process of reconciliation with Greece, known in both countries as Ataturk-Venizelos period of friendship, toward the settlement of several outstanding issues. [Ref 5:p. 11]

Domestic concerns also affected this choice of particular attention to build friendly relations with neighbors. Mustafa Kemal had focussed on the modernization of the Turkish society along the lines of the West as its second most important goal. On assuming office of the Presidency, he ended the link between the Turkish state and the notional leadership of the world Islamic community, symbolized by the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. Mustafa Kemal introduced, from above, a

series of radical reforms in the country's economic, political and social life to build a new, modern society along the lines of the West. The ideological foundation of Mustafa Kemal's reform program, an abrupt and comprehensive break with the past, especially with Islam and its substitution with an ideology of westernization, became known as Kemalism. After a four-year War of Independence that exhausted country's economic and human resources, Turkey was bound to give priority to internal construction if Mustafa Kemal's radical reforms were to take root. This required a neutralism in foreign policy that excluded alliances and external commitments of any kind. [Ref 5:p. 11]

Departures from Turkish neutralism of the formative years occurred in the turbulent environment of the mid-1930s. For Turkey, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was a dramatic warning of "gathering storm" in Europe, not far from its borders. [Ref 5:p. 12] In the face of increasingly aggressive policy of Italy under Mussolini and potential Bulgarian alignment with Nazi Germany, Turkey concluded the Balkan Pact with Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania in 1934, an action aimed at maintaining stability in the Balkans. [Ref 1:p. 53] In 1936 Turkey, facing an increasing threat to European security, requested revision of Lausanne Straits Convention to allow Turkish control and remilitarization of the Turkish straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles. [Ref 1:p. 53] Upon Turkey's request and approval of signatory powers of Treaty of Lausanne, the Lausanne Straits Convention was replaced by the Montreux Convention. Under the new convention, Turkey was authorized to militarize the Straits area, and by unilateral decision, to close the Straits to war vessels when it deemed that there was an immediate threat of war jeopardizing its safety. In 1937 Turkey entered into the Saadabat Pact with Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. [Ref 4:p. 294]

Following the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on November 10, 1938, Ismet Inonu, Ataturk's chief lieutenant was elected



as the second president of the Republic of Turkey. Inonu was determined to keep the country neutral in the event of a war in Europe. However, the threat posed by German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of August 1939, which paved the way for the invasion of Poland and the start of World War II, prompted Turkey to sign a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with London and Paris in October 1939. [Ref 6:p. 87] An important clause of this treaty provided that no action would be required of Turkey that would result in its involvement in war with the Soviet Union. [Ref 1:p. 54] Turkey also signed a nonaggression treaty with Germany on June 18, 1941, but despite heavy German pressure, did not permit passage of German troops over Turkey and ships through the Straits area.

Turkish neutrality during World War II survived until 1944. In August 1944, Turkey broke off relations with Nazi Germany which was, at that time, on the verge of defeat, and declared war on February 23, 1945, against Germany whose defeat was then considered imminent. [Ref 2:p. 33] Joining the Allied side in the last months of the war enabled Turkey to participate in the San Francisco Conference in April 1945 and become one of the founding members of the United Nations (UN). [Ref 7:p. 63]

In the aftermath of the War of Independence, Turkey's foreign and security policies, based on Kemalist motto of "Peace in the World, peace at home", had been relied heavily on diplomatic, political tools to foster a secure environment in which friendly relations were established in every direction including the Soviet Union. This had been achieved without sacrificing Ataturk's long term goal of Westernization. Even Turkey's independence war was, in essence, not against the European system of values, but for the creation of a secular state on the European model. This harmony kept Turkey within the European society of nations and influenced its Western oriented ideology since the War of Independence.

In the post-World War II era, new circumstances forced Turkey to adopt exclusively Western oriented policy, not only in terms of ideology, but also in security and defense matters.

### **C. ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST**

At the end of World War II, Turkey felt threatened both territorially and ideologically by the Soviet Union, which emerged from the war as one of the two most powerful victors, with political and military control over the eastern half of Europe. Turkey's neutrality during interwar years had made its future status ambiguous and its territories a tempting target for Stalin. In March 1945, the Soviet Union notified Turkey that it had no intention of extending the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression of 1925 which was due to expire in November 1945 on the grounds that it required revision to reflect changes brought by the war. [Ref 5:p. 12] Throughout 1945 and 1946, the Soviet Union pressured Turkey for the revision of the Montreux Convention for the joint control and defense of the Straits area which would, in effect, turn the straits into joint Turkish-Soviet territorial waters. Finally, Stalin's demands during the same period for territorial concessions from Turkey, particularly for Kars and Ardahan regions (Turkey's northeastern provinces) which were annexed from the Ottoman Empire by the Russian Empire in 1878 and given back to Turkey under the terms of The Treaty of Mutual Friendship of 1921 between Turkey and the Soviet Union, revealed the real intentions of the Soviet Union with respect to Turkey. The prime concern of Turkish strategy, namely territorial integrity, seemed to be under imminent threat.

Turkey, which did not possess the qualitative and quantitative military power adequate to deter the revived Soviet power from threatening its territorial integrity, turned to the United States, by far the richest and most

advanced capitalist society with a military power capable of encountering this emerging power of the Soviet Union.

Soviet activities in the Near East in 1946, such as communist Tudeh Party's attempt to establish The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in the northern parts of Iran, forced the United States to extend the deterrence Turkey was looking for. [Ref 8:p. 216] First the United States sent a naval force to the eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate it would resist, with all means at its disposal, against the Soviet expansion in the area and then proclaimed the "Truman Doctrine" in 1947.

In announcing his doctrine to a joint session of the House and Senate in March 1947, President Harry S. Truman said:

. . . One way of life is based on upon the will of the majority . . . The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. . . I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way . . . I, therefore, ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey. [Ref 6:p. 89]

In support of the Doctrine, the United States and Turkey signed, on July 12, 1947, the Military Assistance Agreement. Following the ratification of this agreement by the Turkish Parliament on September 1, 1947, American military personnel and material flowed into Turkey and the Turkish army was reorganized along American lines. American strategists drafted plans for a network of bases and other facilities, including the combat airbase at Incirlik near Adana/Turkey. The Pentagon was preparing in Turkey the infrastructure to serve as an outpost for containment of the Soviet Union and projecting power into the Middle East. [Ref 9:p. 5] Step by step, Turkey drew closer to the Western alliance and joined the

Organization of European Economic Cooperation which later became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Turkey subsequently participated in the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), which was designed under the sponsorship of the United States to provide economic assistance in rebuilding Europe. [Ref 1:p. 63] With its admission to Council of Europe in 1950, Turkey's postwar strategy of tying the young republic to the democracies of the West and joining a security alliance with them was almost fully in place. Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the final objective to be achieved in this direction.

In the period following the end of the World War II, France, England and the Low Countries (Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg) had signed the Brussels Treaty to form a defensive alliance against an expectedly re-emergent Germany. [Ref 10:p. 77] Almost immediately, however, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 was overtaken by the signature, in April 1949, of the Washington Treaty which united the United States and eleven other nations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Because it was not geographically located in the immediate Atlantic area, Turkey was not invited to become a charter member of the organization. This fact was not viewed with pleasure by Turkey for it was feared it would cause a reduction in the military and economic aid coming from the United States and, might induce the Soviet Union to increase pressure on Turkey, which was left outside the protective umbrella of the new treaty.

In the following years, Turkey lobbied hard to be admitted to NATO in the face of a group of northern European countries which demonstrated reluctance toward extending the area of NATO's defense responsibilities to include Turkey (and Greece), based on the grounds that inclusion of Turkey would increase the danger of war with the Soviet Union, Turkey's northern neighbor, and would spread NATO too thin, adding to

the armament burden. [Ref 4:p. 296] British government, more interested in the establishment of a separate Middle Eastern defense alliance than supporting Turkey's NATO application, proposed an Eastern Mediterranean Command, covering Greece, Turkey, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, under a British Supreme Commander. [Ref 11:p. 6 ] Turkey resisted this tendency which regarded it peripheral to European security, and argued that a policy of containment in the southern flank would be weakened in the absence of Turkey, and that Soviet expansion in the area would not only threaten the security of the Middle East, but would also endanger Western European security. Claiming that it was an integral and inseparable part of the Europe facing the Soviet Union, Turkey insisted that its forces should join the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR). [Ref 11:p. 6]

The Korean War provided Turkey with the opportunity to join NATO. Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, the UN Security Council decided, in the absence of the Soviet Union, which was protesting the exclusion of Communist China, to invite the organization's members to repel the armed attack of North Korea. [Ref 12:p. 120] In response to this request, the new Turkish government that took the office with a landslide victory in May 1950 general elections under the leadership of Adnan Menderes decided to send a mixed brigade of 4,500 men to the area of conflict. The Turkish contingent sent to participate in the conflict was the third largest force in this UN action, after the American and South Korean forces.

To make use of the advantage provided by the Turkish government's positive response to the UN Security Council and the distinguished actions of its troops in Korea, Turkey made a formal request to join NATO. In addition to showing its allegiance to the West by sending troops to Korea, Turkey had initiated a process of democratization in its political system by introducing the multiparty politics and May 1950

general election had given Menderes' Democrat Party a victory over Republican People's Party which had been in power since the foundation of the republic under single-party rule. These developments, combined with the United States' argument that Turkey's 18 army divisions would divert a substantial amount of Soviet forces to the south and thus, make the defense of the Central Front easier in the event of a war, moderated the initially unenthusiastic views of Europeans. This was also compatible with NATO's initial forward strategy of September 1950 -to defend as far east as possible- which required large conventional build-up in Europe. [Ref 5:p. 20] Thus, Turkey was formally admitted to NATO as a full member on February 18, 1952. Following the entry of Turkey into NATO, the United States and Turkey signed two major bilateral agreements in June 1954. The first was the Status of Forces Agreement and the second was the Military Facilities Agreement. Incirlik airbase near Adana joined the United States global network of Strategic Air Command Bases. [Ref 9:p. 5]

With the membership in NATO, protection of the territorial and ideological integrity of the country against the Soviet Union was secured. Protection against the Soviet Union was, of course, not the only reason for Turkey's membership in NATO. Turkey had entered the post-World War II era not only with an unshakable determination to become a multiparty democracy but also with structural and pressing economic difficulties. Recognizing the fact that the former could not be realized without the solution of the latter, successive Turkish governments sought foreign aid and investment which could only come from the United States and Western Europe. It was also thought in Turkey that the establishment and more importantly the improvement of democratic institutions rested on close structural relationships with the Western democracies. Thus, membership in NATO was an important achievement in relation with Turkey's desire to develop its economy both within a democratic system and within the

framework of Western institutions. Furthermore, following World War II, Turkey had come to the frightening realization that its armed forces were ill-equipped and in urgent need of modernization. Failing to allocate internal resources to military purposes in an extensive way due to the powerful drive toward economic and democratic development, the remaining road to take was to modernize the Turkish armed forces through military aid from the West. Therefore, membership in NATO, from a Turkish viewpoint, has served the triple purpose of (1) defending the country's territorial integrity and the strategic position on the straits area against possible Soviet encroachment; (2) development and modernization of its armed forces; and (3) economic and democratic development while asserting and deepening Turkey's European identity.

These three persistent themes which made themselves felt in post-World War II era only strengthened the existing Western oriented foreign policy of the republic since its foundation in 1923 and still play important role in its general foreign policy orientation today.

Turkey's main assignment in NATO initially centered on attempts to prevent Soviet access to the Mediterranean through the control of Turkish straits, to tie down a considerable number of Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces, some of which otherwise could be deployed on the Central Front, and to serve as an outpost for NATO. In the subsequent years, American policy makers wished to take advantage of Turkey's commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance by integrating Turkey into security plans for the Balkans and the Middle East. [Ref 6:p. 91] With the encouragement of Washington, Turkey and Greece concluded the Balkan Defense Pact with Yugoslavia in 1954. [Ref 4:p.295] In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who saw a direct link between the security of the Middle East and the defense of Western Europe, laid the groundwork for a new defense arrangement for

the Middle East, and Turkey, as a member of NATO, had a significant role to play in maintaining the security of the region. The United States, Basic National Security Policy of 1953 stated that:

In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not now feasible. In order to assure during peacetime for the United States and its allies the resources (specially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan and, if possible, Iran . . . [Ref 11:p. 9]

Washington's "Northern Tier" strategy was based on an alliance of nations of the area, specifically Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Turkey signed a pact of mutual cooperation with Iraq in February 1955 and this alliance was the nucleus of Baghdad Pact which was enlarged to include Britain, Iran and Pakistan later the same year. [Ref 3:p.25] The United States, although not a signatory, became a member of several important committees of the Baghdad Pact and later made individual bilateral defense agreements with the members of the Pact. In effect, this Pact extended defense lines of NATO to include the borders of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. Turkey's importance to the West was greatly increased as a country establishing the "Northern Tier" against Soviet penetration into the Middle East and linking NATO to the Baghdad Pact.

The Baghdad Pact did not survive long due to deep splits between countries of the Middle East. Colonel Gamel Abdel Nassser of Egypt, after overthrowing the monarchy in the military coup of "Free Officers" in 1952, embarked on a program which came to proclaim anti-imperialism and non-alignment in foreign policy.[Ref 10:p. 119] He strongly opposed the Baghdad Pact, labeled it as imperialist, and pressured Iraq for withdrawal from it. Syria sided with Egypt and both countries turned to the Soviet Union for military and



economic aid. This polarization led Britain, the United States and the World Bank to withdraw from the construction project of Egypt's Ashwan High Dam, an action that resulted in Nasser's retaliation by the nationalization of Suez Canal Company and the ensuing international crisis. [Ref 10:p.120] Iraq left the Baghdad Pact in July 1958 after the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by a bloody coup in which Nasserist officers participated. Following the withdrawal of Iraq, the pact was renamed as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

The Suez Crisis of November 1956 had important effects on the future policies of the United States toward the Middle East. The United States decided that the time had come to declare a direct commitment to the Middle East and disassociate the United States, at least publicly, from Britain and France in the region. Therefore, the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957 was an American effort to shape a unilateral approach to the region and sidestep the European allies. [Ref 11:p. 11] During the spring of 1958, strife inside Lebanon brought the ruling government close to being overthrown in a revolutionary uprising. The Lebanese government brought the crisis to the UN based on the grounds that Egypt and Syria were intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon. [Ref 12:p. 142] After receiving no effective assistance from the UN, the Lebanese government sent a request to the United States for aid to help end the crisis. Washington, approving the request, sent forces from units in Europe and the Sixth Fleet. Incirlik airbase was used as a staging point for these forces.

In the face of growing instabilities of the Middle Eastern countries, the Eisenhower administration had found that there was no better alternative in time of regional crisis than a conventionally well-equipped Turkey, coupled with arrangements for prestocking and staging of American forces at strategically located Turkish bases. Washington's response to the crisis in Lebanon was an example of flexibility afforded

by access to Turkish bases for non-NATO contingencies or low level regional conflicts for which NATO's doctrine of "massive retaliation" was inappropriate. [Ref 11:p. 23]

Therefore, while membership in NATO, from a Turkish viewpoint, was to serve the triple purpose of economic, democratic and military development, Turkey's role in the Alliance in 1940s and 1950s, as seen by the West and especially by the United States, was twofold: (1) Defense of NATO's Southern Flank; (2) Defense of the Middle East, both directly and by providing basing and staging sites for the American units, against the danger of Soviet penetration into the region. In other words, underpinning Turkey's early role in NATO, as Bruce Kuniholm put it, "was the principle of reciprocity: Turkey would play an important part in the defense of the West, and make its facilities available, while the West would provide Turkey with a deterrent against Soviet attack, as well as military and economic assistance." [Ref 13:p. 34]

#### **D. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY**

With the developments that took place after 1960, this comfortable strategic environment changed and gave way to a more complicated relationship between Turkey and NATO. In the 1960s and 1970s, with the fundamental developments in the international system, the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance was subjected to a series of tests seriously affecting Turkey, which also began to witness specific and regional problems beyond the Soviet threat. The specific developments that led Turkey very cautiously to new pursuits in search of security and to put greater emphasis on its regional interests can be enumerated as follows;

##### **1. Withdrawal of the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey**

In October 1962, the world was brought to the brink of a nuclear war. This situation was caused by the Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union after

American reconnaissance airplanes revealed that the Soviet Union had begun to install nuclear missiles on Cuba. Turkey, although not directly involved in the crisis, was drawn into it because of one of its earlier commitments to the Alliance.

Evidence appearing in 1957 that the Soviet Union was close to acquiring an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability, had increased the United State's vulnerability and led it to offer deployment of Jupiter and Thor Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe as a counter measure.[Ref 5:p. 20] Following the NATO Council meeting in December 1957, Turkey, together with Italy, consented to the deployment of Jupiter missiles on its soil. Actual installation of Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil began in 1959. By the time their installation was completed, Jupiter missiles were already considered to be obsolete and their withdrawal from Turkey and Italy had been planned by the Kennedy administration. However, since Turkish government regarded these nuclear weapons based on its soil as an important deterrent against Soviet moves, Jupiter missiles were still in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis broke out.

One week after American reconnaissance airplanes brought photographs of missile sites in Cuba, President John F. Kennedy announced a naval quarantine of Cuba. After a few anxious days of public posturing and secret negotiations, Khrushchev, in return for a face-saving compromise involving eventual withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, ordered the Soviet missiles in Cuba to be dismantled and shipped back. [Ref 14:p. 205]

The decision for the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey was announced in January 1963, only three months after the crisis, and had a shock effect in Turkey. The Turkish public had been repeatedly told that these weapons represented an allied force under the joint control of the governments of Turkey and the United States. It appeared, from Turkey's viewpoint, that the United States and the Soviet Union had

made some sort of secret deal that directly affected the security and defense of Turkey without prior consultation with Turkey. This incident allowed Turkish policy makers and the Turkish public to consider that the United States might take unilateral decisions without prior consultation with Turkey even in cases where Turkish security was directly involved. [Ref 4:p. 318]

Turkey's vulnerability to unilateral decisions by the United States was further emphasized during the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964.

## **2. The Cyprus Problem**

Cyprus is an eastern Mediterranean island of 3,572 square miles, roughly the size of Delaware and Rhode Island combined, located less than 50 miles from the southern coast of Turkey and 60 miles from the Syrian coast. [Ref 15:p. 107]

The size of Cyprus and its proximity to the Turkish mainland make it particularly important for Turkish security. The island lies at the entrance of the Gulf of Iskenderun, the innermost corner of the north-eastern Mediterranean, and is large enough for any hostile power to deploy sufficient military force for an air, naval or amphibious operation against Turkey and dominate the eastern Mediterranean.

Largely because of its strategic location, Cyprus has been an attractive island for successive empires. Settled by Greek colonizers in its earliest recorded history, the island was ruled by successively by the Assyrians, Egyptians, Romans, Arabs, Byzantines, Lusignans, Venetians, and from 1571 to 1878 by the Ottoman Empire. [Ref 16:p. 19] Beginning in the 19th. century, Britain had started to show interest to Cyprus in search of security for its trade routes to India. In 1878, Britain had been granted by the Ottoman Empire, the administration of the island in return for helping check Russia's expansionist ambitions. Following the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on Germany's side, the island was annexed to Britain in 1914, ending the period of Turkish

sovereignty. The new Turkish republic, founded in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne, sought to develop close relations with Britain and viewed continued British rule to be compatible with its security interests. The situation on the island remained relatively static until the 1950s.

When, in 1955, Greek Cypriot sentiment in favor of uniting the island with Greece began to meet unyielding British resistance, the demand for "enosis" -union of Cyprus with Greece- turned from a political slogan into a battle cry under a terrorism and sabotage campaign, launched against British rule by a clandestine guerrilla organization, EOKA (whose Greek initials stand for the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). [Ref 15:p. 25]

The Greek War of Independence in 1821 against the Ottoman Empire had led to the establishment of an independent Greek state. After gaining independence, Greece pursued a Panhellenic policy, known as the "Megali Idea" -the Great Idea- that aimed at unification of all Greeks and the revival of Byzantine-Greek Empire centered on Constantinople. The Megali Idea, failing to recover Istanbul (Constantinople) and western Anatolia in the face the War of Independence of Turkish nationalist movement, had continued to stir Greek passions, and in 1955 some Greeks saw the prospect of Cyprus' union with Greece as a partial fulfillment of this great national dream. In the words of a Greek politician:

. . . no selfrespecting Greek politician could afford to show scorn or even neglect [for Megali Idea] . . . the union of Cyprus with Greece appeared to the masses to be a step toward the realization of Megali Idea. To be against it was tantamount to being against the idea of Greece itself, and could spell one's extinction . . . [Ref 16:p.33]

Britain countered demands for "enosis" by arguing that the strategic location of Cyprus necessitated the continuation of British rule on the island for the fulfillment of its defense

obligations in the Middle East. However, for Britain, the turning point came with the Suez crisis of 1956 when British, French and Israeli forces withdrew from the occupied Egyptian territories under pressure from the United States. The Suez crisis revealed the extent to which British power had weakened in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. For Britain, the strategic rationale for keeping Cyprus under control had ceased to be decisive. [Ref 15:p. 27] The question of Cyprus's future arose immediately.

In order to resolve the problem, Turkey, Greece and Britain signed, in 1959, a set of accords, known as Zurich-London Accords, which included the Treaty of Guarantee. Zurich-London Accords declared Cyprus an independent state without partition as of February 1960, and the Treaty of Guarantee authorized Britain, Greece and Turkey to station troops on the island and to intervene, jointly or unilaterally, if the constitutional status quo of the island was violated. The island was to have a legislature with separate representation for Greek and Turkish communities; an elected Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president. [Ref 6:p.94] Since then, the desire of the Greek Cypriots to unite with Greece has led to major unrest between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The delicate arrangements laid down in Zurich-London Accords broke down within a few months. In late 1963, this unrest reached the point where Cyprus was divided into two by a civil war. Turkey, in a vain attempt to put an end to the fighting in the island, appealed to both Greece and Britain to intervene jointly. In December 1963, the scale of fighting on the island surpassed all previous experiences of intercommunal violence. Turkish Cypriots, outnumbered and outgunned, suffered heavy losses. In order to end the escalating conflict, the UN Security Council authorized, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), to be sent to the island. UNFICYP which became operational in 1964, initially managed to defuse potential conflicts and prevent a

large number of local disputes from escalating. However, it was unable to prevent the flare-up large-scale fighting and further loss of life. [Ref 16:p. 62] Following a series of defeats for Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus unilaterally under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee. While several Turkish naval units were being transferred from the port of Istanbul to the port of Mersin on the Mediterranean coast, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, informed the United States of his government's decision to intervene in Cyprus.

The American response from President Lyndon B. Johnson to Premier Inonu was a watershed in Turkey's relationship with the United States. This response, contained in a letter drafted by the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was delivered to Inonu on June 5, 1964 and became known as the "Johnson Letter". [Ref 15:p.39] President Johnson, attempting to prevent Turkish government from landing troops in Cyprus, made in its letter clear that Turkey did not have permission to use American equipment in a military operation against Cyprus. He also warned that the United States and NATO might not feel obliged to defend Turkey in the event of Soviet retaliatory action against it because of its intervention in Cyprus. Specifically the letter stated:

. . . Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The full text of President Johnson's letter is reprinted in "Defending the Upper Gulf" by Marcy Agmon, EAI Paper, No.6, p.27-30

This statement, along with the restriction that "the United States can't agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under the present conditions" led to the abandonment of Turkish plan for landing troops on the island.

The Johnson letter, in the eyes of Turkish leaders and public opinion, significantly undermined the credibility of the whole Alliance and brought into question the entire basis of Turkey's relationship with NATO and particularly with the United States. When the letter's text was leaked to the Turkish press, the damage to American-Turkish relations was severe. Only a decade earlier, Turkey had eagerly sent the third largest military force to Korea to help the United States fight communism; now President Johnson's letter amounted to threatening Turkey with the common Soviet enemy. The feeling of betrayal in Turkey was widespread. [Ref 6:p. 95]

In his letter of reply, dated June 14, 1964, to President Johnson, Turkish Prime Minister Inonu stated that:

. . . The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied . . . If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such discussion, the very foundations of the



Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning<sup>4</sup>

The bilateral relations which had born with the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and eventually led to Turkey's membership in NATO, were severely damaged.

The Cyprus problem, which raised serious doubts about the reliability of the United States as an ally of Turkey first in 1963-1964, further damaged the confidence and trust between two countries in the second half of the 1970s as a result of Turkey military intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the ensuing American arms embargo against Turkey.

Since 1973, there had been signs of active opposition among the Greek Cypriots against the Archbishop Makarios' government in Cyprus. This opposition was given support by the Greek junta leader Brigadier Ioannidis. In July 1974, Makarios, in a letter to Ioannidis, accused his military government of conspiring to overthrow the Government of Cyprus and demanded the recall of 650 Greek officers who were serving as advisors to the Cyprus National Guard. [Ref 12:p. 254] Instead of replying to Makarios, the Ioannidis junta ordered the National Guard to overthrow him. In a bloody coup that began on July 5, the National Guard seized the presidential place and appointed as the new president of Cyprus, Nicos Sampson an ex-EOKA terrorist with a reputation as a Turk-killer. In Turkey, fears of enosis and concerns about the security of the Turkish Cypriot immediately grew.

Following the failure of its attempts to persuade Britain to undertake joint intervention in the island under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey announced that it felt free to act unilaterally to protect the Turkish Cypriots under the treaty provision. When the Undersecretary

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<sup>4</sup> The full text of Premier Ismet Inonu's response to President Johnson is reprinted in "Defending the Upper Gulf" by Marcy Agmon, EAI Paper, No.6, p.30-38

of State Joseph Sisco came to Ankara in order to persuade Turkey not to intervene in the island, Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit told him:

Ten years ago . . . you committed an error and so did we. Your mistake was to tie our hands and stop us. Our mistake was that we listened to you. We will not commit the same error as ten years ago. [Ref 17:p. 95]

On July 20, 1974, Turkey landed 6,000 troops in the northern coasts of Cyprus. The UN Security Council Resolution 353 called for a cease-fire and the initiation of negotiations. [Ref 5:p. 24] However, international negotiations in Geneva failed to provide a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. Upon the break down of the negotiations, on August 14, Turkey launched a three-day second offensive to consolidate vulnerable Turkish positions in the northern part of Cyprus.

This second offensive precipitated an American arms embargo against Turkey. On December 10, 1974, the United States Congress ratified the decision with a provision that the ban on military arms shipments to Turkey come into effect on February 5, 1975. [Ref 17:p. 3] The Congress had used the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Military Sales Act of 1968 as the basis of its decision since both of these laws stipulated that American military equipment were only provided to recipient countries for self-defense. [Ref 16:p. 105]

The impact of the American arms embargo (it was lifted in September 1978 by President Jimmy Carter) on Turkey was profound. Like the "Johnson Letter" of 1964, Turkey once more realized that its defense capability was extremely vulnerable to external manipulation. From the viewpoint of the Turkish public, Turkey was being punished by the United States, its chief ally, for having intervened in Cyprus to protect its national interests. Furthermore, in persuading Congress to

impose the arms embargo, the Greek lobby in the United States had played an important role, creating serious doubts in Turkey about the extent of reliance that could be placed on the United States, where legislative body decisions were highly affected by pressure from the special interest groups.

In response to the arms embargo, Turkey, in July 1975, abrogated the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement between two countries and announced that it would take the control of all American bases, mostly intelligence and communications facilities, on its soil with the exception of NATO bases. [Ref 9:p. 8]

### **3. Change In NATO's Strategy**

NATO's initial forward strategy of September 1950--to defend as far east as possible--was replaced by the strategy of "massive retaliation" in 1954. In the rest of 1950s and for much of the 1960s, NATO was protected, in the words of Henry Kissinger, "by a preponderance in American strategic striking power which was capable of disarming the Soviet Union, and by a vast American superiority in theater nuclear forces ." [Ref 18:p.5]

With the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union, which built up their own nuclear strike capability in the late 1960s, the strategy of "massive retaliation" lost ground as a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union. Thus, the most immediate concern for the Kennedy administration was the formulation of credible strategic doctrine to replace the doctrine of "massive retaliation." The doctrine of "flexible response and forward defense," presented by General Maxwell Taylor in 1959, was adopted as the new doctrine of NATO in 1967 after France, which rejected the implied risk of incalculable nuclear escalation, had left NATO's military structure. [Ref 19:p. 23]

"Flexible response and forward defense" sought above all to deter any possible attack ranging from minor incursions to all-out nuclear war and provided a range of appropriate

responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression with the ultimate deterrent of mutually assured destruction inherent in the devastating second-strike capability of either side. [Ref 19:p. 23] The military planning for this new doctrine implied that conventional capability of all NATO states would have to be strengthened in order to frustrate conventional aggression by Warsaw Pact and to increase length of time before nuclear weapons would have to be used.

In Turkey, these developments contributed to a concern that NATO would not atomically launch an attack in "massive retaliation" in the event of a Soviet aggression against Turkey and Turkish territory might be traded for time since NATO would favor its Central Front over its flanks. [Ref 8:p.218] Meanwhile, the new doctrine underlined Turkey's need for a mobile and modern military with increased conventional capability, only possible with increased American military aid. However, with the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and other crises in Laos and South Vietnam, NATO's attention had shifted from the Southern Flank to the Central Front and Southeast Asia in the early 1960s. Thus, military aid to Turkey was increasingly viewed as burdensome especially in the aftermath of the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the United States due to the Cyprus crisis of 1964, leaving modernization requirements of the Turkish armed forces unfulfilled. [Ref 11:p.19]

#### **4. The Result Of These Developments**

During late 1940s and 1950s, Turkish policy makers felt highly confident with the security provided by NATO and established close relations with the United States. The Soviet threat, during this period, represented the exclusive concern that Turkish strategy was designed to contain. Relations with the Middle East and other Third World countries were approached from the unidimensional perspective of East-West tension.[Ref 4:p. 296]

With the developments described above, Turkish policy makers felt compelled to produce new perspectives to security and to take a far greater account of regional considerations. Extensive reliance on NATO and the United States especially was no longer realistic and could be dangerous for Turkey. The highly liberal constitution of 1961 had allowed for the expression and organization of all kinds of ideas and ideologies, and the consensus on foreign policy had given way to a heated debate on Turkey's future orientation. Meanwhile, considerable state intervention and protectionist import-substituting policies of the formative years of the republic had pushed the Turkish economy into a deep recession, struggling with balance of payment deficits, unemployment and rising inflation especially in the second half of 1970s which witnessed two oil crisis. For Turkey it would be more secure also economically to find alternative sources of cooperation and to diversify connections of its economy. Thus, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The milder climate of "detente" in East-West relations allowed Turkey to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union, to develop political and economic relations with the Middle East, and to pursue a more self-oriented foreign policy, all of which had not been possible in the early years of the Cold War era.

The policy of rapprochement initiated by Turkey toward the Soviet Union led to a visit to Ankara by the Soviet President Nikolai Podgorni in January 1965. In a speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, he acknowledged that Stalin's claims to the straits area and Turkish territory was "incorrect and inappropriate" and had served no purpose other than casting shadow over Turko-Soviet relations.[Ref 8:p. 219] Following the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to Moscow in 1967, relations between the two countries steadily improved especially in the economic field and the Soviet Union became the major supplier of technology

and investment funds to Turkey. In 1967 the Soviet Union agreed to help finance six major industrial projects in Turkey. While loan agreements from 1967 to 1975 totalled around \$700 million, a protocol of 1979 announced agreement on Soviet technology and further credits for 20 projects in Turkey at an amount of \$4 billion, making Turkey one of the major recipients of the Soviet credits made available to developing countries. [Ref 5:p.32]

Restoration of confidence between two countries, which began with the transfer of technology and investment funds, was necessary also from the Soviets' viewpoint. Turkish membership in NATO had complicated Soviet defenses and strategy by exposing large regions in the Soviet Union to Western monitoring in times of peace and to Western arms in times of arms. [Ref 4:p. 291] The Soviets hoped that as result of improved bilateral relations Turkey would no longer allow its soil to be used as a launching base for strategic weapons and would limit the number of American military personnel and bases in Turkey. Technology transfer and economic aid would also reduce Turkey's dependence on the West and help alleviate the "Fear of the Bear" which has overshadowed Turkish foreign policy during the entire existence of the republic. Ultimate objective of the improved bilateral relations, from the Soviet Union's viewpoint, was, as Khrushchev put it, Turkish neutrality.

Although the normalization process initiated by President Podgorni's visit to Turkey in 1965 led the two countries to sign, in June 1978, the political document on The Principles of Good Neighbourly and Friendly Cooperation during Premier Ecevit's visit to Moscow, Turkey's relationship with the Soviet Union has never culminated in a political-military rapprochement incompatible with Turkey's western orientation and its NATO membership. Thus, the political document that the two countries signed in 1978, was far from being a non-aggression pact and was confined to a reiteration of the

principles of the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), while stating that it did not affect the rights and obligations of the parties under other agreements. [Ref 5:p.33]

Turkey's attempt to establishing friendly relationship with the countries of the Middle East was not an easy task as it was in the case of the Soviet Union. First of all, since the foundation of the republic, Turkey had pursued a Western oriented policy. Ataturk's reform program which aimed at the westernization of Turkey and his attack on Islam as an obstacle to these reforms caused Turkey and Arabs to drift apart. Secondly, the main concern for Turkey was the Soviet Union and the threat of communism. Through its membership in NATO, Turkey had opted for alliance with West to fight this enemy. However, most of the Arab countries' main concern and occupation was the struggle against Israel and the West. Finally, memories of the many Middle Eastern states were dominated by misgiving or hostility against Turkey due to the Ottoman past. In this uneasy environment, Turkey tried to improve its bilateral relations with the countries of the region mainly by distancing its foreign policy from that of the United States and by changing its stand on Arab-Israeli conflict while strictly adhering to the principle of non-interference in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of the countries of the region.

First, during the Six-Day Arab Israeli War of June 1967 Turkey tried to reflect changes in its foreign policy toward the region. In 1958, Turkey had allowed the United States to use Incirlik airbase in Turkey for intervention in Lebanon. However, this time Ankara did not allow the United States to use the American bases on its soil for refueling and providing logistic support for Israel. Turkey's refusal of granting the United States use of the bases was an attempt by Turkey to consolidate its position with respect to Cyprus by not siding

with the West and thus by pulling Arab and other Muslim countries on its side, especially in the UN General Assembly.

In the aftermath of the war, the balance of influence in the region shifted from the radicalism of Nasser to the wealthy and pro-Western patriarchates of the Arab world. [Ref 10:p. 122] This change further eased the tensions between the Arab states and Turkey. During the October War of 1973, while Soviet overflights of Turkish airspace were being tolerated, Ankara again refused to allow American use of Turkish basis to resupply Israel.

The second Cyprus crisis of 1974 which resulted in Turkey's intervention on the island and the ensuing American arms embargo against Turkey, consolidated Turkish policy makers' decision to further relations with the Muslim world. Following Turkey's intervention on the island, Turkish Cypriots, seeking to establish a bicomunal, bizonal federal system for the island, had proclaimed the establishment of the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus in 1975. [Ref 16:p.113] However, Greek Cypriots, objecting to the concept of bizonal federation, had secured many resolutions at the UN and at conferences of the non-aligned countries calling for the departure of Turkish forces from the island and urging for return to the pre-1974 status quo in Cyprus. In the same year, Ankara, realizing that it would be possible only in Islamic forums to secure pro-Turkish resolutions and the representation of the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus, decided to upgrade its membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in order to play a more active role. [Ref 20:p. 76] Ankara also established bilateral relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) early in 1975. The OCI subsequently invited the President of the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus, Rauf Denktas, to its meeting to provide information on the Cyprus issue, and gave the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus observer status. Following these developments, Turkey voted in the UN General Assembly for the resolution



declaring Zionism a form of racism on November 10, 1975. [Ref 20:p. 80] At the seventh meeting of the OIC, held in 1976 in Istanbul, Turkey also allowed the PLO to set up an office in Ankara.

For Turkey, with the sharp increases in oil prices in 1973-1974 and again in 1979, the development of economic relations with the countries of the Middle East became as important as gaining their support with respect to the Cyprus problem. Recession in Europe due to the oil crisis of 1973-1974 had caused sharp reduction in the amount of remittances originating from the Turkish workers there, and the total cost of Turkey's oil bill had risen from \$124 in 1972 to \$1.2 billion in 1977. [Ref 8:p. 222] As a result of these developments, in the second half of the 1970s, the Turkish economy found itself in an economic crisis, struggling with severe balance of payment difficulties coupled with rising inflation. The American arms embargo was also exerting severe pressure on the foreign exchange reserves of Turkey. With the second sharp rise in the oil prices after the fall Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, inflation and unemployment rates in Turkey soared. Turkey, desperately seeking affordable oil and foreign capital, was compelled to turn to the Middle East countries as alternative sources of economic cooperation. The main objectives for Turkey were to secure oil, if possible on easy payment terms, to attract booming petrodollars of oil exporting countries for investment projects in Turkey to fight unemployment at home, and to increase exports to the Middle East in order to improve Turkey's balance of payment difficulties. [Ref 5:p. 37] While Turkish construction firms began undertaking various construction projects in the region, manufacturers of consumption goods reoriented their marketing efforts toward the Middle East for export opportunities, resulting in an unprecedented export boom in the early 1980s by both international and domestic standards. It was also

during this period, a 1,000 kilometer oil pipeline was put into operation between Mosul in Iraq and Iskenderun in Turkey.

As it is seen, Turkey's isolation in the international forums because of its stand on the Cyprus problem and the deterioration of the conditions of its economy had compelled it to develop its political and economic interactions with the Middle Eastern countries and this, in turn, had paved the way for a greater political pressure on Turkey exerted by the countries of the region. Turkey responded to these pressures positively, but only to the extent required for the protection of its national interests. In other words, like in the case of process of normalization of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the self-oriented and more autonomous policy that Turkey pursued toward the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s did not aim at shifting Turkey's pro-Western orientation but rather to enhance its security by increasing political interaction with the countries of the region, and to find alternative sources of economic cooperation when the West was not willing to provide this security and cooperation to Turkey.

The developments that took place in the Near East during the late 1970s again focused the attention of the United States on Turkey. With the Iranian Islamic Revolution that led to the fall of Shah Pahlavi in 1979, an anti-American government had come to the power in Iran and American intelligence facilities, critical for monitoring the southern regions of the Soviet Union, were forced to be closed. At the same time, negotiations were taking place on the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II) and these Iranian sites were going to be used to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT I and the pending SALT II agreements. [Ref 5:p. 21] Following the fall of the Shah, the United States turned to Turkey for the use of American bases on Turkish soil for this purpose and pressed the Turkish government to allow U-2 spy planes to overfly the Soviet territory from Turkish bases.

Disintegration of CENTO upon withdrawal of Iran and then Pakistan and Turkey, in March 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 put pressure on both countries to renew the Defense Cooperation Agreement which was abrogated by the Turkish government in 1975 upon imposition of the American arms embargo against Turkey.

On March 29, 1980, Turkey and the United States signed the Defense-Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) authorizing the United States to participate in joint defense measures at specified Turkish armed forces installations. The DECA also specified the activities that the American forces would be allowed to carry out, and allowed the United States to modernize these installations to compensate for the neglect of the 1970s and the loss of intelligence facilities in Iran. [Ref 9:p. 8]

For the rest of the 1980s, at least until the late 1980s which witnessed the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Turkey's main occupation was the implementation of structural changes in the country's economic and political systems, which had collapsed in an environment of social unrest, terrorism, economic crisis and political instability.

#### **E. 1980s: STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN TURKEY'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS**

Between 1974 and 1980, Turkish society experienced what was perhaps its worst crisis since the War of Independence. The institutional framework instituted by the relatively liberal constitution of 1961, along with fragmented party system, had created a political disorder and the effects of sharp increase in the oil prices in 1974 had been felt in the form of reduced remittances from Turkish workers working abroad, problems in marketing Turkish exports in recession-bound Europe, and an oil bill at an amount higher than Turkey's total exports. Turkey resorted to short term borrowing through the OECD and the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) which put the country, in the following years, into an international debt crisis. With the second increase in the oil prices in 1979, inflation gathered momentum and reached an unprecedented triple-digit rate in 1980, while unemployment rate soared to 14.8 percent. [Ref 21:p. 44]

Unstable coalition governments rapidly succeeded one another while failing to address the country's pressing social, economic and political problems. Between 1973 and 1980 eight governments assumed office and only five of these governments represented majorities in the Grand National Assembly while the other three governments were "national unity, above-party" governments; technocratic governments of civil servants, diplomats and professors selected to overcome parliamentary deadlocks and to supervise general elections. [Ref 6:p. 70-71] Economic crisis and political instability created an environment conducive to terrorism which in turn, served to undermine the economic reform attempts of governments that came to power. Stabilizing and adjustment programs introduced on 24 January 1980, under the recommendations of the IMF and the OECD, to curb inflation and alleviate balance of payment difficulties were undermined by the opposition of labor unions and the ensuing sharp drop in industrial production. As political life became increasingly tense, political groups kept on fighting each other and carried out terrorist attacks against the representatives of the established order and opposing groups. The coalition governments, too weak to maintain order, stood by while the country was being pulled into conditions resembling civil war.

On September 6, 1980 in a massive rally at Konya, organized as a "Day of Liberating Jerusalem" by the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan, religious fundamentalists demanded the reestablishment of Islamic law (Sharia) in Turkey, the severing of ties with the West and showed disrespect for the Turkish flag and the national

anthem. These acts were regarded as an open renunciation of Kemalism and a direct challenge to the military. The military's perception of a growing threat of fundamentalism and anti-Westernism, helped precipitate the military coup.[Ref 22:p. 81] During the night of September 11-12, Turkish armed forces seized the control of the country. There was no organized resistance to the coup and most of the population welcomed it as the only alternative to anarchy. On September 12, 1980 General Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, explained to the Turkish public that military takeover was a response to the terror and anarchy that had claimed 5,241 dead and 14,152 injured during the preceding two years, and aimed at restructuring Turkish politics to strengthen the state.[Ref 22:p. 68]

The military junta confirmed the Turkish commitment to the Western alliance and to the economic stabilization program announced in January 1980. However, the restoration of political stability and order in the country was its main priority. Immediately after taking the power, the commanders of the armed forces formed the National Security Council (NSC), headed by General Evren, and dissolved both the government and the parliament. The NSC banned all political activity, extended martial law throughout the country and took severe measures to disable Marxist-Leninist, fascist and religious fundamentalist militants that turned the country into a battleground in their struggle to establish their own "liberated zones" closed off to other ideological factions and state security forces. Between September 12, 1980 and February 1983, 60,841 persons, suspected of terrorism and illegal political activity, were arrested. [Ref 22:p. 88] Meanwhile, West European governments appealed to the military regime to restore parliamentary rule and in the face of severe criticism, Turkey withdrew from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The OECD withheld a portion of the relief package for Turkey, the European Economic Community

(EEC) froze relations with Ankara and suspended financial assistance to Turkey.

At the time of the coup, European Community (EC)-Turkish relations had already entered into a period of strain due to the massive migration of Turkish workers to Europe following the EC-Turkish Association Agreement of 1963. The relations were further strained by Turkey's decision in 1978 to freeze the terms of the Association Agreement and stop reducing tariffs on EEC goods in the face of strong opposition of Turkish industrialists. Furthermore, geopolitical considerations, which had dominated European attitudes to Turkey at the height of the Cold War, had begun to lose their importance to Europe in 1970s as Europe began to prioritize the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy issue. [Ref 23:p. 31] Thus, the 1980 military intervention further complicated the EC-Turkish relations, adding a political dimension to the souring economic relations. While relations with European countries were undergoing a period of strain, the United States provided uncritical support and played a primary role in the economic assistance program established by the IMF and the World Bank.

The NSC, after restoring public order, focused its attention on improving the overall economic situation. It combined the economic stabilization measures with reforms of trade liberalization and export promotion. These policies marked a radical break with the inward-looking, import-substituting strategies and the beginning of a export-led growth based on a industrial economy. While the West European states were continuing to restrict Turkish imports and to criticize its human rights record, Turkey again turned on the Middle East.

Exports to the Middle East soared as Turkey took advantage of the Islamic revolution, which cut off Iran from its major suppliers, the Iran-Iraq war which led both countries to demand more Turkish products in terms of both quantity and

diversity, its comparative advantage in location, and the good will based on its Islamic identity. [Ref 22:p. 109] Between 1980 and 1983, Turkey's total exports rapidly rose from \$2.9 billion to \$5.8 billion. During the same period, the share of the European Community countries in Turkey's total exports dropped from 44.7 percent to 31.4 percent while that of the Islamic countries increased from 22.5 percent in 1980 to 48.2 percent in 1983. [Ref 23:p. 136-137] Turkish construction activity in the Middle East boomed, going from \$4 billion in 1979 to \$12 billion in 1981 and rising to \$14 billion in 1983. [Ref 22:p. 109] By the end of 1982, the number of workers and technicians working in the region reached approximately 250,000. [Ref 8:p. 226]

After overcoming the most pressing economic problems, the NSC supervised the drafting of a new constitution and electoral laws designed to eliminate the perceived defects of Turkey's fragmented political system and the constitution of 1961 by limiting the role of smaller parties and strengthening the power of President, Prime Minister and the party that won the majority in parliamentary elections. The new constitution was put into public referendum on 7 November 1982 and approved by more than 91 percent of the votes. Having established a new political framework, the NSC gradually relaxed restrictions on political life and following the general elections held in November 1983, civilian government was restored again.

European-Turkish relations improved following the transition to democratic rule with the 1983 general elections. Although there was considerable concern in Western Europe over the status of civil rights in Turkey, early in 1984 the Council of Europe voted to readmit the Turkish parliamentary delegation to its Parliamentary Assembly and in November 1986, Turkey began a six month presidency of the Council of Europe. [Ref 1:p. 292] In September 1986, the EEC-Turkey Association

Council held its first meeting since the 1980 military intervention.

Meanwhile, Turkey's exports to the Middle East, which boomed between 1980 and 1982, severely suffered mainly from the prolonged Iran-Iraq war as these countries' oil revenues declined. Within a few years Turkish construction firms understood the impossibility of making long term business planning in the face of political instability of the region. Turkey, realizing the importance of access to stable markets for its drive toward an industrial economy and export-led growth, turned to the more stable and thus reliable European markets. The share of the EC countries in Turkey's total exports increased from 31.4 percent in 1982 to 43.8 percent in 1986 while that of the Islamic countries decreased from 48.2 percent to 35.0 percent during the same period. [Ref 23:p. 136-137] In the subsequent years, Turgut Ozal and his administration, that came to power in the 1983 elections, regarded full membership in the EC as one the most important foreign policy objectives, leading to Turkey's official application, on April 14, 1987, to the EC for full membership.

Turkey's application for membership in the EC was not simply a logical consequence of Turkey's Western orientation. First of all, with the EC's "Southern Enlargement", Greece had become a member in 1981 and this was followed by the full membership of Spain and Portugal in 1986. The accession of these three countries whose export products are similar to that of Turkey, created trade difficulties for Turkey because of the quotas imposed on Turkish exports by the EC. Following its membership in the EC, the opposition of Greece to Turkey's integration with the EC also became increasingly effective. Greece did not only obtain a competitive advantage over Turkey by receiving funds through the Community's regional and social policies, but also blocked the release of assistance funds allocated to Turkey by the Community. [Ref 23:p.35] While in 1970s Turkish industrialists and governmental institutions



were divided over membership issue, with the developments mentioned above, both policy makers and industrialists viewed the full membership in the EC as a source that would provide an inflow of foreign funds into the country and new export opportunities to Europe.

Second, Turkey's increased economic interaction with the countries of the Middle East during the 1970s and early 1980s, and subsequent reorientation of Turkish foreign policy toward greater political cooperation with Arab and other Muslim countries, had not only resulted in the greater visibility of Islam in Turkish politics, but also strained its relations with West, its traditional ally. These relations were further strained due to the 1980 military coup and the issues of restoration of democracy and human rights, contributing to Turkey's drift from the mainstream of European political and economic processes. On the other hand, Greece had obtained advantage over Turkey in furthering its policies in Cyprus by being inside the EC. [Ref 23:p. 35] Close economic and political association with the Middle East and isolation of Turkey from the West were greeted with an increasingly greater concern by the country's secularist intelligentsia, adding an impetus to the application for membership which was expected to bring back the political respectability of Turkey and strenght Turkey's commitment to Westernization against the rising potential of Islam in domestic politics.

Third, geopolitical consideration which had dominated European attitudes toward Turkey during 1950s and 1960s had gradually lost their importance as Europe began prioritizing the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy issue, and distancing itself from the United States. [Ref 23:p. 31] Although this fact was apprehended by many Turkish policy makers, and it was argued that extensive reliance on the United States without developing political relations with Europeans, could leave Turkey out in the cold when bipolarity ended, Turkey's strategic position had, once more, compelled

it to establish close relations with the United States in early 1980s in the aftermath of events in Iran and Afghanistan. While Greece, Spain and Portugal were adopting multidimensional foreign policies and placing greater emphasis on their relations with Brussels, Turkey's rapprochement with the United States was signaling its marginalization in Europe, and application for membership was an attempt by Turkey to pull back the country into European mainstream.

Finally, with the "Southern Enlargement" of 1980s, the pace of economic and political integration of the EC had considerably slowed down and the Community, in an attempt to create a more integrated structure, speed up the integration process and protect its competitive edge over the United States and Japan, had adopted the Single European Act in 1986. The Single European Act, with which the EC countries accepted creation of a common market within Europe by the end of 1992, helped Turkey realize that it had to hurry in order to catch the train and apply for membership as soon as possible despite the heavy pressure exerted by the governments of the EC countries, urging Ankara to delay its application until well into the 1990s.

It took the Commission of the European Community more than two and a half years to prepare its "Opinion Report" on Turkey's request for accession to the Community. In its report dated 20 December 1989, the Commission concluded that:

. . . it would be inappropriate for the Community - which is itself undergoing major changes while the whole of Europe is in a state of flux- to become involved in new accession negotiations at this stage. Furthermore, the political and economic situation in Turkey leads the Commission to believe that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away. [Ref 24:p. 8]

The EC's rejection of Turkish application for membership occurred at almost exactly the same time with the withdrawal

of the Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, from the military and ideological competition with the West and the consequent demise of the Cold War.

Against this background, Turkey entered into the 1990s that witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolar world, compelling Turkey to take a look at assumptions and calculations on which its foreign and security policies had been based since World War II.

### III. TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

With the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the once massive communist threat of the Cold War era vanished. However, the end of the Cold War and the uncertainties caused by the passing away of the bipolarity created a completely new security environment. The initial optimism for a more peaceful international order and hopes for lasting peace quickly proved to be short-lived as conflicts and wars broke out even in the center of Europe.

Turkey has been one of those countries that has been deeply affected by the sweeping changes that the passing away of the Cold War and bipolarity have introduced into international relations. In this new security environment, it can be said that Turkey is a unique country in NATO because no other ally is surrounded by three of the world's unstable and conflict-ridden regions at the same time: i.e., the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East.

The Gulf War of 1990-1991, during which Turkey departed from its traditional policy of non-involvement in the inter-Arab conflicts, brought the danger of war immediately to Turkey's doorstep, while no other NATO ally faced the threat so frontally. Turkey was a frontline state during the war as it took a firm stance on the side of the allied coalition against Iraq in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM; It swiftly moved to implement the UN sanctions by shutting off the oil pipeline that carried Iraqi oil into the Mediterranean, consented to the use of the Incirlik Airbase by the United States Air Force to carry out bombing sorties into Iraq, and as a part of coalition strategy in the war, deployed 100,000 troops along the border with Iraq, diverting a substantial amount of Iraqi forces to the north.

Turkey continues to provide bases for the enforcement of the 'no-fly' zone over northern Iraq (Operation POISED HAMMER)

and to enforce economic sanctions against Baghdad. Today, the highly armed and authoritarian regimes of Iran, Iraq and Syria, which have been long disturbed by Turkey's traditional pro-Western orientation and its democratic, secular regime, also look on Turkey as a Trojan Horse which serves the United States and NATO in the establishment of a permanent Western presence in the region.

In the east, although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has removed the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Turkey, the newly independent republics in the Transcaucasus region--Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan--represent considerable instability on Turkey's eastern borders. In an attempt to end the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Turkey has participated in the mediation process which began in 1992 under the auspices of the Minsk Group of CSCE, and then tried a trilateral political solution together with the Russian Federation and the United States, without any positive result toward the settlement of the conflict. Following the failure of the CSCE process and tripartite mediation efforts, Iran has been involved in the mediation process and its involvement has been supported by Russia as a counterweight to Turkey. Today, Russia and Iran, on one side, Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the other side, have been engaged in a deadlocked and very dangerous rivalry over the mediation process.

Apart from the war between Armenians and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, there is a hidden regional conflict between Turkey's drive to build a zone of influence that will keep Russia away from Turkey's borders, and Russia's determination not to pull out from the Transcaucasus. Russia has successfully exploited the instability in the region and with overt and sometimes covert efforts has forced Georgia and Azerbaijan to join the CIS, and has secured agreements with Armenia and Georgia that allow Russia to maintain military basis in these countries.

In the Balkans, the fate of the Muslim population of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the territorial integrity of this country have been a source of grave concern for Turkey in the face of increasing Serb aggression. Turkey has been constrained from direct intervention in the Balkans in support of the Muslim population in Bosnia-Hercegovina, for this kind of involvement would irreparably set back Turkey's integration with Europe and severely damage its relations with Washington, but it has stated on various occasions that it would not accept any forcible changes to the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In case the aggression by Serbs spreads to the Kosovo region of Serbia, where 90 percent of population is ethnic Albanian and Muslim, or to Macedonia which has large Muslim population as well as a considerably large Albanian minority, the entire Balkan Peninsula may find itself in a conflict which may quickly escalate to a region-wide war. Greece, Bulgaria and Albania may feel compelled to become directly involved in the conflict in order to protect their national interests and this may result in Turkey's direct involvement in support of the ethnic Turks and Muslims living in the region.

The Turkish Ministry of National Defense, in its unclassified study of post-Cold War security issues, has defined this new security environment and possible sources of threats as follows;

. . . The threat and risks to which Turkey is exposed in other words which directed to the security of Turkey, which is not a flank country within NATO any more but instead a front country, are now quite different than those of past. These are not only the military powers of the countries that would be potential threat as happened before but also contain political, economical, and social instabilities, social class disputes, religious, national and ethnic clashes, power and authority struggles in country and region, and religious fanaticism and terrorism in these countries.

On the other hand, because her geopolitical and geostrategic location places Turkey in the neighborhood of the most unstable, uncertain and unpredictable region of the world, she has turned into a frontline state faced with multiple fronts. It is at all times possible for the crisis and conflicts in these regions to spread to and engulf Turkey. [Ref 27:p. 23]

Turkey has attempted to adjust to this new external environment and the changes that the end of the Cold War introduced into international relations by pursuing two complementary objectives. Turkey's first objective has been to preserve and further strengthen the old ties and relationships that it built during the Cold War years with the West. With the above-mentioned dramatic changes, Turkey's security and foreign policies have also evolved to take a far greater account of regional consideration and, thus, Turkey's second objective has been to limit the damage that regional conflicts might eventually inflict on its own domestic stability and welfare. In the pursuit of this objective, Turkey has undertaken broadly linked political, cultural and economic initiatives to spread Turkish influence and win many points of influence or leverage in the conflict-ridden regions stretching from eastern and southern Europe through the Black Sea region to Central Asia.

The ability of Turkey to continue to pursue these objectives and achieve them does not depend only on external factors such as the evolution of the American and Western Europeans policies toward Turkey, but also on domestic factors such as the continuation of the ability of Turkey's mainstream secular parties, which have governed the country since the foundation of the republic, to mobilize the Turkish society along the Western ideas and ideals. Therefore it also necessary to analyze the domestic factors to understand the

compatibilities and incompatibilities between Turkey's policy options and the country's internal environment.

Following a series of economic stabilization measures and reforms of trade liberalization, initiated in 1980, Turkish economy throughout the 1980s has performed impressively in many respect. However, economic growth of 1980s has been accompanied by structural difficulties that the stabilization measures and reforms of liberalization remained far from finding a long-term solution. Among the main structural weaknesses of the Turkish economy are the persistent high rate of inflation, the level of state indebtedness, a substantial budget deficit which largely stems from the financial burden of the unprofitable State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). As a result of these structural difficulties, combined with the adverse effects of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the economic condition of Turkey began deteriorating in the early 1990s, resulting in the announcement, in April 1994, of the harshest austerity measures in the history of the country. Wage earners, in both public and private sectors, with their families have constituted the part of the Turkish society that the austerity measures hit in the worst manner, exacerbating the existing wild income differences within Turkish society and thus fuelling the social unrest. Apart from equity, welfare, and domestic stability implications of this state of affairs, Turkey's inability to eliminate these structural difficulties and put its economy on a stable track that will narrow the socio-economic disparities between Turkey and other Western countries has also become an important impediment to Turkey's membership in the EU.

Turkey's deteriorating economic condition and the social unrest that it brought about have also played into the hands of Islamic forces which pose the greatest threat to Turkey's pro-Western orientation. The Islamist Welfare Party (WP), which has traditionally addressed itself to the petty bourgeoisie of small Anatolian towns disrupted by rapid



industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s, has moved since early 1990s from being a provincial Anatolian party, and focused its energy on local election campaigns to obtain the support of masses who migrated from the country side to the big cities of more prosperous western Anatolia and settled in the ugly shantytowns surrounding these cities. These people, unable to make transition the transition from their traditional, countryside lifestyles to completely alien lifestyle of the big cities due to the social and economic difficulties that they face, have become a target that can easily be exploited by any ideology promising social justice, better living standards and the arrest of declining morality. The WP, which adopted a propaganda platform in which worsening income distribution, corruption in government and decline of morality in society were especially stressed, successfully exploited this group of people in the March local elections and obtained 18.8 percent of the votes, making it third the third party in the polls after two right-of-center parties of secular mainstream.

Although it is unlikely that the WP will be able to obtain votes, sufficient to form a single party in the next general elections, it's ability to challenge Turkey's secular mainstream parties by winning the March 1994 elections in 26 municipalities, including Ankara and Istanbul, has had a damaging impact on Western perceptions of Turkey. If the WP manages to repeat its success in the next general elections with the votes coming from people protesting the growing income differences and declining living standards, this will further damaged the Western perceptions of Turkey, burying all the Turkish hopes of further integration into Europe.

Apart from the threat to the secular Turkish state from resurgent Islam, today Turkey's once dormant Kurdish problem has come to threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey as well as the stability of the whole state. Attempts by the Turkish government to build confidence between the state and

Turkey's Kurdish population which became increasingly alienated by the earlier counter-productive government policies which denied the Kurdish identity, had created a temporary positive and hopeful atmosphere in 1991 and early 1992. However, the hopeful atmosphere has short lived as the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK), afraid of marginalization of its organization, intensified its campaign of violence to spoil the newly-born hopeful atmosphere. Meanwhile, the open offense of some of the Kurdish deputies of the Turkish parliament to the symbol of the Turkish state, the death of Turgut Ozal, who greatly contributed to the initiation of policies that aimed at building confidence between the state and the Kurdish population, and Tansu Ciller government's decision to give priority to find a solution to the country's deteriorating economic condition have hardened the position of hardliners who viewed the attempts of finding a political middle ground for the Kurdish problem as extremely dangerous steps that may lead to the eventual disintegration of the country. As the government hardened its stance toward the problem, the violence has escalated within the last two year.

The problem does not only threatens the territorial integrity of the state, but also adversely effects Turkey's relations with its Western allies. Because of the sensitivity of the Europeans to human rights issues, the Kurdish problem has potential to destabilize the European Union (EU)-Turkish relations. While the EU and the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly have on various occasions criticized the Turkish government's alleged disregard of human rights in its fight against the PKK, the EU has warned Turkey about the implications of its hardened stance toward the problem on the EU-Turkey integration process which reached a critical stage with the signing of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement waiting to be ratified by the European Parliament. Similarly, the relations between Turkey and the United States have also been harmed by the prolonged Kurdish problem. The decision of

the United States to withheld 10 percent of the foreign aid earmarked for Turkey for FY95 until the Department of State makes certain that Turkey makes progress in human rights issues, particularly the Kurdish problem, has clearly shown the disturbance that the United States feels about the way the Turkish government handles the problem, while resulting in heavy criticism by Turkey of the United States for its ill-treatment of Turkey.

While Turkey's policy objective of elevating relations with the West is complicated with the above mentioned factors, with the end of Cold War, Turkey's importance in terms of its military manpower and geographic proximity to the Soviet Union has considerably reduced in the security calculations of Western Europe which no longer needs to fear the East, resulting in the further weakening of ties between Turkey and the West Europe. The dissolution of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the ending of the Cold War and the divisions in Europe have forced the members of the EC to focus on these historical changes, and gave an additional impetus to the Community to take control over the social, economic and political affairs of Europe. In this atmosphere, the West Europeans, who became preoccupied with issues such as German unification, the task of assisting the economic and political reconstruction of the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty within the EU, domestic economic problems that stem from the prolonged recession in Europe, have given less attention to the issue of Turkey's membership, and found it expedient to defer the issue without giving a specific date. At a moment when Europe was moving toward union, Turkey has remained excluded from the European political and economic processes and interactions.

Greece, organically linking the improvement of Turkey-EC/EU relations to the solution of Cyprus issue, has been able to draw the EC/EU into the Greek-Turkish dispute, and, thus, made relations between Turkey and the EC/EU more problematic.

The Greek aim of isolating Turkey from Europe has also been useful for other Europeans who have had reservations about the Turkey's full membership in the EU, such as Germany. At a time when the support and sympathy for democratic political systems and free societies reached its peak, Turkey's Kurdish problem has brought Turkey under the spotlight and made it an easy target for criticism by the Western Europeans, particularly Germany. The German-Turkish relations which have already become tense due to the presence and situation of large numbers of Turkish workers in this country, have been further strained as Germany hardened its stance toward Turkey on the Kurdish issue, further complicating the Turkish efforts to gain full membership in the EU.

Turkey's exclusion from the EU has also enormous security implications. Turkey has recognized the rising importance of the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense component of the EU and as a means of strengthening European pillar of NATO, but despite all of its attempts it has been unable to achieve full membership in this organization. The WEU members try to justify their opposition to Turkey's full membership basically on the grounds that it is not a full member of the EU. In fact, Turkey's strong pro-Western stance during the Gulf War has resulted in its strategic role to be assessed in its Middle Eastern context rather than European, and the EU, which desires to move quickly toward a common foreign and security policy as envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty, has become increasingly unwilling to carry the borders of the EU and WEU to the volatile regions of the world such as the Middle East and the Transcaucasus, which Turkey's full membership in these organizations would imply.

Turkey's concerns regarding the protection of its territorial integrity and independence have been further exacerbated as Turkey has come to the realization that it faces with considerable difficulties in restructuring the Turkish armed forces along the lines of NATO's New Strategic

Concept, adopted in November 1991 in the light of profound changes in East-West relations. Furthermore, with the end of Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the realization of "peace dividend" has come to the fore in the agenda of NATO nations, resulting in the erosion of solidarity and cohesion of the organization. Turkey's request for the deployment of a NATO deterrent force to eastern Turkey during the Gulf War had resulted in serious internal debate among the member countries on whether the defense of Turkey's Middle Eastern borders by NATO is an "in-area" or "out-of-area" responsibility, giving rise to the Turkish concerns that NATO may not extend its protective umbrella to Turkey in case it becomes involved in a confrontation resulting in Turkey invoking the defense clause of the Washington Treaty.

#### **A. DOMESTIC CONTEXT**

##### **1. Economic Condition of the Country**

After almost five decades of industrialization--characterized, on the one hand by considerable state intervention and, on the other, by protectionist import-substituting policies--in the early 1980s Turkey entered a new era of export-led economic growth with the implementation of a series of stabilization and structural adjustment programs introduced in January 24, 1980.

The interim government, formed by the military junta which took over control of the country in September 1980, combined the economic stabilization measures with reforms of trade liberalization and export promotion. These policies marked a radical break with the inward-looking, import-substituting strategies and the beginning of an export-led growth based on a industrial economy. High export growth was pursued via export credits and incentives, and the removal of restrictions on foreign trade and capital. In addition, after a 33 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira, multiple-exchange rates were

abolished and a flexible-exchange rate regime was established.  
[Ref 21:p. 46]

Consequently, throughout the 1980s, the Turkish economy has performed impressively in many aspects. However, these liberalization attempts and structural adjustment policies failed to remedy some of the most important structural problems of the Turkish economy, resulting in the announcement by the government, in April 5, 1994, of the harshest austerity measures in the history of the republic.

Turkey's Gross National Product (GNP) averaged 5 percent per year for the 1980s, reaching its peak level of 9.4 percent in 1990. [Ref 28:p. 28] The Gulf War led to sharply reduced growth of 0.4 percent in 1991, but the expansion recovered in 1992 and 1993 with an GNP of 6.4 and 7.3 percent respectively. Per capita GNP increased from \$1,287 in 1980 to \$2,687 in 1990. [Ref 28:p. 28] These economic reforms have also contributed to a major transformation in the structure of the Turkish economy. Total exports increased from \$2.9 billion in 1980 to \$12.9 billion in 1990, an increase of 345 percent. Meanwhile, imports rose from \$8 billion in 1980 to \$22.3 billion in 1990, an increase of 178 percent, well below the rate of increase of exports. [Ref 23:p. 137] The share of agriculture in GNP declined steadily from 22.6 percent in 1980 to 16.3 percent in 1991, while industry accounted for 22.7 percent of GNP in 1991 and services 55.9 percent. [Ref 29:p. 14] While the importance of the agricultural sector declined, industry's share of exports increased from 36 percent in 1980 to an impressive figure of almost 80 percent in 1990. [Ref 23:p. 11-12] Turkey has become a country exporting primarily industrial products rather than agricultural produce.

Within the framework of outward-oriented economic policies, legislation on foreign investment was also liberalized and significant developments have been witnessed in the fields of foreign-capital inflow and foreign investment. The total amount of foreign direct investment in

Turkey between 1980 and 1990 increased to \$6.22 billion compared to only \$228 million during the period of 1954-1980. Similarly, the number of foreign firms which have invested in Turkey, increased from only 127 in 1981 to 1,812 in 1990. [Ref 23:p. 139]

The government policies of export-led growth based on a industrial economy have not only resulted in a major transformation of the Turkish economy and increased integration with the world markets, but also increased the dependence of the Turkish economy on the developed economies of the world, especially the West European economies. The share of OECD countries in Turkey's total exports increased from 57.7 percent in 1980 to 67.9 percent in 1990. Within the OECD, the EC countries have become main trading partners of Turkey. The share of EC countries in Turkey's total exports increased from 44.7 percent in 1980 to 53.2 percent in 1990. Similarly, while the share of OECD countries in Turkey's total imports increased from 45.3 percent to 63.8 percent, that of EC countries increased from 29.8 percent to an unprecedented level of 41.8 during the same period of 1980-1990. [Ref 23:p. 134-136] The EC countries' share in the total amount of foreign direct investment in Turkey also reached its peak level of \$1.25 billion in 1990, accounting for the 78 percent of total foreign direct investment for 1990 (\$1.61 billion). [Ref 30:p. 30]

The 1980's also witnessed the initiation of huge infrastructure projects. Tele-communication, transportation, electricity generation and irrigation were chosen as priority areas for public investment. Considerable improvements have been achieved: highways were extended by over 2,000 kilometers, the countryside was electrified, the communication system was modernized and every single village was provided with a direct-dialing telephone facility. It was also during this period that the construction work in the \$32 billion dollar South Anatolia Project (GAP) was accelerated with the

transfer of almost \$1 billion dollars to the project every year. The GAP, one of the world's biggest civil engineering undertakings, includes 13 sub-projects (seven on the Euphrates River and six on the Tigris River) consisting of a total of 19 power stations, 22 irrigation dams and hundreds of water storage and distribution projects, including the world's two largest underground irrigation tunnels. When the project is in full operation, 1.7 million hectares of land will be irrigated, an area twice the size of Belgium, 26 billion KWH of electricity will be generated, representing 22 percent of Turkey's hydropower potential, the agricultural output of Turkey will be doubled, and a total of 3,324,000 additional jobs will be created. [Ref 31:p. 3] The construction of the body of the Ataturk Dam, which is the centerpiece of the GAP and the world sixth largest hydroelectric dam in terms of volume of the embarkment, was completed in 1990 after Turkey had spent \$4 billion dollars without any foreign financing. [Ref 31:p. 4]

Economic growth of 1980s has, however, been accompanied by structural difficulties. The most important of these has been inflation. Among the other structural weaknesses of the economy are the level of state indebtedness and a substantial budget deficit.

Within the framework of the economic stabilization measures and the reforms of trade liberalization and export promotion, put into implementation in the early 1980s, the prices of various final and intermediate products manufactured by the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) have been adjusted upward to reduce the burden of SEEs on the government budget and alleviate the pressure on the Turkish Central Bank to finance the budget deficit through money creation. However, since many of the SEEs products are intermediate products used by private firms in the manufacturing sector as input to their production processes, these price increases in SEE products have resulted in the price hikes in the manufacturing



sector and contributed to inflation in general. Furthermore, with the establishment of a flexible-exchange rate regime after having abolished the multiple-exchange rates, the value of the Turkish lira was reduced vis-a-vis other foreign currencies, and because of strong dependence of Turkish manufacturing sector on imported inputs, depreciation of the Turkish lira has increased the domestic cost of these inputs. This increase in the input costs of the manufacturing sector has consequently contributed to the price hikes in the final products of the sector, contributing to overall inflation.

Inflation was also fed by the high priority that the government gave to expansion of the infrastructure and the subsequent increase in the public-sector borrowing requirement. Therefore, inflation never dropped below 25 percent per year during the 1980s and, in fact, crept upward during late 1980s to reach 69.6 percent in 1989. [Ref 23:p. 17] The inflation rate remained at the level of 62.4 percent in 1992, 58.2 percent in 1993, and reached in March 1994, just prior to the announcement of the April 5 Austerity Measures, at a level equivalent to 74 percent when calculated on a yearly basis. [Ref 28:p. 28]

The 1990s have also witnessed the deterioration of Turkey's external debt problem and balance of payment difficulties. During early 1990s, exports, which increased from \$2.9 billion in 1980 to \$12.9 billion in 1990, became stagnant and stalled at a level of \$13.6 billion in 1991, \$14.7 billion in 1992 and \$15.3 billion in 1993. Imports, on the other hand, increased from \$21 billion in 1991 to \$22.9 billion in 1992 and \$29.4 billion in 1993, resulting in an increasingly greater trade deficit. [Ref 28:p. 25] The 1990-1991 Gulf War has also adversely affected the ability of the government to fight the budget deficit by causing Turkey to incur considerable income losses. Turkish financial losses from the war are difficult to calculate, but include lost exports to Iraq, Turkey's second largest market with an export

potential of over \$1 billion per year, lost tourism revenues, lost royalties for transit of Iraqi oil through the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, suspended construction contracts, lost fees from transit trade, and increased oil prices. For example, tourism, which had generated \$3.2 billion in receipt in 1990, was one of the sectors severely affected by the war, with receipts dropping to \$2.6 billion in 1991. [Ref 28:p. 30] Turkey still incurs an income loss of \$500 million per year in the form of lost royalties just due to the closure of Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, an action taken by the Turkish government as a part of economic sanctions against Iraq. Thus, the direct cost of the war to the Turkish balance of payments for the period of 1991-1993 is expected to have run at a rate of almost \$2.5 billion per year. [Ref 32:p. 684]

While the country was incurring substantial income losses, the budget deficit was further exacerbated by the failure of the privatization program, an element of the 1980 economic reforms, to achieve progress in the transfer of the SEEs which have become a financial burden on the state budget, to private hands.

The origins of the SEEs date back to the formative years of the Turkish republic, the "etatist" period of the 1930s. During the etatist industrialization campaign of the 1930s, the government set up many SEEs in sectors considered to be of great importance for increasing the nation's welfare and the state's prosperity or in sectors where private investors, limited in number at the time, hesitated to invest because capital requirements were too great in light of expected returns. Thus, SEEs provided the initial impetus for industrialization in Turkey, which involved import substitution in basic consumer-goods industries, and compensated for the lack of business elite, unwilling or unable to undertake heavy investment, at the time. [Ref 33:p. 163] Within two decades, SEEs were established in almost all sectors affecting the interests of the nation as a whole. SEEs

included the national transportation, defense industry, communications, energy enterprises and banks that owned companies in particular branches such as textile, refining, mining and maritime transportation. Aside from their role in industrial development, SEEs were charged with social goals. The farm-support program stabilized farmer's incomes, while low consumer prices for food, energy, and transportation helped the poor. SEEs also provided training and employed surplus university graduates.

The importance of the SEEs in the Turkish economy is evident from their contribution to total industrial production and the country's severe problem of unemployment. Throughout the 1980s, the public sector accounted for 45 percent of fixed investment, around 40 percent of total value added in the manufacturing industry and half a million jobs, almost three percent of the country's civilian labor force in the 1980s. [Ref 23:p. 16]

The absence of autonomy and managerial incentives, frequent interference from politicians and bureaucrats, the failure of the government to provide incentives to the managerial elite that would encourage increases in the efficiency and productivity have been the main problems of the SEEs, and these problems are exacerbated by the fact that the majority of the SEEs operated in monopolistic markets, protected from competitive pressure as a part of the overall import substitution policies, resulting in the lack of pressure to improve the performance. [Ref 33:p. 164] As the operating losses of the SEEs have grown, they have turned to the government to finance their operations, and this, in turn, has undermined the ability of government to balance the budget. Subsequent pressure on the Turkish Central Bank to finance the budget deficit through money creation and domestic or external borrowing has fueled the overall inflation in the country. Thus, despite their importance in the Turkish economy, since the introduction of 1980 reform program, one of

the aims of economic policy has been the reduction of the size of the state sector through the privatization of the SEEs which have become, since 1970s, "money eating monsters," undercutting the government's ability to balance the budget and fueling the public-sector borrowing requirement.

However, the moves toward privatization have been controversial, and policy makers have faced tough decisions. Some SEE managers and unions have opposed privatization fearing that, once under private management, the enterprises might eliminate unprofitable subsidiaries or reduce overstaffing. The possibility of aggressive lay off with its adverse effects on the country's already high unemployment rate has been source of concern also for the government, preventing it from committing to privatization wholeheartedly. The sale of state equities in two different companies to foreign investors in 1988 within the framework of privatization program has also generated popular opposition to the program, and resulted in heavy criticism of the government for selling the SEEs which became known as a part of the heritage of the Kemalist era, to foreigners. [Ref 33:p. 169] The left-of-center Social Democratic Populist Party (SDP), then the leading opposition party, has interpreted these sales as a threat to national sovereignty and led the opposition. The SDP itself was the successor to Ataturk's Republican People's Party which had originally adopted etatism as its official economic strategy. Thus, between 1980 and 1991, only five percent of the state's holding passed into private hands after a proportion of equities held by the state in fifteen companies had been privatized via stock market sales. [Ref 23:p. 16] After the 1991 general elections, the coalition government of True Path Party and Social Democratict Populist Party has come to power, and the privatization program has come to a standstill. The program was going to be reactivated only in April 1994 within the framework of April 5 Austerity Measures. However, during this period the SEEs continued to

generate only a sixth of Turkey's exports while consuming a third of its imports, and to constitute almost 75 percent of the country's budget deficit, which grew to \$8.6 billion in 1993, double the original target and nine percent of Turkey's 1993 GDP. [Ref 34:p. 506]

In the face of widening budget and trade deficits, persistent high inflation and a mounting external debt which increased from \$40.7 billion in 1988 to \$67.3 billion in 1993, the government felt compelled, in April 1994, to resort to the harshest austerity measures in the history of the country in an attempt to remedy the worsening economic condition of the country. [Ref 34:p. 506] The austerity package which was announced in April 5 and became known as April 5 Austerity Measures, included a 28 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira, limited increase in the salaries of the public sector employees, a pledge to close unprofitable SEEs and to accelerate the privatization program, price increases on goods produced and sold by the SEEs, and one-time taxes on bank and corporate assets.

Depreciation of the Turkish lira by 28 percent has given the desired boom to exports and Turkey's total exports have increased by 23.1 percent in the first nine months of 1994 when compared to the first nine months of 1993. [Ref 28:p. 24] However, it has also led to an increase in the domestic cost of manufacturing sector's inputs, the majority of which are imported, and this increase has consequently contributed to the price hikes in the final products of the sector. These price increases combined with the price hikes in the consumption goods produced and sold by the SEEs have resulted in an unprecedented inflation in the country and the yearly inflation rate for 1994 was announced by the State Statistics Institute as 148 percent. [Ref 35:p. 2] Despite the high inflation rate, the increase in the salaries of the public sector employees has been kept limited to only 20-30 percent as required by the austerity measures, and thus the purchasing

power of these people has been reduced by more than 40 percent on average. Price hikes combined with sharp reductions in the purchasing power of the Turkish people has led to the contraction of the domestic market, and consequently the private sector has been squeezed between increased input costs and marketing difficulties. Therefore, real wages have also dived in the private sector, and wage earners, in both public and private sectors, with their families have constituted the part of the Turkish society that the April 5 Austerity Measures hit in the worst manner.

It should also be stated that the stabilization and liberalization programs of the 1980s had substantial adverse impacts on Turkey's income distribution. This, when combined with the tax system which puts the tax burden on wage and salary earners, has led to the emergence, within the past decade, of wild income differences in Turkish society. For instance, the share of profits and rental income in the country's national income had risen from 49.4 percent in 1980 to an unprecedented level of 70.2 percent in 1988 while during the same period the share of wages and salaries had declined from 26.6 percent to 14 percent. A similar collapse can be seen in the share of agriculture which declined from 23.8 percent in 1980 to 15.8 percent in 1988. [Ref 21:p. 51] Despite the obvious collapse of wages and salaries and the rapid deterioration of the functional distribution of income in Turkey, the governments that came to power failed to reform the tax system, and consequently, 6.5 million wage and salary earners -almost 30 percent of Turkey's civilian labor force- who have never earned more than 27 percent of the national income since 1980, have paid 50 percent of the total taxes that the government collected in 1994. [Ref 36:p. 2]

Unfortunately, it is a fact that while the majority of the Turkish people gets poorer and poorer as their purchasing power diminishes under the persistent high inflation, wide income differences and injustice in the tax system continue

to fuel the social unrest. Thus, the ability of Turkey's mainstream secular parties, which has governed the country since the foundation of the republic, to mobilize the Turkish society along the Western ideas and ideals, on which the socio-economic policies of these parties have been based, becomes increasingly questionable.

The new harsh austerity measures, announced by the Prime Minister Tansu Ciller on April 5, 1994 and the prospect of the layoff of thousands of workers in the SEEs within the framework of privatization program to be reactivated have already resulted in hundreds of thousands of workers turning the May Day celebrations of 1994 into a protest against the government. A similar protest was held on December 20 throughout the country by government employees who boycotted their jobs for one day to protest the 22.5 percent increase in their yearly salaries while the inflation rate for 1994 was announced as more than 140 percent by the government. [Ref 37:p. 1] It seems as if 1995 will be a much more difficult year for these people than 1994. Within the framework of the "stand-by" agreement which Turkey signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the aftermath of the announcement of the Austerity Measures, the government has promised to privatize 15 SEEs at a worth of \$5 billion until May 1995, to reduce the number of people working in the SEEs and government offices, and to freeze the salary increases in the public sector. [Ref 38:p. 1] Furthermore, the government has announced that it targeted reducing the yearly inflation rate from 148 percent to 70 percent for 1995 if everything goes as planned, signaling further diminishing of the purchasing power of the Turkish people at least for one more year.

Apart from the equity, welfare, and domestic stability implications of this state of affairs, Turkey's inability to eliminate the structural difficulties of its economy and thus put the economy on a stable track that will help reduce the

existing socio-economic gap between Turkey and the countries of the Western Europe in the long run has long been detrimental to the Turkish efforts to gain full membership in the EU by giving the Europeans a legitimate ground on which they can justify their decision not to take Turkey's application for full membership into serious consideration. The austerity measures have helped the government reduce the trade deficit from \$14 billion in 1993 to \$6 billion in 1994, and the budget deficit from \$8.6 billion to \$4.5. [Ref 38:p. 1] However, with a rampant inflation not expected to drop below 70 percent in 1995, an unemployment rate which has never dropped below seven percent and is expected to rise as a result of the contraction in the economy that the recent austerity package caused, and interests rates varying between 60 and 120 percent from year to year, Turkey remains far from fulfilling the strict admission requirements of the EU.

## **2. Islam and Domestic Politics**

Within the past decade, the threat to the secular Turkish state from resurgent Islam has become one of the topics of heavy debate, and with the recent success of the Welfare Party, the main political movement of the religious right, overtly espousing Islamist views despite existing constitutional and legal limitations, in the March 1994 local elections, the fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism has become widespread among the country's secularist bloc. The 1995 general elections will be the real indicator of the extent to which the country's secular and democratic regime is threatened by radical Islam, but it should be stated that the cause for concern is real, and a variety of factors lie behind the surge of Islamic forces in Turkey.

During the formative years of the republic, a series of secular reforms which aimed at making what is often referred to as separation of state and religion, and excluding Islam from an official role in the life of nation, had been initiated by Ataturk and radical steps such as replacing the



Islamic law (Sharia) with codes borrowed from European countries, dropping the use of Islamic calendar and Arabic alphabet in favor of the Western calendar and Latin alphabet, outlawing articles of clothing closely identified with Islamic traditions and requiring the Islamic call to worship to be in Turkish rather than Arabic, were taken in 1920s and 1930s. The scope and the pace of these reforms had resulted in the emergence of Islamist reactionary forces in the society, leading Mustafa Kemal to regard a stage of personal authoritarian rule as necessary for securing his reforms before proceeding with the democratic process. Although Mustafa Kemal's long term goal was the establishment of a liberal democracy in Turkey, he temporarily gave up attempts at establishing multi-party politics during these formative years and Islam was removed from domestic politics only to return in 1946 when multi-party politics was restored.

Kemalist reforms clearly aimed at eradicating religious influence from political, legal, educational and social spheres, and restrict it to personal faith and behavior. In this respect Turkish political scientist Feride Acar states that:

. . . the new state's policies did not take on an aggressive mission of neutralizing Islam at the individual level. A personalized, individualized and rather peculiarly secularized Islam was created for the consumption of the citizens of the Republic in the privacy of their homes. As a result, for Turkish people, religion came to represent an array of beliefs and practices that ranges from the almost nominal subscription of the Westernized urban elite to the . . . deep personal piousness of the masses. [Ref 23:p. 225]

With the end of single-party rule under the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the establishment of the multi-party politics, the right-of-center secular parties, which pursued more liberal economic policies and were more tolerant of

traditionalist religious and social attitudes in the countryside compared to the policies of the RPP, developed close relations with different Islamist groups, especially the religious orders in 1950s and 1960s. However, these close relations have not resulted in the takeover of these parties leaderships or organizations by the Islamists, and remained limited to "an indirect relationship via conventional pressure group/political party interaction." [Ref 23:p. 229]

With the establishment of the Islamist National Order Party (NOP) by Necmettin Erbakan, an engineer by training and a professor at Istanbul Technical University, this relationship took the form of direct representation. Erbakan had been actively working in the Union of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and was its president in 1969. The NOP, which was founded in January 1970, rapidly set up branches throughout the country, with most support coming from small towns and villages. The NOP program could not openly attack secularism, but made it clear that through the use of symbols it had an anti-Kemalist ideology, and was committed to Islamization of state functions.

Erbakan, who had realized that appeal only to religiosity was not adequate as a basis for seeking followers and thus votes, attempted to exploit the disturbance that the small town traditional petty bourgeoisie felt from the rapid socio-economic changes that Turkey underwent during the 1960s. Turkey had witnessed an accelerated process of change with rapid growth and industrialization throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. This caused great dislocation throughout society marked by mass immigration from villages to the cities where these people settled in ugly shantytowns. A few major holding companies had benefited from the governments' import substitution policies, undermining the competitiveness of the small traders and manufacturers scattered throughout the country. These small traders and manufacturers were opposed the expansion of big businesses and preferred the dominance of

the SEEs which had established relations with the small scale sector, rather than private monopolies that cut off major markets from Anatolian suppliers and retailers.

The NOP's attempts of addressing itself to the petty bourgeoisie of small Anatolian towns, can be identified in the statement by Necmettin Erbakan:

. . . The economic mechanism works in favor of the merchants of the big cities and the merchants of Anatolia are simply their step-children. The lion's share of import quotas is saved for the merchants of three or four cities. The deposits in Anatolian banks are made by the people of Anatolia but go as credit to the merchants of the big city. The Union of Chambers works with completely as the instrument of a comprador-freemason minority. This huge organization is in the control of comprador commerce and industry. In that case, we said let's get onto the administrative board and turn the Union of Chambers into something which serves the Anatolian merchant and industrialist. [Ref 39:p. 14]

In addition to criticizing Turkey's economic policies, Necmettin Erbakan also attempted to make use of the alienation and uneasiness that many Turks felt from the scope and pace of Western influences in their society. This was true especially for the rural people who immigrated from their villages to big, cosmopolitan cities and faced difficulty in adapting themselves to the completely alien lifestyle of these cities. From the very beginning of his political career, Erbakan had criticized the West and its influence over Turkish society and in his "Declaration to the Religious Turk," he wrote that:

. . . Thus the European, by making us copy him blindly and without any understanding, trapped us in this monkey's cage and, as a result, forced us to abandon our personality and nobility. That is to say, he was successful in this because he used agents recruited from within, who felt inferior and disgusted with themselves, bringing to his knees the Turk who for centuries could not be defeated by the crusades and external blows. [Ref 39:p. 15]

Although the NOP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971, it was reconstituted the next year as the National Salvation Party (NSP), again under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. The NSP entered the 1973 and 1977 general elections with the moral and material prosperity promises. However, in the 1970s it was social democracy, not Islam, that was the strongest ideological current in Turkey. The RPP obtained 33.3 percent and 42.4 percent of the total votes in the 1973 and 1977 general elections respectively while the percentage of votes that went to the NSP was only 11.8 in 1973 and 8.4 in 1977, making the NSP third party in the polls in both elections after the Justice Party (JP), the leading right-of-center party. [Ref 40:p. 404] Although it is difficult to make definitive statements about the characteristics of the voters that voted for the NSP in these elections, Professor Binnaz Toprak of Bogazici University (Istanbul) explains that:

The results of the 1973 and 1977 elections show that the NSP received the highest percentage of its votes in either the last developed, or the most rapidly developing, areas of the country. In the former, individuals who voted for the NSP likely did so as a result of the party's appeal to traditional Islamic sentiments; in the latter, however, the NSP vote represented some form of protest by marginal individuals who had lost their former place within economy - small traders, artisans, small shopkeepers, and the like. [Ref 41:p. 229]

In the aftermath of 1973 elections, the NSP formed a coalition government with the RPP in 1974 and, when this coalition failed within a few months, it joined the Nationalist Front coalition governments in 1975 with the JP and the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party. Necmettin Erbakan and his deputies held important positions in the above mentioned coalition governments. However, rather than Islam, the establishment of "heavy industries" in Turkey was the

major item in the NSP's party program. Although the party program did not described a comprehensive economic development plan, Necmettin Erbakan continually put great emphasis on industrial advancement, and the party monopolized ministries dealing with the Turkish industry, technology and the State Economic Enterprises, in these coalition governments. Turkey had lost its leading position because it had failed to industrialize, and the NSP was promising to "accomplish industrial growth without passing through the traumas brought about by the capitalist model, with its inherent materialism." [Ref 41:p. 228] The NSP claimed that through the establishment of heavy industries and "revitalizing indigenous cultural values which would supply the necessary spiritual and moral qualities for a new work ethic," Turkey could become a great power again. [Ref 42:p. 76]

Necmettin Erbakan, while paying attention not to take actions that would endanger the coalition governments in which it participated, was also concerned that as a junior coalition partner to the RPP or the JP, his party was losing its distinctiveness. Thus, in an attempt to reestablish its own religious identity in the public's eye, the NSP began a campaign to display its independence from the dominant secular party of the coalition governments through issues which would assure controversy in the press, irritate the secularist intelligentsia, and appeal to the traditional values of the petty bourgeoisie. [Ref 42:p. 78] The following statement made by Necmettin Erbakan while he was Deputy Prime Minister in the 1974 coalition government is worth quoting:

. . . As we were in a coalition, unfortunately we could not get everything passed. However, we insisted on having the skirts of hostesses in Turkish Airways lengthened by 15 centimeters. So we had some successes and we believe that we are on the right path. [Ref 39:p. 16]

In summary, it can be said that the social and economic changes undergone by the country since the early 1960s, combined with state dominance and control over religion and religious institutions, had pushed the significance of Islam into the background. As economic and social structural factors gained importance both in national politics and at the individual level, the day-to-day political needs of Turkey had put certain limitation upon a purely religious approach by the NSP to these issues. Islam, by itself, was no longer a sufficient factor for mobilizing Turkish society. All of this was apparently understood by the voters, resulting in the percentage of the NSP votes in the general elections dropping from 11.8 percent in 1973 to 8.4 percent in 1977. [Ref 40:p. 408-409]

With the September 12, 1980, military intervention, the NSP and other political parties of the pre-coup era were dissolved in 1981 and all the members of the last parliament were prohibited from politics. When the ban on political activity imposed by the military junta was lifted in April 1983, the Welfare Party (WP) was formed as the successor of the dissolved the NSP on more or less the same religious-political platform. However, due to the ban on political activities of Necmettin Erbakan and company, the Welfare Party, at its inception, was short of party leadership and the cadres who could mobilize the voters that traditionally supported the NSP.

Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP, its popular name in Turkey) won the 1983 and 1987 general elections by obtaining more than 45 percent and 36 percent of the votes respectively and remained in power until November 1991 with a clear majority in the Grand National Assembly. [Ref 40:p. 408-409] During this period, Turgut Ozal and his successor Yildirim Akbulut (November 1989 - November 1991) as Prime Minister, implemented certain Islamic practices and appointed numerous politicians with Islamic leanings to key

positions throughout various ministries of the Turkish bureaucracy under the influence of some of the former members of the NSP who, in the absence of Necmettin Erbakan, preferred to continue their political activity within the ANAP. This influence grew when Necmettin Erbakan officially became the leader of the Welfare Party in September 1987 following a national referendum that ended the ban on the political activities of the former party leaders. After this point, it was certainly necessary for Ozal to respond positively to the pressure exerted by the NSP element in his party in order to prevent defection of this element to the Welfare Party.

As a result of these pressures, in the second half of 1980s, Turkey witnessed sudden appearance of Islamist movements and cadres in the central political arena, and in the decision-making and controlling positions of the state.

The general election held on October 20, 1991, ended the leading position of ANAP in the Grand National Assembly. The real surprise of the elections was the success of Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party. It received 16.7 percent of the votes and increased its number of seats in the Assembly from 10 to 62. [Ref 40:p. 408-409] This was also an increase over the support that the NSP of Necmettin Erbakan obtained during the 1973 and 1977 elections, when it received 11.8 and 8.4 percent of the votes and 48 and 24 parliament seats respectively. In his Master's Thesis, Robert Miranda makes it clear that the WP was not alone in capturing this 16.7 of the vote and 52 additional seats in the Assembly. The WP ran in the election as a coalition partner with two other right-wing parties, the Nationalist Work Party and the Reformist Democratic Party. These two parties put forward candidates under the banner of the WP when they anticipated that they would not meet the barrier of obtaining ten percent of the votes necessary for legislative representation under terms of Turkey's proportional representation election system. The Nationalist Work Party is considered to be the successor of the

ultranationalist, extreme right-wing Nationalist Action Party (NAP) of Alpaslan Turkes, one of the parties outlawed by the military junta that came to power in 1980. If the NAP's election result are reviewed from the 1960s until the 1977 elections, it can be seen that this party had various levels of support as high as 14 percent in 1961, to as low as 2.2 percent of the votes in 1965. The average support for the NAP in the general elections of 1969, 1973 and 1977 was approximately 4.26 percent. Thus, it would be a conservative estimate to assume that the Nationalist Work Party element of the WP coalition, received roughly between 2.2 percent (its lowest support in 1965) to 4.26 percent of the vote (its average between 1969 and 1977) in the 1991 elections. If this support for the Nationalist Work Party is subtracted from the 16.7 percent of the vote which went to the coalition under the WP in 1991, then the WP only realized a scant increase of 0.82 to 2.88 percent over its 1973 election results, when it received its highest percentage of votes, i.e., 11.8 percent. [Ref 42:p. 50-52]

This conclusion is further supported by events that took place in the aftermath of the 1991 election. Nineteen of the 52 members of the Assembly who were elected under the WP in 1991 election later on defected from the WP to join the Nationalist Work Party and three other members of the WP reentered the Reformist Democratic Party. Thus, the number of seats held by the WP in the parliament dropped from 62 to 40, representing only 8.8 percent of the total seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. [Ref 42:p. 53]

The inability of Necmettin Erbakan and his Islamist WP (or its predecessors, the NOP and the NSP) to receive more than 10 to 15 percent of the vote in all legislative elections held since the 1950s and to obtain a respectable representation in the Assembly led the party to change its strategy and channel its energy into local governments in the aftermath of the 1991 general elections.



The WP has moved -at least for the time being- from being a provincial Anatolian party addressing itself to the petty bourgeoisie of small Anatolian towns disrupted by rapid industrialization to focusing its local election campaigns on obtaining the support of masses, who in the hope of finding a new job and securing a brighter future, migrated from the countryside to the big cities of more prosperous western Anatolia and settled in the ugly shantytowns surrounding these cities. The WP now appeals to these shantytown-dwellers who have been unable to make the transition from their traditional, countryside lifestyle to the completely alien lifestyle of these big cities due to the social and economic difficulties that they face.

These shantytowns continue to be constructed overnight illegally without the permission of city planners and municipal authorities and are inhabited by hundreds of thousands of poor migrants who flooded into big cities like Istanbul and Ankara at the rate of half a million a year. Most of the habitants of these shantytowns, especially the latecomers, are employed in the marginal sector, without any job security and with a lower pay compared to that of the strongly organized, relatively high-wage group of workers, exacerbating the existing income inequalities. Unplanned and rapid urbanization has prevented the municipal services from reaching these shantytowns sufficiently, making life much more difficult for these people and their families. Mass media exposes the lifestyle of Westernized middle and upper classes of these cities to poor shantytown-dwellers. Shocked by the differences that they see in terms of both living standards and moral values, these people have become a target that can easily be exploited by any ideology promising social justice, better living standards and the arrest of declining morality.

The WP, which adopted a propaganda platform in which worsening income distribution, corruption in government and general decline of morality in society were especially

stressed, successfully exploited this group of people in the March 1994 local elections and obtained 18.8 percent of the votes, making it the third party in the polls after the True Path Party (TPP) and another right-of-center party, ANAP. [Ref 43:p. 46] In 26 of Turkey's 76 provinces, the candidates who entered the local elections under the WP, were elected as the city mayors, including in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey's the two most populated cities and, the political and economic capitals respectively.

The WP majors, denouncing corruption within the main secular parties and trying to widen the support base of the WP by promising social justice, morality and economic prosperity, have concentrated on improving public services in the cities where they have won the municipal elections. As *The Economist* puts it, for the time being they are picking up rubbish on time, fixing the drains and potholes quickly, providing subsidized, cheaper bread from their own bakeries and paying their employees without any delay, while carefully playing down their Islamic zeal. [Ref 44:p 24] The initial attempts by some of the WP mayors, such as trying to ban the consumption of alcohol in public places and segregating the municipal buses by sex, have been dropped in the face of severe criticism by the public, the governors of these provinces and the government. Especially the proposal by Istanbul Mayor Tayyip Erdogan that Istanbul's ancient walls be torn down as a symbol of Byzantine Christendom, has brought harsh criticism throughout the country and, thus, has been dropped as have other similar displays of religiosity. [Ref 45:p. 6] For the time being, rather than taking actions that will fuel the anxiety and concern felt by the secularists and political groups advocating the continuation and development of democracy in Turkey, the WP mayors try to pursue a very cautious policy and play down the Islamic principles in their day-to-day works.

It is apparent that the WP is waiting for the next general elections which are expected to be held in October of this year, one year earlier than the scheduled date, and that it wants to enter this election without increasing the existing awareness among the secularist majority of the need to maintain a countervailing power against the Islamists.

Thus, the 1995 general elections will be an extremely important test for Turkey's right-of-center and left-of-center secularist parties which, since the 1950s, have always been able to receive more than 70 percent of the votes collectively in all of the general elections, in terms of revealing the extent to which the Islamist WP is able to become a real alternative in the eyes of the Turkish people to the secularist parties of the center, and to challenge these parties for obtaining the right to govern the country.

It should be kept in mind that, the danger posed by the Islamists lies in the inability of Turkey's ruling secularist parties to handle grave economic and social problems of the country. Turkey's deteriorating economic conditions, particularly vast income inequalities fuelled by high rates of inflation and unemployment, have the potential for creating socio-economic circumstances that help the Islamists to establish closer relations with the poor population groups at an increasingly greater speed and scale. This may provide Islamist forces with the strong power to mobilize economic as well as social protest. As indicated earlier, the new harsh austerity measures, announced by Prime Minister Tansu Ciller on April 5, 1994, and the prospective layoff of thousands of workers in the SEEs within the framework of the privatization program included in these measures, have already resulted in hundreds of thousands of workers turning the May Day celebrations of 1994 into a protest against the government. A similar protest was held on December 20, throughout the country by the government employees who boycotted their jobs for one day to protest the 22.5 percent increase in their

yearly salaries while the inflation rate for 1994 was announced as more than 140 percent by the government.

In the words of former Ambassador of the United States to Turkey Morton Abramowitz, "with the decay of ideology and the decline of political parties on the left and right," especially in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, "fundamentalist Islam is the only radical alternative in the Turkish political system," and the recent success of the WP in local elections, "probably rests less on its inherent strengths or organizational prowess than on the failure of mainstream parties to fulfill their promises" and provide the Turkish people with the benefits that they have been waiting for so long. [Ref 46:p. 178-179]

Furthermore, international developments concerning relations between Muslim and non-Muslim populations, within Europe and around it, also present a threat of strengthening the relative power position of Islamist forces in Turkey. The inability of the Turkish government to pursue a policy of active involvement in the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh and especially in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans in support of the involved Muslim population, has put Turkey under heavy pressure from the Muslim sphere both internally and externally. Turkey has been constrained from direct intervention in the Balkans in support of the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, fearing that this kind of involvement would irreparably set back its integration into Europe and severely damage its relations with Washington, has tried to ease these pressures by participating in the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (Operation DENY FLIGHT), in the naval forces in the Adriatic Sea enforcing the UN sanctions against Serbia (Operation SHARP GUARD), and by placing 1,500 Turkish troops under the command of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). However, despite these actions, Islamist groups have demanded a more active approach, including direct intervention, from the

Turkish government and tried to mobilize public support by emphasizing the religious aspects of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, i.e., the Slav (Orthodox Christian) versus Muslim confrontation. For example, Necmettin Erbakan has declared that " if we come to power , we will do in Bosnia what we did in Cyprus" recalling the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, when the NSP of Erbakan was a coalition partner of the RPP in the government. [Ref 47:p. 19]

Erbakan has used the tragedy in Bosnia-Hercegovina to discredit Turkey's Western-oriented regime and accused the government of having left the case of Bosnian Muslims in the hands of Western-dominated institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. In one of his skillful speeches, he criticized the government by saying:

. . . . Bosnia-Hercegovina became an independent country of 5 million people governed by the Muslims. In a short time the Serbs and Croats massacred 250,000 Muslims just because they were Muslims. 50,000 innocent women were raped. Two million people were forced to leave the country. The genocide in Bosnia is probably the second biggest one in history after the West's genocide at Andalusia. The Germans saved the Croats. Unfortunately, Turkey behaved almost like a spectator in the tragedy of Bosnia. In fact, by simply saying that 'everything that needs to be done has been done', Turkey implicitly reassured the Serbs against intervention, and, indirectly encouraged them to massacre the Muslims. . . . As disclosed in the letter by British Prime Minister Major to Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs Douglas Hurd, the goal of the West is the elimination of Bosnian Muslims. [Ref 48:p. 76]

It also necessary to mention that the EU's rejection of Turkey's request for accession to the union has been a big blow to Turkey's secularist intelligentsia and the mainstream parties that have invested a good deal of political and personal capital and time toward achieving Turkey's full membership in the EU. Since the foundation of the republic,

all of the mainstream parties that came to power have pursued a pro-Western policy that aimed at establishing all kinds of economic, military and political ties with the democracies in the West to promote Turkey's continued economic and societal modernization. Within this framework, integration with Europe, particularly with the EU, which would also help Turkey to be seen and to be perceived as being European, has been one of the primary objectives of the Turkish governments. Necmettin Erbakan and company, on the other hand, have always opposed Turkey's association with the EU and denounced other parties as simply being part of a "Western Club" with a "discotheque mentality," urging that Turkey not join the EU. [Ref 29:p. 51] He has insisted that Turkey should lend greater weight to its ties with the Arab and other Muslim countries, and play a leading role in the establishment of a "Islamic Common Market" rather than trying join the EU where it "could only be the gatekeeper living in the basement while Europeans occupied the floors above." [Ref 39:p. 16]

As Turkey's prospect of achieving full membership in the EU remains questionable despite its membership struggle which started more than 30 years ago with the EC-Turkey Association Agreement of 1963, today an increasingly greater number of Turkish people question the dream of Turkish entry into the EU and many have become convinced that once Turkey overcomes existing obstacles to EU membership, the EU will invite new ones to prevent Turkey's entry. The common perception among the Turkish people is that the West sees no place for Muslim Turkey within Europe, and that Turkey is being denied membership because of racial, religious or cultural differences between the Turkish people and the Europeans. In turn, this growing sense of isolation from the West undercuts Turkey's secularist mainstream parties' ability to continue to mobilize Turkish society along Western ideas, and plays into the hands of Islamic forces which pose the greatest threat to Turkey's pro-Western orientation. While former President

Turgut Ozal warned that Turkey's rejection by the EU would push Turkey away from Europe and encourage the spread of religious fundamentalism throughout the region, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, in a conversation with *U.S. News and World Report*, Paris Bureau Chief Fred Colman, said that:

More than 90 percent of the people living in Turkey are for a secular and democratic country. But public opinion could change for two reasons; prolonged economic crisis and rejection by the West. We have tried to integrate our economy with the EU. But still we are rejected. Over the same period, Spain, Portugal and Greece entered the EU and got billions of dollars in aid. Our people have started questioning. [Ref 49:p. 51-52]

It should also be stated that today, with the emergence of largely Turkic- speaking republics in Central Asia onto the world political stage, Turkey has attempted to play the role of a model for the Westernization and integration of these republics into the world economy, and of a vanguard aiming at checking the threat of Islamic radicalism or of Iranian influence in this region. Therefore, while membership in the EU is expected to give Turkey a greater voice in international affairs and help Turkey establish its influence over the region, its rejection by the EU not only fuels the cause of Islamists in Turkey, but also undercuts its claims to be a fully western state and prevents Turkey from playing these political and economic roles effectively by making Turkey less attractive to these countries as a western model.

Today, there are true signs of politically active, often radical, Islamist elements in Turkey. The 1995 general elections shall be the best indicator of whether or not the secular and democratic nature of the Turkish Republic is seriously threatened by Islamic radicalism. However, it should also be stated that radical Islam is unlikely to come to power in Turkey. Among the key obstacles to a takeover by radical Islamist forces in Turkey are the following:

First of all, with the authorization of multi-party politics in 1946, Turkey has established institutional channels for the expression of political preferences and social ideas in the last five decades. This has taken the pressure in this matter away from religion. While in the 1950s and 1960s the right-of-center parties developed close associations with different Islamist groups, in the last two decades, unlike the earlier era, this representation has taken the form of direct representation of Islamist groups in the various levels of Islamist parties as well as right-of-center secular parties. The direct representation of Islamist groups in the competitive politics of a parliamentary democracy, when combined with day-to-day political needs of a relatively urbanized, educated and industrialized Turkey, has gradually pushed religious issues into background and forced these Islamist groups to move away from their extremist stands toward moderation. In other words, the extremism of Turkish Islam has been deradicalized by the participation of Islamist groups in national politics and open elections.

Second, the radical reforms initiated by Ataturk in the country's political, social, and economic life has made religion, within the past 70 years following the foundation of the republic, a private matter for many in Turkish society. Turkey's political institutions, education system, mass media, economy and state bureaucracy have functioned to support this structure where the affairs of state are separated from religion's influence and where Islam is restricted to the private sphere. As a result, for the majority of Turkish people Islam today is far from being an effective regulator of social, economic and political life. Even in the 1970s, Turkey's socio-economic and political needs had put a certain limitation upon a purely religious approach by the NSP to these issues. Within the past two decades, Turkey's exposure to the West has increased, its technological, industrial and socio-economic development has acquired greater speed. Today,



the political and socio-economic needs of the country are much more complex than in the 1970s. Thus, the majority of Turkish people does not conceive the WP and its ideology and approach to the complex needs of the country as a real alternative to the mainstream secular parties.

Third, the Shi'a minority in Turkey (the Alevis) which is estimated to comprise approximately 20 percent of Turkey's total population, has traditionally objected to the imposition of Islamic law (Sharia), which would mean Sunni religious domination over the Shi'a minority. The Alevis thus has supported political parties that are committed to the secularist values and protection of their rights as a religious minority group. The Alevis continue their tradition of "bloc voting" in favor of the secular parties of left-of-center in the general elections, a tradition which started with Ataturk's own secular Republican Peoples Party and still continues with today's secular parties of left-of-center generally.

Finally, the Turkish Armed Forces which have taken on a role as guardians, not only of the national security and constitution of the republic, but also of Kemalism, constitute a powerful barrier to the attainment of absolute power by the Islamist.

In their military education, officer candidates are instilled with the values of Kemalism from the very beginning. To a considerable degree, the military has successfully instilled the Kemalist spirit in its officers who proudly view the role of the military in protecting the democratic state against not only external enemies, but also the extremes of left and right, including radical Islam. Through its strict hierarchical structure and education system the military has maintained this distinctive outlook. Cohesiveness and discipline are believed to have made the officer corps immune to radicalism. In order to continue this cohesiveness and prevent the infiltration of extremism of any kind into its

ranks, the Turkish armed forces continually conduct investigations of all ranks and services, resulting in the dismissal of military personnel from the service in case they are determined to have any kind of involvement in radicalism. For instance, in the aftermath of a recent investigation, six Turkish Navy officers, including one Lieutenant and one Lieutenant Commander, and a Turkish Army officer were dismissed from the service on December 20, 1994, on the grounds of having been involved in fundamentalist Islamic activism. [Ref 37:p. 1]

Ataturk had always insisted that the military forces, as a national institution above partisanship, should stay out of politics. However, on three occasions, in 1960, 1971 and 1980, the senior military have judged it necessary to intervene to guide Turkey's political development toward the eventual achievement of Ataturk's goal: a modern, secular republic. Especially in the case of the intervention of 1980, the military's perception of a growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Westernism in Turkey, helped precipitate the military coup.

Today, the Turkish armed forces, with their traditional commitment to the Kemalism and the secular constitution of the republic, remain as one of the most important barriers to the rise of Islamic radicalism at the expense of Kemalist reforms, and to any change of the secular and democratic principles of the constitution of the republic. Although it is unlikely that the WP will be able to obtain votes, sufficient to form a single-party government in the next general elections, it has thrown a challenge to Turkey's secular mainstream parties by winning the March 1994 local elections in Ankara, Istanbul and 24 other municipalities. This has had a damaging impact on West European perceptions of Turkey and many Western commentators have started to mention Turkey with Egypt and Algeria as regimes threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. It is a fact that West Europeans have come to perceive political and

cultural Islam as a serious threat to their societies. The fears and prejudices in the West about Muslims have been greatly magnified under the influence of international and domestic developments like exposure to the unfamiliar lifestyles of Muslim guest workers, immigrants, refugees, Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the rise of anti-Western, militant Islam. The success of the WP in the local elections has been sufficient for Europeans to view Turkey and its 70-year-old secular and democratic regime as seriously threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. The danger is that if the WP manages to repeat its success in the next general elections with the votes coming from people protesting the growing income differences and declining living standards, and thus obtain a respectable representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkey will be placed within this broad enemy image of the Muslim world, burying all the Turkish hopes of further integration into Europe and putting its 30 years of struggle for full membership in the famous "Western Club" to rest.

### **3. Kurdish Problem**

Over the past four years, Turkey's once-dormant Kurdish issue has reached an unprecedented intensity in both domestic and foreign affairs and become a threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. It has also strained the country's relations with its Western allies who demanded a greater degree of respect for human rights in Turkey's approach to the problem. Resurgent Kurdish nationalism and escalating terror of the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK-Kurdistan Workers' Party) has also exacerbated the tensions in Turkey's relations with its southern and south-eastern neighbors willing to exploit the problem to weaken the Turkish state.

The sensitivity of the Turkish people and governments on the problem stems from some historical facts. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the World

War I, and the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, the vast territories of the Empire were divided up among the victorious powers. Even Anatolia, the only remaining homeland for Turks from these vast territories, was partitioned except for a tiny area in Central Anatolia, deemed by the Allied Powers to be sufficient for a new Turkish state. The Treaty of Sèvres called for an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia and an autonomous Kurdistan in south-eastern Anatolia. Regarding Kurdistan, the treaty stated that "a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates" should be drafted, and went on to say that:

. . . If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish people. . . show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. [Ref 50:p. 659]

Turkish nationalism was born as a reaction to this treaty, which expressed the will of the victors of the World War I and was agreed to by powerless Ottoman Sultan sitting in Istanbul. Following the four-year Turkish War of Independence which was fought under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed between the same Allied Powers and the new nationalist government in Ankara in 1923, delineating and codifying the territorial boundaries of the new Turkish state while burying the Treaty of Sèvres with its plans for Kurdistan. Thus, for the Turkish people, while the Treaty of Sèvres has come to mean the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the imperialist forces and a threat to the existence of Turkey, the Treaty of Lausanne has come to be associated with the War of Independence and the victory of the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal against these imperialist forces.

Turkey views any attempt, internal or external, to change the territorial boundaries of the Turkish Republic, as an open challenge to the legal, historical and political legacy of the War of Independence out of which the modern Turkish state emerged, and to the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As long as the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan, claiming to be the sole representative of the Turkey's Kurdish population, continues its campaign of violence and espouses separatism toward the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, the Kurdish problem, for the Turkish people, takes on a dimension different from giving Turkey's Kurdish population the right to speak, teach or issue publications in Kurdish.

There are an estimated eight to twelve million Kurds in Turkey. While originally concentrated in south-eastern region of the country, with the large scale migrations in the recent decades--estimated at more than 100,000 annually--they are distributed among the larger cities of Marmara, the Aegean and Central Anatolia, creating large Kurdish enclaves in these cities. The eastern and south-eastern regions of the country, where Kurds originally concentrated, have traditionally been the most underdeveloped parts of Turkey. Mountainous terrain and harsh climate have considerably prevented the development and maintenance of the infrastructure in the region, and despite the state's continuous attempts of encouraging the private sector to make investment in these parts of the country, the private sector, attracted by the economic opportunities, availability of qualified labor force and adequate infrastructure in the more prosperous western regions, has not responded positively to these incentives devised by the state and continue to ignore these parts of the country in their investment plans. With its limited financial resources, the state has tried to create employment opportunities in the region by locating production facilities of the various SEEs in the region, continuing to run unprofitable state farms and overstaffing the public offices

there. However, from communications to transportation, from health services to education and employment opportunities, these regions have remained the most backward, the poorest and the most isolated parts of the country. Hoping to find new employment opportunities and secure a brighter future for themselves and their families, millions of Kurds have migrated to the more prosperous western parts of the country. In those cities, the majority of Kurds have been integrated first with the work force and then steadily assimilated into the surrounding Turkish society.

Kurdish unrest in south-eastern Turkey is not a new development. The first uprising against the state took place in 1925, and was led by a Kurdish religious leader, Sheikh Said. However, his appeal was both religious and nationalist. He and other dervish leaders of the Naqshbandi order, one of the religious orders that had been banned as part of secular reforms, urged their Kurdish followers to overthrow the "godless" government in Ankara. [Ref 1:p. 52] The Sheikh Said uprising was followed by two other uprisings of lesser importance in 1930 and between 1936 and 1938, all of which were suppressed by the Turkish military. From the suppression of the Kurdish revolts of the 1930s until the early 1970s, the Kurds of south-east Turkey were not active politically. The Kurdish issue re-emerged as a source of violent anti-state activity in the late 1970s on the back of the growth in radical politics in Turkey during that decade.

During the late 1970s, the years preceding the September 12, 1980, military intervention, the PKK emerged as a branch of radical left-wing student politics. The PKK, aiming at carving out a separate Kurdish state in the predominantly Kurdish areas, has engaged in an armed struggle with the Turkish security forces. From the early days of its inception, the PKK received military and logistical backing from external powers, primarily Syria, which has longstanding territorial and ideological disputes with Ankara. In the aftermath of the

1980 military intervention, the PKK, in the face of purge operations of the Turkish army, fled to Syria. While PKK recruits were given Syrian identity documents and taken to the training camps in Syrian controlled Beka'a Valley in eastern Lebanon, Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, was allowed to reside in Damascus. The PKK-led violence in south-eastern Turkey remained at a low intensity until 1984 under the martial imposed by the military junta.

In the summer of 1984, PKK cadres divided into two section, smuggled themselves from northern Iraq into Turkey and attacked two small Turkish towns, Semdinli and Erüh. Turkey responded by stepping up its military campaign against the PKK and entering into an "hot pursuit" accord with Baghdad with which Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkey enter Iraq in order to launch military campaign against the PKK camps in northern Iraq. Iran protested the agreement and accused Turkey of siding with Iraq in its war against Iraq. For Iran, Turkey was helping Iraq to police the northern parts of the country, and defend both Iraqi territory and the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline against Iraqi Kurdish groups backed by Iran. From late 1984 till the end of Iran-Iraq war, armed clashes went on in northern Iraq and south-east Turkey, with Syria and Iran on one side supporting the Kurdish rebels, and Iraq and Turkey seeking to repress them.

It was during this period that the PKK engaged in Vietcong-style guerrilla tactics designed to frightened the local population, the majority of which is Kurdish, into supporting it. With its Marxist-Leninist philosophy completely alien to the local mentality of south-eastern Turkey, the PKK initially made little progress in winning support from the Kurdish population who resented the brutal PKK attacks on their villages. However, its other strategy, reducing the legitimacy of the Turkish government in the eyes of Kurdish population, has been more successful. Toward this aim, the PKK has launched night attacks to the Turkish border stations and

ambushed the security forces; raided the state farms, government buildings, production facilities of various State Economic Enterprises; and damaged the roads, railways, communication and electricity networks in the region. In the face of rapidly intensifying PKK attacks and growing casualties and material damage, the government has felt compelled to increase the presence of the security forces in the region and, in 1987, for a state of emergency to be extended every four months in ten provinces in the south-east of the country by a parliamentary vote.

Increased military presence in the region, the introduction of the state of emergency, the evacuation of the some of the widely scattered villages for security reasons, government policies and practices against the expression of their ethnic identity by the Kurdish population, when combined with the traditional backwardness and isolation of the region from other parts of the country, have caused an increasingly greater number of Kurdish people to perceive the Turkish government to be hostile to themselves, and, thus, to hold grievances against the Turkish state. These government policies had a counter-productive effect exacerbating the polarization of Turkish society along ethnic lines. Many Kurds, even those who are not involved in the violence, have found themselves on the defensive. The government's policies, by alienating the local Kurdish population, have unfortunately played into the hands of the PKK as planned by this group. While the PKK totaled a few hundreds of supporters in 1984 when it launched its attacks in south-east Turkey, in 1992, according to a report prepared for the president and cited by the Turkish Daily News, it numbered some 10,000 to 15,000 PKK guerrillas scattered in the mountainous region. [Ref 51:p. 122] Ilnur Cevik, the editor of the Turkish Daily News, states that "Our elephant (the Turkish forces), while trying to crush the fly (the PKK), seems to be missing the insect and in the



process is destroying everything it steps on," contributing to the popularity of the PKK. [Ref 51:p. 125]

Against this background, in July 1990 the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDP) issued an unprecedented report on the south-east, recommending a number of measures that it envisaged would help build confidence between the state and Kurdish population of the south-east, and eliminate the main causes of the problem. Among the recommended measures were the abrogation of a law introduced in 1983 implicitly banning the use of the Kurdish language, ending the state of emergency declared in 1987, and abolishing the Village Guard system introduced in 1985 as a system of civilian militias to supplement the Turkish security forces in the region and help local villagers protect their villages from PKK attacks. While the public discussion on the Kurdish issue reached an unprecedented level with this report and the foundation of the People's Labor Party (HEP) by a group of Kurdish deputies of the Turkish parliament, the Turkish government, meeting under the chairmanship of President Turgut Ozal decided to abolish the law restricting the use of languages other than Turkish. In April 1991, with an extensive package of legal reforms approved by the Turkish parliament, Turkey's Kurdish population became legally free to speak Kurdish and practice their own customs. The performance of Kurdish music and singing were also permitted. The new government that came to power in the aftermath of October 1991 general elections continued to seek political solutions to the problem by offering language and cultural concessions. The government granted the Kurdish people freedom to issue publications in Kurdish and establish a Kurdish cultural institute. [Ref 32:p. 689] Textbooks in Turkish on how to learn Kurdish, books in Kurdish on Kurdish poetry and traditional tales, books on the Kurdish uprisings during Ataturk's time and publications carrying articles with titles, such as "The Turkish State, in Pursuit of Expansionist Goals, Attacks Southern Kurdistan,"

and "Kurdistan Cannot Advance an Exploitative Administration" have become available in the bookstores, as have newspapers printed in Kurdish. [Ref 29:p. 43]

These developments marked an clear attempt by the Turkish governments to build confidence between the state and the Kurdish population which became increasingly alienated by the earlier counter-productive government policies, and to find a political middle ground for the Kurdish problem which would take the pressure in this matter from PKK-led violence.

However, the positive, hopeful atmosphere that emerged in Turkey in 1991 and early 1992 remained far from yielding tangible results. The PKK, afraid of marginalization of its organization and methods, immediately stepped up its campaign of violence against the state in order to spoil the newly-born hopeful atmosphere. Taking advantage of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's power in northern Iraq, the PKK transferred its headquarters from Lebanon and intensified its incursions across the Turkish frontier.

Intensification of the PKK-led violence also coincided with the open offense of the HEP deputies to the symbol of the Turkish state at every opportunity. The HEP, which could not fulfill all the stipulations of the electoral law in time to participate in the October 1991 general elections, had run in the election under the banner of SDP and obtained 22 seats in the Turkish parliament. During the inauguration ceremony of the new Turkish parliament on November 6, 1991, which was broadcast live by more than 15 domestic TV stations throughout the country and recorded by tens of foreign TV stations, HEP deputies Hatip Dicle and Leyla Zana, for the first time in the history of the republic, added separatist sentiments to their oath-taking in front of the whole parliament, the President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of Turkish General Staff, the Service Commanders, high level bureaucrats and millions of TV viewers. For example, Leyla Zana, after reading the oath of office, violated the rules of parliamentary conduct by making

certain additions, in Kurdish, to the text of the oath and saying, before leaving the dais, "Live Kurdish people and Kurdistan." [Ref 52:p. 1] Similarly, on the first day of the new Turkish parliament, the HEP deputies had also not hesitated to wear ties, handkerchiefs, or hairbands colored with red, yellow and green, the three colors used by the Kurdish separatists.

While the government's policies toward Kurdish problem were complicated by the intensification of the PKK's campaign against the state and the repercussions of the actions taken by Kurdish deputies of the parliament, the crushing of the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq in March and April 1991 by the Iraqi military and the subsequent massive flight of Iraqi Kurds toward the Turkish border, has added a third dimension to the problem, further complicating Turkey's position. The exodus of Iraqi Kurdish refugees towards the Turkish and Iranian frontiers began during the first two weeks of April 1991, so that by the middle of the month it was reported that around 500,000 were massed along the frontier with Turkey. The Turkish Red Crescent, the army, local villagers and later on some international aid agencies did their best to help these people, but it soon became clear that the situation was unsustainable. The flood of refugees faced the Turkish government with a dilemma. On the one hand, it could not ignore the humanitarian dimension of the problem, on the other hand it was reluctant to allow the refugees to move to the inner parts of the country. If it did so, it would acquire the long-term responsibility for their care and accommodation which would imply a heavy burden on the state budget. Furthermore, the government was also concerned that, mixed among the Kurdish refugees, there could be PKK members and sympathizers who have engaged in an armed struggle with the state security forces for long. By the middle of April it became accepted that the only solution for Turkey would be to move refugees back to northern Iraq. However, there was no

chance they would do so without protection against Iraqi forces. For Turkey this meant going back on what had been a fixed point in the Turkish policy toward Iraq; firm opposition to any sort of partition of Iraq, either implicit or explicit, which would imply acceptance of the idea of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. Nevertheless, Turgut Ozal, seeing no other way out, suggested that the UN should take over territory in northern Iraq to provide a "safe haven" for the Kurdish refugees. At the end of April, coalition troops in northern Iraq began Operation PROVIDE COMFORT by establishing a security zone of 170,000 square miles to which the refugees could turn. [Ref 50:p. 674] In July, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was succeeded by Operation POISED HAMMER in which coalition troops were withdrawn from Iraqi territory, but succeeded by a coalition force of 2,000 men from five different countries including Turkey, stationed at the Turkish border town of Silopi. The coalition force was gradually withdrawn from Silopi, but the special air contingent at Incirlik Airbase near Adana, consisting of 32 American, five French and eight British fighters, was retained within the framework of Operation POISED HAMMER. [Ref 53:p. 1]

By proposing the formation of a "safe haven" in northern Iraq, Turkey has automatically contributed to Iraq's losing state authority over northern Iraq and to the creation of a political vacuum in this part of the country. This political vacuum was filled by the Iraqi Kurds, leading to the emergence in the spring of 1992 of what is, in effect, an unofficial Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq under the protection of the international force. Thus, Turkey which has always been concerned about any kind of influence that will encourage its own Kurds to seek independence, has found itself in a contradiction which still remains unresolved. Turkey, on various occasions, has declared that it opposes any partition of Iraq which could lead to the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. On the other hand, the mandate for the

stationing of the air contingent at Incirlik Airbase has been continuously renewed by the Turkish parliament in six-month installments since the start of Operation POISED HAMMER, contributing to the institutionalization of a separate Iraqi Kurdish identity in northern Iraq and keeping the territorial integrity of Iraq in doubt.

As the Turkish government's attempts of finding a political middle ground for the Kurdish problem were presented with the complicating factors mentioned above, the Turkish government has found it a more secure approach to pursue a cautious policy toward the problem. Hardliners in both the government and the military have stated their concerns that the recent reforms such as lifting the ban on the use of Kurdish language and providing freedom to issue publications in Kurdish would lead to other demands, then leading to demands for autonomy, federation and eventually a separate Kurdish state on the Turkish land as envisaged, more than 70 years ago, in the Treaty of Sevres. Meanwhile, the deaths of Turkish soldiers, which totaled 1,768 between 1992 and 1994, and the arrival of their coffins in various Anatolian towns and villages increased the anti-Kurdish feelings throughout the country. The resentment that was felt against the PKK throughout the country had reached an unprecedented level when a PKK squad in Bitlis ambushed and killed 35 unarmed Turkish soldiers in Bitlis who had completed their terms as soldiers and were on the way to their homes in May 1993. The radical and provocative statements and actions of some extremist HEP deputies against the Turkish state, which had openly started during the inauguration ceremony of the Turkish parliament on November 6, 1991, continued in an increasing manner, and thus have exacerbated the public disturbance. The pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), founded by the same party cadres of HEP in May 1993 after the state authorities started legal proceedings against the HEP, held a party convention which turned a separatist convention and show of the PKK. In this

convention, the DEP gave signals that it would become even more radical. It kept this promise when its chairman Hatip Dicle tried to justify a PKK bomb attack in Istanbul's Tuzla district against military cadets waiting at a rail station, which left five young soldiers dead, as a rightful action.

In this atmosphere, which replaced the hopeful atmosphere of 1991 and early 1992, the PKK-led violence has continued and thus not given the Turkish government the chance to reduce its military presence in east and south-east Turkey or lift the state of emergency which was declared in 1987 in ten provinces. According to Turkish official numbers declared on January 2, 1995, in 7,793 PKK-related incidents that took place between January 1992 and December 1994, 1,768 members of the state security forces and 527 village guards were killed, and 8,811 PKK terrorists have been captured by the state security forces. Within these three years 2,115 villages have been evacuated for security reasons, 5,210 village schools remained closed and 192 schools were set on fire by the PKK. [Ref 54:p. 1]

Today, the Turkish government needs to review its approach to the Kurdish problem. Some still argue for a continued military effort to reduce the PKK-led violence. The radical and provocative statements made by the deputies of pro-Kurdish parties, their determination to give offense to the symbols of the Turkish state at every opportunity, the intensification of the PKK-led violence throughout the country within the past a few years have strengthened the position of these people who see the Turkish government's attempts of finding a political middle ground for the Kurdish problem, which would take the pressure in this matter from them, as the first extremely dangerous steps toward the eventual disintegration of the country. Others seek to reduce the level of violence through political reforms that will provide the Kurdish population with increased cultural and educational rights, and economic growth in the east and south-east regions.

Indeed, the successive Turkish governments have always pursued the strategy of fostering the economic development of the eastern and south-eastern regions and thus reducing the poverty of these regions, in the belief that an improvement in living standards will defuse separatist ambitions. The GAP, which will double Turkey's total agricultural output by opening an additional 1.7 million hectares of land to irrigation, and create a total of 3,324,000 new jobs, has been the centerpiece of this strategy. However, due to the financial difficulties of the country, Turkey has been able to complete, after spending more than 10 years and \$11 billion, only 40 percent of the irrigation projects and 56 percent of energy projects included in the GAP by the end of 1994. [Ref 31:p. 4] Turkey still needs to spend more than \$20 billions in order to complete the project, the final expenditure for which is estimated to be around \$32 billion. Although bringing economic prosperity to the south-east and pulling down the high rate of unemployment in the region have acquired greater urgency with the intensification of the violence in the region, if the Turkish economy does not recover quickly from the crisis that it fell into recently, Turkey will not be able to transform the proposed benefits of the project into reality for at least another decade.

Therefore, the political reforms that will provide the Kurdish population with increased cultural and educational rights remain the only alternative available to the Turkish government. While liberal policies toward the Kurdish problem, initiated in 1991 under President Turgut Ozal and Premier Suleyman Demirel constituted first steps in this direction, Tansu Ciller government that came to power with the death of Turgut Ozal and election of Suleyman Demirel as president, has refrained from taking additional steps that will further contribute to the attempts of building confidence between the state and the Kurdish population. Her inexperience in domestic policy matters, and the new government's decision to give

priority to the economic matters in an attempt to pull the country out of the economic crisis that it fell into, have strengthened the position of hardliners who wanted to deal with the Kurdish problem through military means rather than political. As the new government hardened its stance toward the problem, the Kurdish violence throughout Turkey has increased, proving once more the necessity of methods, other than military, to handle the problem.

Today, the government needs to take the initiative and pursue political reforms that will prevent further alienation of the Kurdish population from the state, and rebuild the confidence between the state and its Kurdish population. The reform package of 1991 which lifted the ban on the use of Kurdish language and provided the freedom to issue publications in Kurdish, can be enlarged by lifting the ban on radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish. The government may also allow the Kurdish people to open their own schools, and let them teach and learn in their own schools where the medium of instruction is Kurdish. However, at this point, it should also be stated that Turkey is confronted by a terrorist movement which continues to claim not only the lives of state security forces, but also the lives of non-combatants, including teachers, health workers and men of religion as well as children. Thus, on the issue of PKK-led violence, determined opposition to terror remains the only alternative available to Turkey. Additional initiatives, like abolishing the law that introduced states of emergency in ten provinces of east and south-east Turkey or decreasing the number of security forces stationed in the regions of violence would, of course, be helpful in increasing the effectiveness of this kind of cultural and educational reforms in reducing the violence and building confidence between the state and the Kurdish population. The ability of the Turkish government to take these initiatives, depends on the evolution of the PKK's activities. Today it has become clear that the PKK aims at



creating an environment ridden by violence, which would compel the Turkish state to harden its attitude toward the Kurdish problem and thus pave the way to the polarization of society along ethnic lines. It should be kept in mind that the PKK does not represent all Kurds, and, thus, the Turkish government in its war against the PKK should pay attention not to alienate millions of Kurds totally assimilated to the surrounding society by forcing them to make a choice between the state and the PKK. This task, in the face rising levels of PKK-led violence, is increasingly difficult.

Turkey would be far better off if it could put the Kurdish problem behind it. It has already diverted resources and energy away from the pursuit of other domestic and international goals. Operations of the Turkish security forces in both Turkey and northern Iraq, damage to the infrastructure and government property, compensation payments to the government workers and employees working in the region, and housing grants to local villagers whose houses were evacuated for security reasons cost Turkey an estimated total of \$3 to \$4 billion every year. At a time when Turkey seeks to expand its role in regional and international affairs, the continuation of the domestic violence and instability also undermines Turkey's role as a stabilizing influence in the turbulent regions of the world. As long as the Kurdish conflict continues, Turkey will remain vulnerable to the manipulations of Syria and Iran which continue supporting the PKK despite Turkey's attempts of halting their support

Syria has periodically used its support for the PKK as an instrument of pressure against Turkey. The longstanding territorial and ideological differences between Damascus and Ankara have played an important role in motivating Syria to maintain this instrument of pressure against Turkey. Turkey's ability to cut off the flow of the Euphrates, which is badly needed downstream by Syria, has been an additional concern for this country. The "water problem" came to the fore again in

January 1990 when Turkey completed the construction of the body of the Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates and greatly reduced the flow of the river for one month as it partially filled the reservoir behind the dam. It was only after the victory of the United States-led coalition forces over Iraq and the dissolution of the Soviet Union that Syria asked the PKK to vacate the training camps in the Bekaa Valley in a response to the pressures exerted by Turkey and the United States. Despite its promises to end support for the PKK, Syria has continued to provide clandestine assistance to the PKK. Even if Syria stops providing assistance, it can always revive its support for the PKK if its interests dictate.

Iran, on the other hand, has its own reasons for fostering instability in Turkey. With the end of Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has been engaged in a rivalry with Turkey in establishing influence among the newly independent republics of Central Asia. Iran has also been disturbed by Turkey's pro-Azerbaijani stand with regard to Armeno-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno Karabakh and the active role that Turkey played in the Nagorno-Karabakh mediation process. Furthermore, both Iran and Syria, which have been long disturbed by Turkey's traditional pro-Western orientation and its democratic, secular regime, look on Turkey as a Trojan Horse which serves the United States in the establishment of a permanent Western presence in the Middle East.

One of the other most adverse effects of the prolonged Kurdish problem is the damage that it has done to Turkey's relation with its European allies and the United States. For instance, the good relations between Germany and Turkey have severely suffered from the problem and it does not seem to be easy to restore them to their previous level. The German government's permissive attitude toward PKK activities in Germany has given the PKK freedom to direct its attacks against Turkish government and business interests in Europe from German soil. Despite Turkey's heavy pressure, Germany

continued its permissive attitude until November 26, 1993, when the Federal Interior Minister Manfred Kanther announced that the PKK was henceforth banned in Germany. [Ref 47:p. 101] German-Turkish relations were further strained when Germany decided to suspend military aid to Turkey in 1992 because previously supplied equipment had been used in security operations in south-east Turkey. Even though the aid has been restored, Bonn announced that supposedly due to fiscal constraints associated with the unification, Germany will end its long-standing military aid to Turkey by the end of 1995.

Because of the sensitivity of Europeans to human rights concerns, the Kurdish problem also has the potential to destabilize EU-Turkish relations. The EU and the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly have on various occasions criticized the Turkish government's alleged disregard of human rights in its fight against the PKK. The closure of the DEP by the Constitutional Court in July 1994 and the sentencing of six of its former deputies to prison terms of up to 15 years in December 1994 by the State Security Court, have resulted in further straining of Turkey's relations with its Western allies. Turkey has, on various occasions, stated that these six former DEP deputies have not been convicted, as some have stated, of having said things the Turkish government or military preferred not to hear, but of having established organic links with the PKK and giving shelter to the PKK militants who tried to escape the search operations of the state security forces. The Turkish government has also stated that Turkey, submitted to the European Human Rights Convention and its control mechanisms, will abide by the any possible ruling of the European Human Rights Court on the case if the verdict of the State Security Court is appealed by the defendants to the European Human Rights Convention. These statements and the court evidences including the communications of some of these deputies with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, monitored and recorded by the National

Intelligence Agency, have not prevented many European officials from harshly criticizing Turkey and warning it about the implications of its actions on Turkey's integration process with the EU. Michael Lake, the EU's representative to Turkey, has gone further and stated that "currently the European Parliament believes that the human rights issue in Turkey has become serious enough to prevent Turkey's custom union with EU," reminding the Turkish officials of the necessity of the European Parliament's approval for the effectivity of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement signed on March 6, 1995. [Ref 55:p. 3]

The relations between the United States and Turkey have also been harmed by Turkey's prolonged Kurdish problem. Even though the United States has traditionally supported Turkey in its war against terrorism and provided Turkey with military equipment, especially AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters and S70-A Black Hawk General Purpose helicopters which are heavily used by the state security forces against the PKK, it has been critical of Turkey's human rights record especially with respect to the Kurdish population. The FY95 aid bill signed by President Clinton in August 1994, stipulates that 10 percent of the \$364.5 million in direct loans earmarked for Turkey will be withheld until the United States Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense, makes certain that Turkey makes progress in human rights and on the Cyprus issue. Furthermore, the disturbance that the United States has felt about the closure of the DEP and the sentencing of its six former deputies to prison terms of up to 15 years has been made clear to the Turkish government by John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary for State responsible for human rights, during his third trip to Turkey in five months. [Ref 56:p. 1]

The relations between Turkey and its Western allies were further strained when Turkey launched a military campaign in northern Iraq against the PKK on March 20, 1995. 35,000 Turkish troops, supported by aircraft and artillery, crossed

the Iraqi border and penetrated 40 kilometers into Iraq along a 250 kilometer front to track down 3,000 PKK militants and prevent them from using northern Iraq as a base for attacks against Turkey. [Ref 57:p. 1] This operation, code-named "Operation Steel," is the sixth and the largest one among the military campaigns that Turkey has launched in northern Iraq since 1984 when Turkey entered into an "hot pursuit" accord with Baghdad with which Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkey enter Iraq in order to launch military campaign against the PKK camps in the region. [Ref 58:p. 1] "Operation Steel" was launched in the face of increasing infiltration into Turkey of PKK militants, who, taking advantage of the fighting between the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Massoud Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani, found increased freedom of movement in northern Iraq. The EU has urged Turkey to keep the operation short and withdraw its troops as soon as possible, and warned that a delayed Turkish action would greatly risks the ratification of the EU-Turkish Customs Union Agreement by the European Parliament. Initially, the United States has been far less critical of the Turkish move than the EU has been. However, in the face of prolonged operation, it has increased pressure on Turkey for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Iraq, and the United States' concern about the lack of a firm timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish troops have been made clear to the Turkish government in a visit by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke to Ankara. [Ref 59:p 1] Turkey, while stating that its troops will be withdrawn from northern Iraq as soon as three PKK camps located in the region are purged of militants, has also expressed its concern about the security vacuum in the region and asked the assistance of the United States to bring to a halt the fighting between Kurdish factions in northern Iraq. The withdrawal of Turkish troops has begun with the return of a Turkish brigade of 3,000 men

and of 60 armored vehicles that provided artillery support to these troops from northern Iraq to Turkey on April 7-8, 1995. [Ref 60:p. 1]

Unfortunately, as a result of heavy pressure exerted on Turkey by the United States and its European allies with respect to the Kurdish problem, the Turkish people has come to perceive a serious conflict between Turkey's national interest and the interests of its Western allies. The perception of conflict with the West has never been so strong and widespread among the Turkish people since 1974 when Turkey decided to intervene in Cyprus militarily despite the heavy opposition of its Western allies. Today, there is a fear among an increasingly greater number of Turkish people that the West, in order to achieve what it could not at the end of World War I with the Treaty of Sèvres, is trying to use Kurds in Turkey to divide the country. Aware of this collective concern, politicians such as Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey at the time of its military intervention in Cyprus, "have started to make pronouncements to the effect that the United States is currently engaged in an effort to carve out a Kurdish state from south-east Anatolia" as envisaged by President Woodrow Wilson more than 80 years ago. [Ref 61:p. 12] Similarly, both Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Ciller have stated that if Turkey's presence in the West means that it must be divided, then they would rather not see Turkey in the Western camp. This language, touching the legacy of the War of Independence out of which modern Turkey emerged, is understood very well by every Turk. The Turkish people believe that Turkey cannot afford to be more tolerant toward separatists, nor allow abuses of freedom of expression by those who openly advocate rising up against the state just to accommodate its Western allies. The Turkish people also believe that with the territorial integrity of their country at stake, the dues they are expected to pay for entry into the European club seem

too high. The West has said and may continue to say that it does not want to see Turkey split up and divided in order for an independent Kurdish state to be established. However, the real problem is that this is not what an increasing number of Turkish people have come to believe. If this belief increases in Turkey, it may become much more difficult for the Turkish government to develop policies that are more acceptable to the West in the handling of the problem.

Therefore, before being too late, the Turkish government should restart attempts of finding a political middle ground for the Kurdish problem, and try alternatives that are currently available to it, such as political reforms that will provide the Kurdish population with increased cultural and educational rights. Currently, Turkey has nothing to lose if it takes these measures. Since only time will show whether or not these reforms will be effective in the settlement of the Kurdish problem, Turkey should initiate these measures as soon as possible rather than letting the problem drag out, and accepting a serious confrontation with the West.

## **B. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST**

### **1. Turkey and the European Union**

Turkey's secularist intelligentsia and the mainstream parties have invested a good deal of political and personal capital and time in Turkey's full membership in the EU. Since the foundation of the republic, all of the mainstream parties that came to power have pursued a pro-Western policy aimed at establishing all kinds of economic, military and political ties with the democracies of the West to promote Turkey's continued economic and societal modernization. Within this framework, integration with the EU, which would also help Turkey to be seen and to be perceived as being European, has been one of the primary objectives of the Turkish governments, leading to Turkey's official application, in April 1987, to the EC for full membership.

The "Opinion Report" of the Commission of the European Community on Turkey's request for accession to the Community, which concluded that "it would be inappropriate for the Community--which is itself undergoing major changes while the whole of Europe is in a state of flux--to become involved in new accession negotiations at this stage," recommended that accession negotiations with any country should not start before 1993 at the earliest, except in special circumstances. [Ref 24:p. 4] In addition to such a general assessment, the Commission also stated that the specific analysis of the economic and political situation of Turkey showed that it would be hard for Turkey to cope with the adjustment constraints with which it would be confronted in the medium term if it acceded to the Community. Economic problems such as a persistent high rate of inflation, low level of economic development by EC standards in terms of GDP and GDP per capita, a high rate of population growth (2.5 percent annually, ten times the EC average) that results in sustained high level of unemployment despite the high economic growth rates that Turkey achieved throughout the 1980s, structural incompatibilities between the Turkish economy and the Community, as well as political problems such as the need to expand political pluralism, the ability to sustain the improvement in human rights, the persistence of disputes with Greece, and the lack of solution to the Cyprus problem were characterized as some of the factors which would create adjustment constraints for Turkey. [Ref 24:p. 4-7]

The Commission also stated that:

. . . These doubts are accompanied by the concern the Community may feel regarding the burden Turkish accession would impose on its own resources. The additional budgetary burden, notably that resulting from the inclusion of Turkey in the structural funds, would be even greater than at the time of the last accessions, given Turkey's size and level of development. Access of Turkish Labour to the Community Labour market, which would eventually have to come



about . . . gives rise to fears, particularly while unemployment remains at a high level within the Community. [Ref 24:p. 7]

The Commission's 'Opinion Report' resulted in mixed interpretations in Turkey, leading to controversies over whether or not Turkey was still eligible for full membership. The Commission also suggested the reactivation of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement of 1964 which had been dormant for a long time and proposed a set of measures towards increasing interdependence between the Community and Turkey. The Commission report stated that:

. . . To contribute to the success of Turkey's modernization efforts, the Commission recommends that the Community propose to Turkey a series of substantial measures which, without casting doubt on its eligibility for membership of the Community, would enable both partners to enter now on the road towards increased interdependence and integration. [Ref 24:p. 8]

These proposals included measures in four areas: the completion of the customs union between Turkey and the Community in accordance with the provisions of the Association agreement, the revitalization and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation, and the strengthening of political and cultural links. [Ref 24:p. 8-9]

The Council of Ministers, adopting the report of the Commission without any change, endorsed the reactivation of the Association Agreement with Turkey and requested the Commission to study a "package of cooperation" between the EC and Turkey. Announced in July 1990, this package, also known as the Matutes Plan, foresaw the establishment of a customs union for industrial products by December 31, 1995, the implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol which would release the EC aid to Turkey in the amount of 600 million

European Currency Unit (ECU), and included an important section on cooperation between Turkey and the Community in various sectors including industry, agriculture, finance, transport, energy, science and technology. [Ref 62:p. 83]

This "package of cooperation" which was conceived to reactivate the Association Agreement, met with Greek resistance in the Council of Ministers. Greece used its veto power, particularly with regard to the proposals for resumptions of financial cooperation and conclusion of the Fourth Financial Protocol which would release the EC assistance funds to Turkey. Since Greece was able to use the Community platform to voice its demands and cast its veto whenever cooperation between the Community and Turkey came on to the agenda, the EC-Turkey Association Council, the key organ responsible from the implementation of the "package of cooperation," has also become dysfunctional. Under these circumstances, the work toward the customs union with Turkey has remained the only major positive element in Community-Turkey relations since 1990.

At this point Turkey's relations with Greece deserve brief comment because Turkish-EC/EU relations have come to be heavily controlled by the strategic goals of Greek foreign policy. Turkey and Greece have suffered poor relations for a long time. The list of ongoing disputes includes Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus, its recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and its continuing military presence in the island; the dispute over military and civil air traffic zones in Aegean Sea; alleged mistreatment of each other's minorities; and Turkish claims of militarization of Greek islands in the Aegean by Greece in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne. The longstanding dispute between the two countries over the territorial waters and continental shelf in Aegean Sea reached its peak level in November 1994 as the International Marine Law Agreement went into effect. Greece, withdrawing from NATO's planned "Dynamic Guard-94" naval

exercises in the international waters of the Aegean Sea at the last moment, began its own naval exercises named "Aegean Guard" in early October, and by carrying the exercise beyond its territorial waters in November, it has given impression that it will extend its territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 miles in accordance with that law. [Ref 63:p. 1] Turkey, as it did several times in the past, declared that it will regard the extension of Greece's territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles as an "act of war." Greece has then stated it has no intention of adopting the 12-mile limit for the moment.

Greece, organically linking the improvement of Turkey-EC/EU relations to the solution of Cyprus issue and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, has been able to draw the EC/EU into the Greek-Turkish dispute, and, as a member state, utilized its status to further its position and make relations between Turkey and the EC/EU more problematic. Athens' continued opposition to Turkish entry into the EC/EU has not only served the Greek aim of isolating Turkey from Europe, but also been useful for other Europeans who have had reservations about Turkey's full membership in the EC/EU.

The dissolution of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the ending of the Cold War and the divisions in Europe, forced the members of the European Community, which was facing a major economic reorganization following the adoption of its strategy on the Single European Market, to focus on these historical changes, and gave an additional impetus to the Community to take control over the social, economic and political affairs of Europe. These culminated in the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference in December 1991. With the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the Community members committed themselves to a vast array of new policy and institutional arrangements toward greater political and social integration, as well as monetary and economic union. At a moment when Europe was moving toward union, Turkey remained

excluded from the European political and economic processes and interactions.

With the end of Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey's importance in terms of its military manpower and geographic proximity to the Soviet Union has also been considerably reduced in the security calculations of Western Europe, which no longer needs to fear the East. The 1990-1991 Gulf War and the Turkey's strong pro-Western stance in this war have helped Turkey to restore its strategic importance for the West, but this has also resulted in the definition of its strategic importance largely in Middle Eastern rather than European terms. As a result, the EC countries, exploring the development of a "common foreign and security policy" as envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty have become "increasingly unwilling to accept the additional burden of a direct exposure in the Middle East" which Turkey's full membership in the Community would imply. [Ref 29:p. 104] Furthermore, with the demise of the Cold War and the dissolution of communist regimes, questions of democracy and human rights have been brought to the fore in the Western agenda, and at a time when the support and sympathy for democratic political systems, free societies and national self determination reached its peak, Turkey's Kurdish problem has brought the country under the international spotlight and made it an easy target for criticism by the Western Europeans, who have long been critical of Turkey's fragile democracy, interrupted by military interventions three times, and its poor human rights record. It appears that Turkey's Kurdish problem and the way Turkey tries to handle it have had the most damaging long term impact on West European perceptions of Turkey, contributing to further marginalization of Turkey in Europe.

In this atmosphere, the West Europeans, who became preoccupied with issues such as German unification, the task of assisting the economic and political reconstruction of the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe so that the

difficulties of transition do not overwhelm their fragile democracies and market economies, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and then implementation of it within the EU, domestic economic problems that stem from the prolonged recession in Europe and the increasing pressure of immigration throughout the Mediterranean basin from poorer countries to more prosperous countries of Europe, have given less attention to the issue of Turkey's full membership, and found it expedient to defer the issue without giving a specific date. The veto power of Greece has been useful for other members of the Community who have had reservations about Turkey's full membership, and rather than pressurizing Greece to withdraw its veto, they have reinforced the idea that Turkey's full membership was not feasible because of the Greek veto. In particular Germany, which exerts tremendous influence within the EU, has developed important reservations about Turkey's membership in that organization. Like the relations between Turkey and Greece, the German-Turkish relations also deserve brief comment because Turkey's relations with Germany, which has been viewed by Turkey, up until very recently, as the premier European ally of Turkey which could promote its application for membership in the EU, have become increasingly tense since the late 1980s and have further complicated the Turkish efforts to gain full membership in this organization.

The principal German concern has been the prospect of additional Turkish immigrants in Germany if all restrictions on the movement of labor were to be removed as a result of Turkey's full membership in the EU. Since the early 1960s, within the framework of two separate special agreements signed in 1957 and 1961 between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Labor of the then Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers had migrated from Turkey to the FRG until the imposition of an immigration ban in November 1973 by the FRG. [Ref 23:p. 141-142] The November 1973 ban did not lead to a sudden halt of

immigration to the FRG. Rather the composition of workers changed as more women and children began to participate in the emigration process as a result of family reunification policies. By the mid-1980s the number of Turkish workers in the FRG had exceeded 1.5 million and the size of Turkish population residing in this country had reached almost 1.8 million, more than one third of all foreigners residing in the FRG at that time. [Ref 23:p. 143] The issue of the immigration of Turkish workers started to damage the relations between Turkey and the FRG severely for the first time in 1986. The FRG, which became sensitive about the issue, developed important reservations about the movement of Turkish workers within the EC and prevented the free movement Turkish workers in the Community which was to be allowed as of December 1986 in accordance with the 1963 the EC-Turkey Association Agreement. This issue continued to damage the relations between the two countries especially after unification of the FRG with the German Democratic Republic. With the opening of the Iron Curtain, thousands of East Germans flooded into the labor market of Germany and began competing with the Turks and other non-German migrants. The financial burden of unification on the German economy and the state budget contributed to the deterioration of the general climate facing the foreign workers in Germany. The new Foreigners Law which went into effect in January 1991 clearly indicated a trend toward facilitating deportation of foreign workers, especially those who are recipients of social aid from the German government for themselves and/or their families. In certain states such as Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, the rights that were being enjoyed by the foreigners such as the right to be elected to local parliaments, have been abolished. Turkish government calls for the protection of the rights of Turkish citizens residing in Germany and the liberalization of Germany's restrictive citizenship requirements have strained the relations between the two countries. The rise of deadly

attacks on Turkish citizens in this country by neo-Nazi German groups and the German governments' responses to this right-wing violence have been another grave source of strain in the bilateral relations.

The reason for the deterioration of the relations between the two countries is not limited to the issue of immigration of Turkish workers to Germany. For several practical and ideological reasons, Germany has been actively involved in Turkey's Kurdish problem, and the stance that the German government took against Turkey has severely damaged their bilateral relations. Practically, the presence in Germany of more than 300,000 Turkish Kurds from among 1.8 million Turkish immigrants forces the German society and government to get involved in the problem. Ideologically, the principle of self-determination enjoys general support among Germans, and thus, Germany has been among the most sensitive in Europe on the issue of Turkey's human rights record and Kurdish problem. The German government's permissive attitude toward the PKK activities in Germany has given the PKK freedom to direct its terrorist operations against the Turkish government and business interests in Europe from this country. Germany's attitude toward the PKK was exemplified by the 15 October 1991 statement of Gottfried Henning, a German defense ministry official, that if Turkey continued its cross border "hot pursuit" attacks against the PKK camps in northern Iraq, Germany would ask NATO to reconsider its supply of weapons to Turkey. [Ref 64:p. 18] German foreign ministry officials denied that Henning's statement represented official German policy. However, in April 1992 the German government temporarily suspended defense assistance to Turkey on charges that in the PKK-led violence in south-east Turkey, the Turkish security forces had employed against the civilian population weapons previously supplied by Germany. Even though the arms embargo was later lifted, Bonn announced that supposedly due to fiscal constraints associated with the unification, Germany

will end its long-standing military aid to Turkey by the end of 1995, giving a major damage to Turkish-German security relations. [Ref 47:p. 101]

Following the Gottfried Henning's statement of 15 October, the German Cologne Chamber of Commerce announced on 16 October 1991 that German businesses and industries wishing to do business in south-east Turkey would have to apply for visas from the PKK offices in Germany. [Ref 64:p. 18] Turkey, interpreting this as a direct challenge to the sovereignty of Turkey and de facto recognition of the PKK, officially protested to Germany and increased its pressure on the German government for the banning of PKK activities in Germany. Despite Turkey's heavy pressure, the German government continued its permissive attitude toward PKK activities in Germany until November 26, 1993 when the Federal Interior Minister Manfred Kanther announced that the PKK was banned in Germany. [Ref 47:p. 101]

The German government's hesitation to support Turkey during the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis has also left a negative impression on Turkish opinion. Germany has been the leading country in showing reluctance to provide the symbolic NATO support to Turkey in order to deter a potential Iraqi attack on Turkey during the crisis, fearing that a conflict between Turkey and Iraq could draw NATO "into a confrontation that would be peripheral to overall European interests." [Ref 47:p. 15] Eighteen German Alpha jets were eventually deployed to south-east Turkey as a part of Allied Mobile Force-Air, but this has not been sufficient to erase the negative Turkish impressions about the German commitment to Turkey's security. In an interview broadcast on German television on January 24, 1991, Turgut Ozal, then President, termed Germany "an unreliable NATO ally" that had been protected by the alliance for forty years and was "now unwilling to stand by Turkey in its time of need." [Ref 29:p. 134] Similarly, when asked about Turkish-German relations, Suleyman Demirel, then prime



minister, replied that "The smells coming from there [Germany] are not good," demonstrating the Turkish sense of frustration over German policy and attitudes. [Ref 64:p. 19]

As it is seen, the Turkish desire to elevate relations with Western Europe to higher levels, in particular the wish to ultimately become an organic part in the process of European integration around the Maastricht Treaty, has remained far from realization. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and of the divisions in Europe has resulted in West Europeans entering a process in which political and social tensions and incompatibilities between Turkey and these countries have been magnified and crystallized. In the words of Turkish political scientist Dr. Sezer Bazoglu:

. . . the network of relations that Turkey had built with Western Europe at the height of the Cold War seems to have entered a state of paralysis, if not dissolution, at this historical moment when military and ideological security from the Soviet threat is no longer the determining influence in shaping Europeans' foreign and security policy choices and strategies. [Ref 47:p. 5]

Despite all the political and social tensions, the economic and commercial ties between Turkey and the EU have remained undamaged. The EU continues to be both Turkey's main trading partner and the primary source that provides inflow of foreign funds into the country. The share of EU countries in Turkey's total imports, which reached 41.8 percent in 1990 with \$9.3 billion, has continued to increase and reached the level of \$13 billion in 1993 accounting for 44 percent of Turkey's total exports. During the first 6 months of 1994, this number has reached 45.4 percent. [Ref 28:p. 27] The share of EU countries in Turkey's total exports, which reached 53.2 percent in 1990, remained at the level of 51.8 percent in 1991, 51.7 percent in 1992 and 49.5 percent in 1993, while increasing in nominal terms, from \$6.9 billion in 1990 to \$7.3

billion in 1993. The EU countries' share in the total amount of foreign direct investment in Turkey, which reached its peak level of \$1.25 billion in 1990, dropped to \$1 billion in 1991 as the attention of European investors began to divert toward Eastern Europe. [Ref 30:p. 30] However, it has recovered quickly, reaching \$1.12 billion in 1992 and \$1.17 billion in 1993. For the first six months of 1994, the total amount of direct investment by EU countries has amounted to \$630 million, accounting for 71 percent of the total foreign direct investment in Turkey for this period. [Ref 65:p. 30]

Similarly, the work toward a customs union between Turkey and the EU, which was envisaged in the "package of cooperation" prepared in accordance with the directives of the EC Council of Ministers in 1990, has continued and the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement was signed on March 6, 1995, at the meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council in Brussels. According to the agreement, it has been decided that the EU countries and Turkey will completely eliminate the custom tariffs for industrial products in their trade with each other as of January 1, 1996.<sup>5</sup> Within the framework of the agreement, which makes Turkey the only non-member country to achieve a customs union agreement with the EU, it has been also decided that the EU shall provide Turkey with financial assistance in order to compensate for the losses that the Turkish economy will incur as a result of the customs union. Although the amount of financial assistance to Turkey was not officially announced, the EU is expected to provide Turkey with more than \$3.2 billion within five years following the effectivity of the agreement. [Ref 66:p. 1]

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<sup>5</sup>Turkey has been gradually reducing the customs tariffs in its trade with the EC/EU countries since 1973 within the framework of a timetable, set forth in the Additional Protocol (1970) to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement of 1963.

Like the 198 "Opinion Report" of the Commission of the European Communities, the Customs Union Agreement has resulted in mixed interpretations in Turkey, leading to controversies over whether or not it gives Turkey an advantage over the Central and Eastern European countries with which the EU signed association agreements and increases its chance of being admitted to the EU. The EU's insistence on the ratification of the agreement by the European Parliament so that the agreement can go into effect has cast doubts on the willingness of the EU countries to take Turkey's membership issue into serious consideration in a reasonable time period, and exacerbated the Turkish concerns that once Turkey overcomes existing obstacles to EU membership, the EU will invent new ones to prevent Turkey's full membership. Statement by Michael Lake, the EU representative to Turkey, that "currently the European Parliament believes that the human rights issue in Turkey has become serious enough to prevent Turkey's custom union with EU," has resulted in pessimism in Turkey also about the future of the customs union agreement. [Ref 55:p. 3]

## **2. Turkey and the Western European Union**

Turkey's exclusion from the EU has enormous security implications as well. The increasing tendency among several West European countries to improve the coordination and cooperation of their security policies in institutions outside NATO, and to give greater energy to the process of "Europeanization of Europe's defense" by enhancing the West European Union's (WEU) operational capabilities, has given rise to the Turkish concerns that "these trends and moves may some day actually culminate in a Europe without the United States and a European security community, a kind of 'Fortress Europe' built around the EU and the WEU but without Turkey." [Ref 67:p. 51]

The transformation process that NATO entered with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the military and

ideological competition with the West and the consequent demise of the Cold War has eventually led to the promulgation of "The Alliance New Strategic Concept" at NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991. The political impetus required for a greater military role for the WEU, which had been developing for some years, was also formalized at the same summit, and a few weeks later on with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, it was decided that the WEU would continue to be developed simultaneously as the defense component of the EU and as a means of strengthening European pillar of NATO.

Following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the nine nations of the WEU had met at Petersberg near Bonn in June 1992 and the resulting "Petersberg Declaration," issued at the conclusion of that meeting, included a section on strengthening the WEU's operational role which envisaged the establishment of the WEU Planning Cell and "military units answerable to the WEU" in order to give a military reality to the concept of a European defense identity. [Ref 68:p. 8] The Petersberg declaration has also set out a three stage process for the WEU's development. The first stage makes the WEU "an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance." A second stage will be "the eventual framing of a common European defense policy," which might in the third stage, "lead to a common defense." [Ref 69:p. 10]

In January 1993, the WEU Council and its Secretariat were transferred from London to Brussels and the WEU Planning Cell became operational, as planned in the Petersberg Declaration, in April 1993, illustrating the will to make the WEU play a key role in constructing a common European defense. Furthermore, with the inauguration of the WEU Satellite Center in Torrejon, near Madrid on April 28, 1993, the WEU obtained autonomous satellite verification capability of monitoring compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe

(CFE) and to track potential threats to European security, enhancing the WEU's operational capabilities. [Ref 69:p. 11]

Turkey, which applied to the WEU for membership in 1987, has recognized the rising importance of the WEU's role and place in the emerging European security architecture as the defense component of the European Union. The considerable progress that the WEU has achieved in enhancing its operational capabilities has given an additional impetus to Turkey to lobby hard for full membership in this organization. Despite the considerable efforts that Turkey has made toward gaining full membership status, it has been able to achieve only associate membership in the WEU. Turkey, together with Norway and Iceland, became associate members following the 1992 Rome Summit of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the WEU nations. [Ref 70:p. 29]

Turkey's current associate status does not allow it to participate fully in discussions and in the voting process. This restriction, preventing Turkey from playing a role in the shaping of the evolving European defense identity, has caused dissatisfaction in Turkey as well as concerns of exclusion from European political and military processes which may culminate in "a kind of 'Fortress Europe' built around the EU and the WEU." [Ref 67:p. 51] Following the signing of the Turkey-WEU Association Agreement in November 1992, Hikmet Cetin, then Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted Ankara's dissatisfaction and remarked that "Turkey accepts its current status only as a temporary measure until it achieves full membership" in the WEU. [Ref 47:p. 12] Underscoring the importance of full membership for Turkey in the WEU, Ian Lesser of RAND has noted:

. . . Turkish exclusion from full participation in these [European defense] arrangements, regardless of their precise form, would be understood in Ankara as a demonstration of Europe's unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security role on the continent. [Ref 29:p. 107]

It is not only the limited role allocated for Turkey in the shaping of the evolving European defense identity that causes dissatisfaction and frustration in Turkey as to its associate member status. More important than this, the collective defense provisions of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which are not tied to a specific geographic area unlike the NATO's collective defense provisions which are restricted to the area described in Article VI of the Washington Treaty, do not apply to Turkey because of its associate member status. In other words, the WEU is not required to invoke the defense clause of the Brussels Treaty and come to the Turkey's aid in case of an aggression against Turkish territory.

Although European officials insist that associate membership is a "cast iron" security guarantee, their reaction to Turkey's request for the deployment of the AMF-A to eastern Turkey during the 1990-1991 Gulf War as a sign of solidity of NATO's security guarantee to Turkey in case of an armed attack by Iraq has demonstrated clearly the reluctance of some European allies to come to the aid of Turkey even in the absence of an Iraqi attack. Some European allies, led by Germany, have shown reluctance to provide this symbolic support, fearing that "a conflict between Turkey and one of its neighbors could result in Turkey invoking the defense clause of the Washington Treaty and drawing NATO into a confrontation that would be peripheral to overall European interests." [Ref 47:p. 15] In the face of heavy criticism by Turkey and the United States, the AMF-A was eventually deployed to Turkey, but the credibility of claims by European officials that Turkey's associate membership is a "cast iron" guarantee was severely damaged in the eyes of the Turkish people. It was obvious that NATO's European allies would have been extremely reluctant to come to the aid of Turkey if it had actually become the target of an Iraqi attack.

This event has demonstrated that the EU, which desires to move quickly toward a common foreign and security policy, will be increasingly unwilling to accept the additional burden of a direct exposure in the unstable and volatile regions of the world such as the Middle East and Transcaucasus, which Turkey's full membership in the EU and WEU would imply. [Ref 29:p. 104] The WEU members try to justify their opposition to Turkey's full membership basically on the grounds that it is not a full member of the EU. In fact, Turkey's strong pro-Western stance during the Gulf War has resulted in its strategic role to be assessed in its Middle Eastern context rather than European, and thus, the prospect of Turkey's full membership in the WEU has diminished considerably on the contrary to Turkey's hopes that its pro-Western stance and contribution to the protection of the interests of the West would be appreciated by Europe and help Turkey become a full member of the WEU.

### **3. Turkey and the United States**

Currently, the relations between the United States and Turkey are undergoing a period of reexamination in the light of changes that the end of Cold War brought onto international scene. Turkey knows that of all Western countries, the United States is the most sympathetic to Turkey's interests and most willing to go to work on its behalf. However, it is also a known fact that there are strong currents in the United States in favor of letting Europeans take care of their own defense. The size of American forces in Europe has already moved down from more than 300,000 troops to roughly 100,000. Despite President Clinton's pledge that the United States shall continue to maintain the size of its forces in Europe at this level, the increasing tendency among several West European countries to give greater energy to enhancing the WEU's operational capabilities has given rise to the Turkish concerns that "these trends and moves may some day actually culminate in a Europe without the United States and a European

security community, a kind of 'Fortress Europe' built around the EU and the WEU but without Turkey." [Ref 67:p. 51]

Thus, increasingly greater numbers of people within the Turkish political and business elite as well as in the Turkish military have come to the opinion that over-reliance on the United States may not be in Turkey's long-term interests, and that, in the words of Turkish political scientist Dr. Sezer Bazoglu, "a bilateral military relationship with the United States would turn Turkey into a military outpost of Europe while Western Europe closed itself into a united Europe." [Ref 47:p. 17]

These concerns are not new. The relations between Turkey and the United States, which began with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and eventually led to Turkey's membership in NATO, have been periodically disturbed by the emergence of issues damaging the confidence and trust between the two countries. President Lyndon B. Johnson's letter of 1964, which led to the abandonment of initial Turkish plans of intervention in Cyprus and the Congressional arms embargo of 1975 which was imposed following Turkey's intervention in Cyprus during the summer of 1974 placed considerable strain on bilateral relations and raised serious doubts in Turkey about the reliability of the United States as an ally of Turkey. Furthermore, geopolitical considerations which had dominated European attitudes toward Turkey during the 1950s and 1960s gradually lost their importance as Europe began prioritizing, during the 1980s, the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy issue, and distancing itself from the United States. [Ref 23:p. 31] This fact was apprehended by many Turkish policymakers, and it was argued that extensive reliance on the United States without developing political relations with Europeans, could leave Turkey out in the cold when bipolarity ended. This concern has been one of the reasons that led to the Turkey's 1987 application to the EC for full membership. Turkey's rapprochement with the United States as a result of



developments that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Iran and Afghanistan was a signal of its marginalization in Europe, and application to the EC was an attempt by Turkey to pull the country back into European mainstream.

However, with the exclusionary signs that Turkey receives from the EU and the WEU, Turkey's relations with the United States have acquired greater significance, at least from Turkey's viewpoint, and are expected to become much more important in case Turkey continues to be excluded from the ongoing European processes toward greater economic, political and especially military integration. If the extend of European integration does not meet Turkey's expectations, particularly in terms of security arrangements, then Turkey will seek assistance from the United States to compensate for the lack support from the WEU or NATO. If Turkey fails to achieve full membership in the EU and the WEU, Ankara will desire continued economic and military assistance from the United States and look to it for measures that will increase marketing opportunities of Turkish goods and services in this country, and thus, will support the general development of Turkish industry and society. Ankara will also press the United States to support Turkey's position in Europe and ask its assistance to bring pressure on the Europeans to achieve Turkish goals of full membership in the EU and WEU.

American interests may require that the United States provide such assistance and encourage Turkey's integration into the West so that Turkey maintains its pro-Western orientation. The United States recognizes the importance of Turkey, as President Clinton put it:

. . . in helping to play a stabilizing role in a host of regional trouble spots ranging from the former Yugoslavia, through the Caucasus, into Central Asia, and, of course, toward the southeast, where Iraq and Iran both continue to pose problems for peace and stability in the world. [Ref 71:p. 767]

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey's strategic and political significance has acquired a new regional dimension considering the turbulence and instabilities in the Balkans, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The United States wants a continued constructive Turkish approach to those areas and to ensure that Turkey does not add to the instability of these regions. In the words of Graham F. Fuller:

. . . Turkey's growing importance today is much more powerfully defined by its centrality to regions of major instability in which long-range policies of Turkey could undergo significant and unprecedented change. The policies adopted by Turkey will have a great impact on many key problems, with Turkey serving either as a stabilizing force or as a complicating and exacerbating factor. [Ref 29:p. 165]

It is also a fact that having a close ally such as Turkey, which has more or less parallel interests with the United States in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, offers the United States a measure of influence in those regions, and it can benefit from Turkey's insight, influence and access to these areas.

However, the review of relations between the two countries comes at a time when the American policymakers are focusing more sharply on domestic issues and are spending less time on foreign affairs. The United States also faces economic problems which, when combined with the expectations of peace dividend, result in shrinking defense budgets and increasingly constrained foreign aid funds. Currently, these considerations, in the eyes of American policymakers, seem to have prevailed over the policy option that favors providing Turkey with the assistance that it expects to get from the United States. For instance, the security assistance to Turkey by the United States, long the centerpiece of the Turkish-American relations, had been raised, from \$553.4 million to

\$635.4 million in 1991 appropriations, but the United States Congress reduced, in 1992 appropriations, the Bush administration's proposed budget allocation for military assistance to Turkey from \$543 million to \$450 million. [Ref 72:p. 373] The amount of the United States security assistance provided to Turkey has continuously shrunk since then. According to the FY95 aid bill, H.R. 4426, that President Clinton signed into act in August 26, 1994, the Congress has determined the security assistance to Turkey as \$364.5 million. [Ref 73:p. 1] Furthermore, as of 1992, Congress has converted military assistance money from outright grants to loan credits, putting a further burden on Turkey's total foreign debt of approximately \$65 billion. These actions have not been welcomed by Turkey, which is in the middle of a multi-year, multi-billion dollar defense modernization program, heavily suffering from the adverse effects of the economic crisis that the country fell into.

Furthermore the timing of these actions has coincided with a period during which Turkey is incurring income loss of almost \$500 million every year due to the closure of the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, one of the actions that Turkey took in support of the United States-led coalition during the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Turkey stated its desire to diversify its relations with the United States, which are based predominantly on security assistance and defense cooperation. In this respect, Turkey has seen increased investment and trade with the United States, which would also help Turkey compensate for the losses it incurs due to the war, as the first important step in this direction. The United States under the Bush administration promised to review Turkey's textile quotas toward increasing Turkey's access to the American textile and apparel market, and to encourage American investors to invest in Turkey. However the volume of trade between the two countries, which stood at the level of \$3.1 billion in 1991, has not shown any development in favor

of Turkey. The volume of trade increased in 1992 to only \$3.4 billion and to \$4.3 billion in 1993, not because of increased Turkish exports but increased imports from the United States. [Ref 28:p. 26-27] Similarly, foreign direct investment coming to Turkey from the United States reduced from 456.3 million in 1991 to 197.6 million in 1992 and has not increased to its 1991 level since then. [Ref 74:p. 30]

Consequently, Turkey, criticizing the United States for not adequately recognizing its support of coalition of forces against Iraq and especially the difficult economic sacrifices that it has made in support of the economic sanctions against Iraq, has called for revision of the United States-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) of 1980.

The DECA, which was originally intended to last 5 years but has been repeatedly extended, stipulates that "The United States will exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed upon financial and technical assistance to Turkey's development efforts." [Ref 27:p. 16] Turkey, perceiving that the United States no longer exerts its "best efforts" has demanded that yearly military aid guarantees be included in the DECA. In response, the United States has pointed out that the executive branch can not make commitments binding Congress to appropriate any specified sum of aid. In the face of continued Turkish insistence on some form of guaranteed security assistance, the United States has stated that it would be forced to close down its bases in Turkey in case Ankara continues to insist that the military aid it receives from the United States should be guaranteed, negatively affecting the Turkish perceptions of the extend of the United States's commitment to Turkish security concerns.

The relations between two countries have been further strained when the FY95 aid bill was signed by President Clinton in August 1994, stipulating that 10 percent of the \$364.5 million in direct loans earmarked for Turkey will be withheld until the United States State Department, in

consultation with Department of Defense, makes certain that Turkey makes progress in human rights and Cyprus issues. Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, on several occasions, made it clear that Turkey would not accept such a condition imposed by the United States. However, when it became clear that she refused to accept only 10 percent of the aid, i.e. only that part which was conditioned by the Congress, opposition parties severely criticized both the United States for its ill-treatment of Turkey and Premier Ciller for having ridiculed and embarrassed Turkey by rejecting 10 percent of the aid but accepting the rest.

Furthermore, considering the fact that the Clinton administration will find it more difficult to generate the support that may be necessary to satisfy Turkish expectations in the 104th Congress with a Republican majority busy trying to comply with the terms and conditions of the "Contract with America," the Turkish hopes of support from the United States are not expected to find a fertile ground in the United States.

Turkey believes that if the United States is interested in seeing Turkey continue as a stable, democratic, secular, economically dynamic state in the conflict-ridden regions of the world, it must do its part in promoting trade and investment in Turkey, providing Turkey with military and economic assistance so that economic disparities between Turkey and the Western European countries get narrower, and reducing impediments to Turkey's membership in the EU and the WEU. As Ambassador Morton Abramowitz put it, " the Turkish experiment is unique, and the United States has a major stake in its success. But preserving that stake will demand more concentrated and sympathetic attention than senior U.S. officials have usually been willing to devote to their long-time ally." [Ref 46:p. 181]

#### **4. Turkey's Relations with NATO**

As indicated earlier, Turkey is a unique country in NATO because no other ally is surrounded by all three of the world's most unstable and conflict-ridden regions at the same time, i.e., the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. Under these circumstances, for Turkey which perceives itself to be surrounded by much instability and faced with the potential security challenges of great complexity and diversity, the Atlantic Alliance continues to form one of the basic principles of the Turkey's security policy. However, Turkey has also come to the realization that, due to economic problems and special security concerns that the country is confronted with, it faces with considerable difficulties in restructuring the Turkish armed forces along the lines of NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted in November 1991 in the light of recent profound changes in East-West relations. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the realization of "peace dividend" has come to the fore in the agenda of NATO nations redefining their security interests, and the consequent erosion in NATO's solidarity and cohesion has emerged as another reality of the post-Cold War era that Turkey has to adopt to.

NATO entered a process of change when the 16 member countries' Heads of State and Government met in London in July 1990 to review the Allied military strategy of "Flexible Response and Forward Defense," which had served the Alliance successfully against its main enemy since its adoption in 1967. The resulting London Declaration recognized that NATO should retain smaller, highly mobile, versatile, more flexible forces and the strategy of "Flexible Response and Forward Defense" should be transformed to one which, in the words of the London Declaration, "would move away from forward defense, where appropriate, and modify flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons." [Ref 75:p. 11] Following the completion of the review of the Alliance's military

strategy by the Strategy Review Group established in the aftermath of the London Summit, the Heads of State and Government had met once again in Rome in November 1991 and promulgated the "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept." [Ref 75:p. 11]

During the period the draft concept was being prepared, NATO members were faced with difficulty in the analysis of the possible future risks to Allied security due to rapidly changing political situation in the then Soviet Union. However, it was clear that the old massive and potentially immediate threat to NATO from the Soviet Union had disappeared. Instead, a situation in which many of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe were faced with political, social and economic pressures, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes which could lead to crisis and in turn to possible conflicts, had taken place. Additionally, the southern region of the Alliance was identified as a region of security concern, particularly given the build-up of military power and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [Ref 25:p. 18]

Based on these perceived threats, key features of the forces that will be fielded by NATO has been identified as smaller forces, many at lower states of readiness; increased reliance on multinational forces; greater ability to built-up forces through reinforcement, mobilization or reconstitution; and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. [Ref 19:p. 23-24] NATO's old static linear defense posture, the "layer cake" defense concept of dividing the potential battlefield between forces and assigning each nation its own territorial area of responsibility, has also been replaced with enhanced flexibility, giving way to a mobilizable and maneuver-based defense. [Ref 76:p. 8]

In accordance with these key features, it has been decided that NATO will field three categories of conventional forces which would be underpinned by nuclear forces:

- Reaction Forces: Multi-national forces, mobile and flexible with employment options in all parts of the alliance. These are divided into Immediate Reaction forces which are available in seven days to deploy and Rapid Reaction Forces available on 15 days notice to move. The Reaction Forces were originally expected to comprise about 15 percent of the forces available to NATO.
- Main Defense Forces: These are six multi-national corps, constituting the bulk of the ground forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and capable of being built-up as necessary by reinforcement, by mobilizing reserves or by reconstituting forces. They constitute 60 percent of forces available to NATO.
- Augmentation Forces: These are essentially strategic reinforcements for existing forces in a particular region and constitute 25 percent of the total. [Ref 77:p. 32]

As it is seen, NATO, in its new concept of "Reduced Forward Presence," has extensively relied on multi-national formations. For example, Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Forces, may have as many as 9 participants and ACE Immediate Reaction Forces may contain participants from as many as 13 different nations. [Ref 25:p 34] Furthermore, the old structure of static forces providing a linear defense, has given way to a mobilizable and maneuver-based defense and thus providing effective surveillance, intelligence, command and control to identify threats, and having logistic capabilities to match the required mobility have become vital for the implementation of the new concept, which moved from "forward defense" to "reduced forward presence." [Ref 77:p. 32]

Unlike the issues of new force structure and nuclear policy, the issue of "out-of-area" has caused much controversy among the NATO members throughout the period the new Strategic Concept was being prepared. The "out-of-area" problem, which has been continuing to create coordination problem among the members of NATO since its inception, stems from the fact that



the Alliance's applicability is limited by the North Atlantic Treaty's reference to geographical boundaries as stated in Article 6. [Ref 76:p. 1] This problem has become associated particularly with the Middle East and the difficulty of coordination among NATO member states in response to an "out-of-area" crisis had become apparent several times in the past two decades. The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait forced the Alliance to confront once again the problem of "out-of-area" conflict at a time when the Alliance was undergoing a period of major restructuring. Under these circumstances, member countries had found introducing such a divisive issue as "out-of-area" planning into the process of drafting the new Strategic Concept fruitless and counterproductive. Therefore, NATO's new Strategic Concept recognizes that Allied security must take account of the global context and that NATO's security interests can be effected by risks of a greater complexity and diversity, but it goes no further than acknowledging that arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation regarding the responses to such risks. [Ref 75:p. 13]

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept has caused concerns in Turkey that the strategy of "reduced forward presence," combined with NATO's extensive reliance on multinational formations and the continuing debate on the issue of "out-of-area," may not provide Turkey with an effective defense umbrella in case it becomes involved in a confrontation requiring Turkey to invoke the defense clause of the Washington Treaty. Turkey has also come to the realization that preoccupation of NATO's European allies with their own problems such as German unification, the task of assisting the economic and political reconstruction of the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe and implementation of Maastricht Treaty within the EU, has consequently resulted in an erosion of NATO's solidarity and cohesion.

As a result of profound changes in East-West relations, a buffer zone has been created in Central Europe and threat in that region has decreased to a risk. Consequently, warning time has increased, allowing NATO, in its new military doctrine and force posture, to move from the concept of "forward defense" to the new concept of "reduced forward presence." Consequently, the countries in the Central Front of NATO have been able to reduce size, readiness and availability of their forces and place greater reliance on small, mobilizable units equipped with high technology and high fire-power weapons. However, since Turkey is surrounded by all three of the world's most unstable and conflict-ridden regions at the same time, there are no buffer zones around Turkey as there are in Central Europe. Combined with the fact that the Turkish armed forces are equipped with relatively out-moded equipment, the concept of "forward defense" still retains its validity for Turkey. Consequently, Turkey has decided to uphold the older concept of "forward defense," and continue to maintain a large army, the second largest in NATO. Although Turkey has been undergoing a large scale, multi-billion and multi-year defense modernization program since mid-1980s, this program has considerably slowed down since the early 1990s as the economic conditions of the country deteriorated and, thus, the reductions in the manpower levels that would be possible by the qualitative improvements in the military equipment, have remained below the planned levels.

Secondly, NATO's old static defense posture, the "layer cake" defense concept, has been replaced with enhanced flexibility, giving way to a mobilizable and maneuver-based defense. With this change, greater strategic mobility, a modern command-control-communication network, providing effective surveillance and intelligence to identify threats, having logistic capabilities and the sufficient infrastructure to match the required mobility have become vital for the implementation of the new concept. However, the mobility of

the Turkish armed forces, and their command-control-communication capabilities still need to be increased, and the inadequate infrastructure in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, the least developed parts of Turkey, requires heavy investment for improvement so that the maneuver-based defense can be applied effectively in these regions bordering the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. The difficulties that Turkey faced during the 1990-1991 Gulf War when it tried to mobilize 100,000 troops along the Iraqi border as a part of coalition strategy have confirmed the Turkish armed forces' need for greater strategic mobility and the lack of sufficient infrastructure in the region.

Furthermore, if we take a look at the economic indicators in Turkey, we can easily see that its financial ability to satisfy the modernization requirements of its armed forces and thus increase its mobility and command-control-communication capabilities, is severely limited. A foreign debt of \$65 billion, a public sector borrowing requirement of almost \$40 billion and a triple-digit inflation rate for 1994, clearly indicate that Turkey's ability to restructure its armed forces along the lines of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept is heavily dependent on the military and economic assistance of the West.

Finally, the key features of the forces that will be fielded by NATO have been identified as smaller forces, many at lower states of readiness, increased reliance on multinational forces, and greater ability to built-up forces through reinforcement, mobilization and reconstitution. This means heavy reliance by NATO on intraregional (such as Allied Forces Europe, South -AFSOUTH), interregional (such as the ACE Rapid Reaction Forces) as well as external reinforcements (such as the forces which would come from the United States) to preserve or restore the territorial integrity of its threatened members. [Ref 25:p. 38] Moreover, these reinforcements, which are predominantly multinational in

composition, will be necessary at least to demonstrate NATO's cohesion and solidarity against any potential aggressor, and at that point, the key question becomes whether or not these reinforcements can arrive in sufficient numbers and time to influence the outcome of events. [Ref 25:p. 37] Timely deployment of reinforcements also requires effective planning, coordination and, more important than these, solidarity and cohesion among the countries contributing to the multinational NATO forces.

Unfortunately, Turkey has come to the frustrating realization that NATO members did not have this solidarity and cohesion when it requested the deployment of Allied Mobile Force-Air (AMF-A) to eastern Turkey during 1990-1991 Gulf War. Although AMF-A was designed to show NATO's unity as a deterrent force, due to the debate on whether the defense of Turkey's Middle Eastern borders by NATO is an "in-area" or "out-of-area" responsibility, it took Germany, Belgium and Italy more than three weeks to send their aircraft to Turkey. Furthermore, after serious debate on the need of for such a move, NATO's Defense Planning Council (DPC) required "highly specific rules of engagement to limit the possibility that the force might engage in combat in circumstances not explicitly envisaged by the political authorities." [Ref 78:p. 251]

The emerging difficulties regarding the applicability of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept in Turkey and the erosion of NATO's solidarity and cohesion have severely complicated one of the pillars of Turkish security policy: "Taking part in collective defense organizations and carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it in this context." [Ref 79:p. 3] Turkey's concerns regarding the protection of its territorial integrity, its independence and the republican regime of the country were further exacerbated when its assumption that Europeans still consider Turkey to be a key ingredient in the defense of Europe proved to be wrong as can be inferred from the reluctance of the WEU to respond

positively to Turkey's drive toward full membership in that organization.

#### IV. TURKEY IN THE REGIONS OF CRISIS

##### A. TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

###### 1. Central Asia

Turkey's primary objective in Central Asia has been to foster the development of largely Muslim-Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union as independent, secular and democratic countries with market oriented, liberal economies. Toward this objective, with the backing of the West, particularly the United States, Turkey has promoted itself as an economic and political model for these newly independent republics with which it has historical, cultural and linguistic ties, and undertook interrelated political, cultural and economic initiatives in an attempt to build a zone of Turkish influence in Central Asia.

Turkey, aiming at preventing the resurgence of Russian power and the spread of Iranian-type fundamentalism in the region, has seen the development and integration of the economies of these countries with the world economy, as vital factors that will affect their orientation in the long term. Thus, technological and economic assistance, bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation initiatives and various investment projects toward the development of infrastructure in the region have constituted the main thrust of Turkish policy toward the region.

Turkey extended recognition to Central Asian republics - Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan- on December 16, 1991 and sent ambassadors to all five capitals. Despite the complete absence of ties between Turkey and these republics prior to their independence, immediately after the recognition of the republics high profile visits had taken place between Turkey and these countries. Heads of state of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan visited Turkey in December 1991, and by spring of 1992, the leaders of all five republics had paid visits to Ankara. In response, the Turkish Foreign Minister visited these republics in February 1992 and his visit was followed by the visit of Suleyman Demirel, then prime minister, in May 1992 with a 144 man delegation consisted of high level bureaucrats, businessmen and specialists. [Ref 23:p. 203] During these visits Turkey and the Central Asian republics expressed their desire to establish close relations and seek cooperation on a variety of different issue. By February 1993, Turkey and the Central Asian republics had signed more than 140 bilateral protocols and cooperation agreements on a variety of subjects ranging from banking to agriculture, trade, industry, aeronautics, education, publishing, academic and military training. [Ref 51:p. 112]

In order to foster immediate ties, Turkey has initiated a series of economic assistance packages for these countries. Turkish Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has allocated between \$1.1 and \$1.2 billion in credits to Central Asian republics to stimulate their trade with Turkey, and an additional \$975 million in loans has been authorized by the Turkish government for the use of these countries. [Ref 47:p. 82] Turkey has also committed \$350 million in food aid to Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. [Ref 80:p. 608] Although these assistance funds remain far from meeting the immediate needs of Central Asian republics, they mean considerable commitments for Turkey and its economy. Indeed, these economic assistance packages have made Turkey the fourth largest provider of aid to these republics after Japan, the EU and the United States. [Ref 80:p. 608]

The Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development (TACD) within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been assigned the responsibility of coordinating and supervising the assistance to Central Asian republics and initial studies made by the TACD have also revealed the need for technical

assistance in developing the infrastructure in the region. [Ref 47:p. 81] The Turkish General Directorate of Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) has been assigned the task of developing a telecommunications network between Turkey and the countries of the region which will also provide these countries with access to the INTELSAT satellite for worldwide communication.

PTT has supplied each of the five Central Asian republics with public exchanges (each 2,500-line capacity) and earth stations, and thus connected them to the INTELSAT, establishing direct communication links between these states, Turkey and other countries. [Ref 80:p. 606] Turkey has planned to widen this communication network with the installation of 10,000-line exchanges in the main cities of the Central Asian republics, and in this direction, Turkish communication systems manufacturer NETAS has begun, through joint ventures, establishing factories in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for the manufacture of digital switchboard systems. [Ref 80:p. 606]

TACD also coordinates Turkish initiatives toward establishment of cultural ties with the Central Asian republics. It has arranged 10,000 scholarships at Turkish higher educational institutions for students from Azerbaijan and Central Asia and is planning for the establishment of regional university, like the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, that will provide education in areas of engineering and management primarily for Central Asian students. [Ref 47:p. 81] Meanwhile, toward the development of close cultural relations, General Directorate of Turkish Radio and Television has established a new special channel, named Avrasya (Euro-Asia), and has begun broadcasting television programs beamed to these republics via INTELSAT. To create a common linguistic and educational base, Turkey has also encouraged the Central Asian republics to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin alphabet and committed to provide them with textbooks, publications and financial assistance in case they decide to



adopt the Latin alphabet rather than the Arabic alphabet, as favored by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The programs broadcast by Avrasya channel via satellite carry subtitles in Latin script to familiarize the Central Asian viewers with the characters. [Ref 81:p. 72]

Turkey also recognizes Central Asia's potential to become a major supplier of energy in the next century and sees the development of oil and gas industries around the Caspian Sea and in Central Asia as vital for the economic independence of the Central Asian states from the Russian Federation. Hydrocarbon resources of the Central Asian republics also present opportunities for the development of Turkey's own economy which would, in turn, help Turkey to overcome the financial obstacles that limit its initiatives in Central Asia. Therefore, Turkey has been very active in developing plans that envisage construction of oil and gas pipelines to become an energy bridge between the Central Asian republics and Europe. While these energy resources present Turkey with an opportunity to reduce its dependence on Middle East oil, various project activities, such as engineering, excavation, and pipe manufacture, which will be undertaken within the framework of pipeline projects present Turkish construction companies with substantial job opportunities. Once constructed, these pipelines will also provide Turkey with considerable income in the form of transit fees. More important than these, Turkey hopes that the export of energy resources to the West will provide the Central Asian republics with fresh money necessary for the socio-economic development of these countries, which in turn will create new marketing opportunities in Central Asia for the Turkish exports. In this direction, Turkey has offered Turkmenistan, which has one of the largest gas reserves in the world, the construction of a gas pipeline that will carry the Turkmen natural gas to Turkey and then to Europe through Turkish outlets on the Mediterranean. The accord for the construction of the pipeline

was by the two countries in November 1992, and initial feasibility studies were completed by the Turkish pipeline company BOTAS on three different routes in March 1993. [Ref 82:p. 30] Among the proposed alternative routes, the route that goes from Turkmenistan to Iran and then to Turkey has been adopted and at the January 1995 meeting of President Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, both countries expressed their desire to initiate construction of the project as soon as possible. [Ref 83:p. 2] The construction of the 2,500 kilometer long gas pipeline, which will have a total capacity of 15 billion cubic meters/year, is expected to be completed within five years at an estimated project cost of \$6 billion. [Ref 83:p. 2]

Turkey strongly believes in those republics' development potential if they can successfully exploit their energy resources and wants to tie them Turkish-led economic system so that it has leverage over their future economic policies. Toward this objective it has promoted membership of the Central Asian republics in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) founded earlier by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and has pressed for a kind of common market among Turkic countries at the October 1992 "Summit of Turkic Countries" in Ankara. [Ref 84:p. 74]

Toward the integration of economies of the Central Asian republics with the world economy, Turkey has placed great emphasis on the ECO, which was enlarged in February 1992 to include Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics, with the exception of Kazakhstan. [Ref 7:p. 66] The first and second summit meetings of the reactivated ECO were held in Ankara and Istanbul in October 1992 and July 1993 respectively. [Ref 85:p. 10] The ECO which was further enlarged to include Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, aims at easing trade barriers and promoting cooperation in areas such as agriculture, communications, banking, culture and transportation among the member states. However, foreign exchange problems that the

Central Asian republics face and their insistence on entering counter-trade agreements or paying their trade debts through barter rather than hard currency have emerged as important factors preventing Turkey from establishing close commercial relations with these republics. The lack of a legal framework and the absence of appropriate private sector partners in the Central Asian republics have also been sources of concern for Turkish businessmen who look for business opportunities in this region. [Ref 80:p. 603] Thus, Turkey's current trade with the Central Asian republics remains very limited. Turkey's total exports to all Turkic republics of former Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan, totalled only \$164.6 million in 1992 (1.1 percent of Turkey's total exports in 1992), and \$455 million in 1993 (3 percent of Turkey's total exports in 1993). For the first four months of 1994, Turkey's exports to the Turkic republics amount to \$147.9 million (3 percent of Turkey's total exports in the same period). [Ref 86:p. 25] Turkey's imports from the Turkic republics of former Soviet Union account for less than 1 percent of its total imports. Turkish imports from these countries totalled \$97 million in 1992 (0.4 percent of Turkey's total imports in 1992) and \$196.8 million in 1993 (0.7 percent of Turkey's total imports in 1993). For the first four months of 1994, the imports from the Turkic republics amount to \$38.5 million, accounting for 0.5 percent of Turkey's total imports for the same period. [Ref 86:p. 26]

While Turkey's commercial relations with the Central Asian republics remain limited, a variety of factors, both internal and external, prevent Turkey from also establishing a zone of Turkish influence in Central Asia to the extent desired, and successfully playing the role that it initially hoped to play in that part of the world.

Turkish drives to build a zone of influence have met an increasingly greater Russian resistance that aims at preventing the Central Asian republics from diversifying their

relations with countries other than the Russian Federation and to halt the spread of Turkish influence in the region. For instance, Russia has been disturbed by the reactivation of the ECO and the decision of Central Asian republics to join this organization for regional cooperation with Turkey and Iran, and clearly forced the Central Asian republics to choose between the ECO and a Russian-dominated close economic union which, in July 1993, Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation decided to form. [Ref 85:p. 10] The Russian Federation Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin has characterized the reactivated ECO as an attempt to organize a common market with customs union and the beginning of a "different political alignment," and stated that:

Our friends from the CIS who, looking for better fortunes, are turning to the south, should choose between closer economic integration with Russia and with their southern neighbors. [Ref 85:p. 10]

The pressure on the Central Asian republics by the Russian Federation has been successful to a certain extent and caused these republics to adopt a cautious policy toward Turkey despite their gratefulness for Turkish assistance toward socio-economic development of their countries. The Russian military doctrine that appeared in mid-1992 and focused on Russia's strategic interests in the near abroad has been an important factor behind such a cautious approach by the Central Asian republics. The draft doctrine included the defense of the rights of Russian citizens and "people ethnically and culturally identifying themselves with Russia in the former republics of the USSR" as one of the basic tasks of the Russian military. [Ref 87:p. 73] The draft doctrine's assertion of Russian ethnic interests in the near abroad has not only revealed the vulnerability of the former republics of the Soviet Union, but also made these republics highly sensitive to the protection of Russian interests. For example,

Kazakhstan, highly vulnerable to Russian pressure because of its Russian population which makes up 40 percent of its total population, stated at the October 1992 Turkic Summit in Ankara that it would develop ties with Turkey and the other Turkic republics only on the condition that this would not harm its commitments to other Commonwealth of Independent State members. [Ref 80:p. 599] Similarly, the Central Asian republics have resisted Turkey's offer of establishing a kind of Turkic common market at the same summit, indicating their cautious policies toward Turkey. [Ref 84:p. 74]

It is also a fact that after more than 70 years of Soviet rule and centralized economic planning, the external financial aid that the Central Asian republics received from the international community, including Turkey, has remained far from ending the dependence of the economies of these countries on the Russian Federation. Not only Turkey, but also the Central Asian republics have recognized that neither the Turkish economy nor the technological capabilities of the Turkish industry are sufficient to satisfy the needs of these countries and give Turkey leverage over their future economic policies. With the recent economic crisis that Turkey fell into, its ability to continue economic assistance to the Central Asian republics, and thus to spread its influence over the region, becomes increasingly questionable.

It is not only the economic dependence of the Central Asian republics on the Russian Federation or the continued commitment of Russia to protect its interest in the near abroad that force these republics to pursue a cautious policy toward Turkey. The Central Asian republics, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, have only limited democracies and are run by former Communist leaders who want to keep their opposition from coming to power. These leaders depend on the Russian Federation and its military for both maintaining their power and the security of their countries against external threats. Therefore, rather than rapidly developing close relations with

Turkey, they have preferred not to antagonize the Russian Federation. Turkey's pressure on the leaders and the ruling elite of the Central Asian republics for the initiation of democratic reforms in their countries has been another factor leading to a cautious policy by these countries toward Turkey.

Furthermore, at a time when Turkey promotes itself as an economic and political model for the Westernization and integration of the Central Asian republics with the world economy, its inability to obtain full membership in the EU despite its 30-year-old membership struggle, not only undercuts its claim to be a fully western state, but also makes Turkey less attractive to these countries. Turkey, believing that if it can not fully enter the EU, its value to Central Asia as a western state and model will greatly decline, has repeatedly told the EU countries that its full membership will greatly improve its ability to play a stabilizing role in the region and prevent the spread of Iranian-type fundamentalism both directly and indirectly. In the face of continued rejection by the EU, Turkey's hopes of becoming a bridge country that will link the EU with the ECO have also diminished.

Today, Turkey recognizes that Central Asia's ties to Russia cannot be easily replaced and that the needs of the countries of the region are far more than Turkey can provide. Turkey's domestic economic constraints, Russian resistance, internal instabilities of the countries of the region, their economic, military and political dependence on Russia, other states' economic and political rivalries with Turkey for influence over the region have greatly restricted the ability of Turkey to establish a zone of influence in Central Asia. Turkey has won many points of influence and obtained some leverage in the region despite all its shortcomings. However, these remain far from what Turkey initially hoped to achieve.

## **2. The Transcaucasus**

Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has removed the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Turkey, the newly-independent republics in the Transcaucasus region--Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan--represent considerable instability on Turkey's eastern borders. Turkey's primary objectives in the Transcaucasus have been to form a zone of Turkish influence in the region that will prevent the return of a Russian military presence to its borders and play a leading role in the exploration, extraction, and refining of Azeri oil and transportation of it to Europe. Turkey has also recognized the importance of the Transcaucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, in spreading Turkish influence over Central Asia and reorienting their economies from Russia to Turkey.

However, the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKOR) which began in 1988 as struggle of that province's largely Armenian population for autonomy and then independence from Azerbaijan toward unification with Armenia, has become the main barrier preventing Turkey from achieving its policy objectives regarding the Transcaucasus.

Turkey was the first country to extend recognition to Azerbaijan, which proclaimed its independence in September 1991. Turkey, recognizing Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991, has developed close relations with this country particularly after the election as president of relatively pro-Turkish Abulfaz Elchibey of Azerbaijan's Popular Front in May 1992. [Ref 80:p. 602] Despite all historical, cultural and linguistic ties between the two countries, Turkey has refrained from directly intervening in the war over the NKOR on the side of Azerbaijan, fearing that this kind of involvement would irreparably set back Turkey's integration with Europe and severely damage its relations with the United States. With the intensification of the war in early 1992 as Karabakh Armenians attempted to establish a link between the NKOR and Armenia,

Turkey co-authored UN resolution 882 with Russia and the United States authorizing a cease-fire in NKOR and became one of the ten members the CSCE's Minsk Group that was set up to bring an end to the war through negotiation. [Ref 26:p. 31] From early 1992 until early 1993 Turkey actively participated in negotiations conducted by the Minsk Group which did not yield any positive result toward the settlement of the conflict. Despite its reluctance to enter the war, Turkey felt compelled to heighten its forces' readiness on the border with Armenia in May 1992 and then in April 1993, intensified aerial reconnaissance along the border and has repeatedly warned Karabakh Armenians to withdraw from the Azerbaijani territories that they have occupied since the breakout of the war.

When Turkey heightened its forces' readiness in May 1992 upon the shelling of Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani controlled autonomous region in Armenia, by Armenian forces, and threatened to send Turkish forces into the enclave, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, then the Commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Forces, in turn, warned Turkey that its direct involvement in the in the war could place the two parties, in the words of Shaposhnikov, "on the edge of World War III." [Ref 25:p. 23] The Turkish-Soviet Treaty, signed in 1921 in Moscow, describes Nakhichevan, with which Turkey has an 11 kilometer border, as an autonomous region under the control of Azarbaijan on the condition that Azerbaijan does not relinquish this right to a third party. [Ref 23:p. 206] In accordance with the treaty, Turkey believes it has responsibility of protecting Nakhichevan against attacks threatening the borders and status of the region.

Meanwhile, Turkey's active involvement in the mediation process, the anti-Russian stance of President Abulfaz Elchibey who continuously rejected the idea of joining the CIS and the close relations that Turkey established with Azerbaijan, have been the source of serious concern for the Russian Federation,



which wants to protect its strong influence over the Transcaucasus.

Russia's concerns were exacerbated when Turkey proposed a territorial exchange to end the war in the spring of 1992. Turkey, with the support of the United States, offered a post-war settlement creating a purely Armenian state incorporating the NKOR, and a purely Turkic Azarbaijan state incorporating the Nakhichevan Autonomous region which is separated from the Azerbaijani territory by the Armenian territory. [Ref 88:p. 5] This plan, which would give Turkey a direct link with Azerbaijan and make possible the construction of pipelines, that will carry the energy resources of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics directly to Turkey through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, has been source of a grave concern for Russia since it would make Turkey, not Russia, a major player in the energy game, protect Turkey's energy sources from any interruption by Armenia, Iran and the Russian Federation, and thus give Turkey a greater voice and leverage in both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Three months after Turkey and Azarbaijan signed, on March 9, 1993, an accord for the construction of an oil pipeline between Baku in Azerbaijan and Turkey's Mediterranean port of Yumartalik for the pumping of Azeri crude oil to be extracted from Azeri and Chyrag oil fields in the Caspian Sea, in June 1993 military leader Suret Huseinov launched a military coup, reportedly with the backing of the Russian Federation, against Azerbaijan's pro-Turkish President Elchibey. [Ref 26:p. 31] Following the military coup which replaced Elchibey with the former first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Geidar Aliev as president, Russia has increased its pressure on Azarbaijan for the return of Russian troops to this country, and forced Baku to give 20 percent of the profits of oil exploration to Russia and bring the Russian oil company LUKOIL into British Petroleum-led international consortium (SOCAR) that had been formed to develop Azerbaijan's Chyrag

and Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea, in return for assuring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and helping it to regain control over Nagorno-Karabakh [Ref 88:p. 11] Russia has increased its pressure on Geidar Aliev also to continue operating the ballistic-missile early-warning radar system at Lyaki in Azerbaijan in return for restoring peace in the region. [Ref 87:p. 77] Furthermore, in order to prevent Turkey from playing a leading role in the transportation of the Azeri and Central Asian oil, it has opposed the March 1993 Turkish-Azeri agreement that envisages construction of an oil pipeline between Baku and Turkey's Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik through Georgia or Iran and Nakhichevan, and pressured Azerbaijan to suspend the pipeline negotiations with Turkey and to accept the transportation of Azeri oil by a pipeline that will be built between Baku and the Russian oil export terminal at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea by the Russian-Kazakh-Omani Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). [Ref 89:p. 17] Turkey has placed great importance on the Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline because it would make possible the transportation of not only the Azeri oil, but also the oil that will be extracted from the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan. Therefore, the March 1993 agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan allows Kazakhstan to join the project later, and envisages a transportation capacity of 40 million tons per year, almost double the amount of Azeri oil production capacity. [Ref 88:p. 5] The extra capacity has been incorporated into the pipeline to attract transportation demand from Central Asian countries, mainly from Kazakhstan. This project which would reorient the Central Asian energy economy from Russia to Turkey has been a source of serious concern for Russia, which became highly sensitive to Turkish efforts at establishing a zone of Turkish influence in Central Asia.

While trying to exploit the war over NKOR for the stationing of Russian forces in Azerbaijan, obtaining a share

a Azerbaijan's oil economy, and preventing Turkey from playing a leading role in the energy game, Russia has also tried to distance itself from the CSCE's mediation process through the Minsk Group, and began bilateral consultations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh Armenians toward the settlement of the conflict. In an attempt to monopolize the mediation process, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev also requested at the CSCE foreign ministers' meeting in Rome in 1993 that Russia be formally granted a special role as peacekeeper in the former Soviet Union. [Ref 26:p. 33] Turkey has strongly opposed Kozyrev's request and insisted on international mediation through CSCE or the tripartite mediation effort that Turkey, the United States and Russia initiated in the spring of 1993 before the military coup against Elchibey.

Meanwhile the poor performance of Azerbaijani forces against the Karabakh Armenians continued, resulting in the occupation of Kelbadzhar corridor, linking the NKOR to Armenia, in April 1993 and of large Azerbaijani territory along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border in September 1993 by the Karabakh Armenians. [Ref 47:p. 64] In the face of continuous set-backs against Armenian forces and Russian pressure, Azerbaijan felt compelled to join the CIS in late September 1993. The mediation efforts of the CSCE to end the fighting, which again intensified in December 1993 with the counter-attack of Azerbaijani forces to recover the occupied territories, have not produced a lasting solution to the conflict and various proposals of cease-fire have been rejected either by Azerbaijan, which insists on the condition that any cease-fire should be preceded by the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories, or by Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians on the grounds that they did not provide security guarantees for the Karabakh Armenians. Meanwhile, in the absence of progress in the CSCE's mediation process, both Armenia and Azerbaijan, under President Aliiev, addressed formal requests to Iran in December 1993 to

participate in the mediation process. [Ref 26:p. 34] Iran's involvement in the mediation process has been supported by Russia as a counterweight to Turkey. Russia has also believed that only Tehran is in position to persuade Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to bring Afghan Mujahidin, fighting in the war over the NKOR on the side of Azerbaijan, back to Afghanistan. [Ref 26:p. 36] Iran, for its part, has found it expedient to become involved in the mediation process. The development of close relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, particularly under the leadership of Azerbaijan's pro-Turkish President Elchibey, has been source of concern for Iran. Other than pursuing pro-Turkish, anti-Russian policies, Elchibey also pursued a policy that aimed at the unification of Iranian Azeris and of what he called Southern Azerbaijan, i.e., northern parts of Iran, with Azerbaijan. Iran, seeking to limit any kind of development that will encourage separatist sentiments among its Azeri population, believed that Turkey, by siding with Elchibey and helping him establish a strong nationalist government, was encouraging the break-up of Iran. Today, Russia and Iran, on one side, Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the other side, have been engaged in a deadlocked and dangerous rivalry over the mediation process.

The military coup against pro-Turkish Elchibey and the decision of the Azerbaijan National Assembly to join the CIS, followed by Geidar Aliev's decision to draw Iran into the mediation process, initially resulted in cooling of Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan. However, in the face of increasingly greater Russian pressure on Azerbaijan for the stationing of Russian troops and border guards on its territory and for obtaining a share of Azerbaijan's oil economy, Geidar Aliev has found it expedient to restore relations with Turkey. In his visits to Turkey in February and May 1994, Aliev stated that he would accept the deployment of Russian troops in Azerbaijan only within the framework of the CSCE and together with military units from other countries,

and called on Turkey to supply Azerbaijan with weapons to counteract weapon deliveries made to Armenia. [Ref 88:p. 22] In his February visit to Turkey, Aliev also stated that the March 1993 agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan on the construction of Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline could be finalized "in the immediate future." [Ref 26:p. 36] Azerbaijan had reported, on January 27, 1994, that it had postponed indefinitely joint plans with Turkey to build the Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline because of its domestic political and economic problems caused by the war over the NKOR. [Ref 90:p. 108] As a sign of goodwill, Geider Aliev has also accepted Turkish requests to increase the share of the Turkish state oil company Turkish Petroleum Incorporated in SOCAR from 1.75 percent to 6.75 percent. [Ref 91:p. 4]

Today, Turkey still tries to prevent, together with Azerbaijan, the deployment of exclusively Russian peacekeeping forces in Azerbaijan, and insists on international mediation either by the CSCE or through the tripartite initiative with Russia and the United States. However, it should also be stated that prolonged war over the NKOR, the military coup against pro-Turkish Elchibey, and the inability of Turkey to intervene in the war in support of Azerbaijan, combined with the Russian efforts of excluding Turkey and the United States from the mediation process, have greatly helped the Russian Federation to control the mediation process, and spread its influence over the Transcaucasus. Other than forcing Azerbaijan to join the CIS, it has secured an agreement with Armenia that allows Russia to maintain military bases in this country.

Armenia has historically depended on Russia and seen Russia's military presence in the country as a security guarantee against Turkey. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, some Russian forces have remained in this country, and during the Tashkent Summit in May 1992 Armenia joined a common defense system, similar to NATO, with Russia and

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. [Ref 27:p. 3] In the face of prolonged war over the NKOR, Armenia also views the Russian forces as a guarantee against possible Turkish intervention in the war over the NKOR on the side of Azerbaijan.

Russia has also succeeded in obtaining a considerable part of Azerbaijan's oil economy by compelling Baku to transfer 10 percent of the profits of oil exploration to Russia by reducing the share of SOCAR, British Petroleum-led international consortium that had been formed to develop Azerbaijan's Chyrag and Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea, from 30 percent to 20 percent. [Ref 88:p. 16] The war over the NKOR has also delayed finalization of plans for the construction of the Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, and forced Turkey to come up with routes alternative to the optimum route which links Azerbaijan to Turkey through the NKOR, Armenia and Nakhichevan. Turkey has proposed alternatives routes which bypass Armenia and the NKOR, linking it to Azerbaijan through Georgia or Nakhichevan and Iran. [Ref 92:p. 24] However, Turkey has faced difficulty in obtaining the support of the West for these alternative routes which increase the project cost considerably, and in the case of the second alternative, passes through Iran. Under these circumstances Russia has successfully promoted its alternative route of Baku-Novorossiysk and seriously challenged Turkey's desire of playing a leading role in the transportation of Azeri and the Central Asian oil to Europe, which would help Turkey form a zone of influence in both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

Russia's attempts to gain influence in the Transcaucasus have not remained limited to Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia has also exploited the instability in Georgia and pressured this country into joining the CIS and accepting the Russian demands of maintaining military bases in the country. After the takeover of Abkhazia by Abkhazian forces in September 1993, Georgia felt compelled to accede to Russian demands and

joined the CIS in the autumn of 1993. [Ref 87:p. 76] Following the agreement signed between Georgia and Russia in February 1994 allowing Russia to maintain three bases in this country, Russian troops were deployed in Georgia as a peacekeeping force between Georgian and Abkhazian forces in June 1994. [Ref 85:p. 10]

Turkish concerns of increasing Russian military presence in the neighboring countries have been exacerbated by Russian attempts toward the upward revision of the quantities of troops and armored vehicles it may station in the Caucasus under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Russia, claiming that the treaty limits agreed upon in the Cold War no longer meet its security needs, asked NATO and the Eastern European signatories of the CFE treaty to agree to reconsider or lift the flank limits in October 1993. [Ref 89:p. 17] Although this request was rejected by NATO, Russia continued to raise the issue and has increased its pressure on the Caucasus states to allocate part of their respective quotas for Russia. This method, which would help Russia increase its military presence in the region without exceeding the sub-limits assigned to the CIS members, has raised serious concerns in Turkey, and caused Turkey to lobby hard within NATO to prevent such reallocation. Consequently, NATO foreign ministers meeting in Istanbul in June 1994 released a statement affirming the sovereignty of the Caucasus states and expressing NATO's concern over the pressure that Russia exerts on these countries for the revision of sub-limits. [Ref 87:p. 83]

NATO's rejection of revision of CFE Treaty limits has not alleviated Turkey's concern which about Russia. While Dogan Gures, former Chief of Turkish General Staff, described the Russian Federation as a "very serious threat to Turkey" in the pursuit of an "expansionist policy, acting today out of ambitions inherited from the tsarist regime," Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller has accused the Russian Federation of

trying to avoid the responsibilities it has undertaken within the framework of the agreement on conventional arms reduction, and stated that "Russia is determined to assert itself as a superpower and is working to change the principles of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty to suit its own interests in the Caucasus." [Ref 93:p. 18] Turkey, which views the Russian attempts to restart discussions on the treaty's terms as the beginning of a significant arms race in Europe, has stated, on various occasions, that Russia will be in open violation of the treaty when the limits take effect after the completion of the reduction period of 40 months which began in November 1992. [Ref 27:p. 14]

### **3. A Regional Cooperation Scheme: The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ)**

The BSECZ is a project conceived by the former Turkish Ambassador to the United States Sukru Elekdag in 1989. The necessary political impetus was given to the project by former President Turgut Ozal, who in 1990 formally proposed the creation of the BSECZ, comprising Turkey, the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey's offer had been supported by the countries mentioned above, and the initial plans which would lay down foundations of the project were developed by the representatives of the four countries in 1991. Rejection of Turkey's membership application by the EC, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and ensuing instability in the regions surrounding Turkey have given Turkey additional impetus to turn these plans into reality in order to promote regional cooperation, economic growth, stability and peace within the Black Sea zone and its surroundings.

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the number of countries that want to join the project has increased, and on June 25, 1992, the BSECZ was formally established with the Bosphorus Declaration. [Ref 94:p. 61] The eleven signatories of the declaration are Albania, Armenia,



Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.

The BSECZ's main goals and areas of activity are set forth in its eighteen-point Charter which envisages the development of specific cooperation projects among the member countries in ten areas: transportation and communications; information exchange; economic, commercial and statistical standardization and certification of products; energy; mining and raw material processing; tourism; agriculture and agricultural industries; veterinary and sanitary protection; health care; and science and technology. [Ref 95:p. 33] The establishment of a Europe-wide economic area, the achievement of a higher degree of integration of the participating states into the world, and the development of economic cooperation as a contribution to the CSCE process have been expressed, in the Charter, as the main goals of the BSECZ. [Ref 95:p. 32-33]

Turkey has seen the BSECZ as a very important tool that will help it promote stability and peace in a region stretching from eastern and south-eastern Europe to the Transcaucasus, and believes that by bringing the member countries into economic cooperation and thus increasing their chances of integrating with the world economy, particularly establishing trade relationships with the EU, it could promote political cooperation among the member countries vital for the welfare, prosperity and stability of the whole region. Turkey has also seen the BSECZ and its leading position in this organization as a tool that will help it to promote itself as a regional power and further its international reputation as a country contributing to stability, and as an economic opportunity that will help Turkey reach the Black Sea market through Turkish contractors and manufacturers with its relatively developed industrial and technological base and export-oriented economy. In turn, all of these, Turkey hopes, will enhance its chance of achieving full membership in the EU. Turkey believes that, in the words of President Suleyman

Demirel, "if a united Europe is going to work it must establish strong ties with the cooperative schemes around it." [Ref 7:p. 68] In this direction, Turkey has seen the BSECZ, incorporating the economies of eastern and south-eastern Europe, the Transcaucasus, and Turkey, as a major economic scheme that can develop essential ties between Europe and the newly developing regions around the Black Sea.

Turkey has provided the funds for the establishment of a coordinating unit in Istanbul, and the necessary institutions, namely the BSECZ Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC) and the BSCEZ Council made up of the foreign ministers of the member countries, were set up in 1992. At the December 1992 meeting of the BSECZ foreign ministers in Antalya/Turkey, the Black Sea Foreign Trade and Development Bank was established as a vehicle for member countries to organize financial resources and implement regional development projects, possibly with a Japanese contribution. [Ref 23:p. 210] After an internal debate over the location of the bank, at the December 1993 meeting of the BSECZ Council in Sofia, the location was chosen as Thessaloniki/Greece and its share capital was fixed at 1 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a major milestone in the BSECZ's development. [Ref 95:p. 35] Despite its initial success in establishing an organizational, the BSECZ faces considerable obstacles that it must overcome to transform itself into a dynamic organization. Except for Greece and Turkey, the economies of the members of the BSECZ are in a major transformation. They are characterized by, in general terms, extremely high rates of inflation, insufficient industrial bases, low levels of capital investment, and very low or negative growth rates. Furthermore, internal instabilities of the member countries and territorial and ethnic disputes among its members also prevent intensive regional cooperation. The Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the NKOR, the Dniester conflict in Moldova, Abkhazian separatism in Georgia and the civil war in this country between the

forces loyal to former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the Georgian government forces, the ongoing crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina which may quickly escalate to region-wide war in the Balkan Peninsula with the direct involvement of Greece, Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey, tense Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Armenian relations, the rivalry between Turkey and the Russian Federation over forming a zone of influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and the control of energy resources in these regions are only some of the existing sources of tension that contribute to regional instability and cast a shadow over the future evolution of the BSECZ.

Turkey, aware of these problems, has pursued a cautious policy toward the security roles that the BSECZ can play in the region, fearing that this kind of role may create regional opposition and further complicate the BSECZ's development. However, Ukraine and Georgia have strongly advocated a security role for the BSECZ from the very beginning. At the November 1993 meeting of the PABSEC in Kiev, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk proposed that the BSECZ include regional security affairs as one of its responsibilities, and recommended that the BSECZ ban the use of Black Sea navies for offensive actions; ban naval and other military exercises from the Bosphorus; limit the frequency of naval exercises in the Black Sea; and draft a declaration of the inviolability of the borders along the Black Sea. [Ref 95:p. 35] Similarly, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, has proposed on various occasions that the BSECZ should have a crisis management and disarmament dimension in the Black Sea region. [Ref 96:p. 14] Both Ukraine and Georgia have seen the BSECZ as a platform to impose some sort of control over the Russian attempts to increase its influence over the former republics of the Soviet Union, and limit Russia's ability to engage in special peacemaking and/or peacekeeping missions in these republics.

At this point it should be stated that prospect of the BSECZ assuming an additional security dimension remains low largely because of Russia's membership in the organization. Russia, aware of growing uneasiness among the former republics of the Soviet Union about its attempts to extend its influence throughout the former Soviet Union, has tried, from the very beginning, to prevent discussion of political and security issues within the BSECZ. Russia has also shown resistance to the BSECZ's falling under Turkish leadership. For instance, it rejected the Turkish proposal to locate the Black Sea Foreign Trade and Development Bank in Istanbul, and supported Greece in securing BSECZ Council decision to locate the bank in Thessaloniki/Greece. As *Izvestiya* puts it:

. . . people in the Kremlin and on Smolenskaya Square do not want the BSECZ, which was created on Turkey's initiative, to be turned into a tool for the expansion of Ankara's political influence in the region. [Ref 47:p. 78]

Before the BSECZ can be truly effective, ethnic, national and territorial disputes among and within its member states, which continually prevent the BSECZ's decision-making mechanism from taking and enforcing actions that will enhance regional cooperation, must be settled. Furthermore, its members should achieve significant economic growth on their own. Considering these facts, it appears that the development of the BSECZ along the lines desired by Turkey will take longer than Turkey expected.

It should also be stated that increased cooperation between the BSECZ and the EU, and the promotion of trade and investment between the member countries of these two organization are of great importance for the future of the BSECZ. Poorer countries of the BSECZ, which face difficulty in competing in international markets, view the BSECZ as an mechanism that allows them to expand trade relations among themselves, which in turn, will enhance their chance of

establishing trade relations with the EU countries in the long run. Therefore increased cooperation between the EU and the BSECZ is of real importance in encouraging these countries to accelerate their economic development, and to settle the existing disputes among and within themselves peacefully for an accelerated development. In this direction the first concrete step was taken in May 1994, when the EU and BSECZ countries came together at an international conference, held by the EU's Council of Ministers, to initiate energy cooperation between the two organizations. [Ref 95:p. 36] If similar initiatives yield concrete cooperation projects, the chance of BSECZ to achieve its objectives and contribute to the regional stability considerably increases.

## **B. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

### **1. Problematic Relations With Neighbors**

In its relations with the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey has traditionally pursued a policy of strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of these countries. As Turkey's relations with the West were weakened following a series of developments such as the unilateral decision by the United States to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963, and the Cyprus dispute in 1964, Turkey began to place greater emphasis on developing its relations with the Arab and other Muslim countries of the region. While Turkish policymakers felt compelled to take a far greater account of regional considerations with the deterioration of relations with the West, the second Cyprus crisis of 1974 and the ensuing American arms embargo against Turkey, consolidated their decision to further relations with the Muslim world. With the sharp increases in oil prices in 1973-1974 and again in 1979, the development of economic relations with the countries of the Middle East had become as important as gaining their support with respect to the Cyprus problem. Therefore, particularly since the second half of the

1960s, Turkey has distanced its foreign policy toward the Middle East from that of the West, particularly the United States, and begun separating itself from the disputes that emerged between the West and the countries of the region by taking a more neutral stance.

The Gulf War of 1990-1991, which brought the danger of war immediately to Turkey's doorstep, forced Turkey to depart from its traditional policy of non-involvement in the inter-Arab conflicts. While no other NATO ally faced the threat so frontally, Turkey was a frontline state during the war as it took a firm stance on the side of the allied coalition against Iraq in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Turgut Ozal, then President, played a major role in Turkey's policy formulation toward the 1990-1991 Gulf War. He regarded the crisis as an opportunity to assert Turkey's strategic importance and to prove to the West that, in the words of Ozal, "Turkey is a country that can be trusted." [Ref 32:p. 687]

It should also be stated that the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and Iraq during the years preceding the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait also played an important role in Turkey's taking a firm stance on the side of the coalition. Following the ceasefire in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, during which both Iran and Iraq benefited from Turkey's neutrality, Iraq had toughened its stance toward Turkey. During the war years Iraq had preferred to keep a low profile while criticizing Turkey's increased exploitation of the Euphrates waters for the GAP project. However, when Turkey announced, in November 1989, that it would reduce the flow of the Euphrates as of January 13, 1990, for one month to partially fill the reservoir behind the Ataturk Dam, Iraq did not refrain from harshly criticizing Turkey. Iraqi petroleum minister Issam Al-Jalabi told the Arabic *Alif Ba* magazine that "Turkey is deliberately trying to stop the flow of the Euphrates," and that Iraq would try to get other Arab

countries to boycott Turkish goods. [Ref 20:p. 84] Apart from the "water problem," there was also a growing uneasiness in Turkey because of increasing threat of the use of non-conventional weapons by Iraq. Turkey was also alarmed at the stockpiling by Iraq of long-range missiles which might carry conventional and non-conventional warheads, and these concerns were exacerbated when the components of Iraq's planned "super gun" were seized at the Turkish border town of Edirne in May 1990. [Ref 3:p. 63]

With the occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Iraq's bid for regional hegemony with its well-equipped armed forces, missile technology and non-conventional weapons capability, became a serious threat. Following the UN security Council Resolution 661, dated August 6, 1990, Turkey announced on August 8, that the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline between Kirkuk (Iraq) and Yumurtalik (Turkey) was closed, and all other commercial links with Iraq and occupied Kuwait were suspended. The closure of the pipeline and the ending of all trade with Iraq, which were vital for the success of economic sanctions against Iraq, presented Turkey with substantial costs. Turkey was dependent on the pipeline for 50 percent of its oil imports and for an income of \$500 million per year in the form of transit fees. [Ref 97:p. 315] Turgut Ozal was aware of the costs that Turkey would incur due to the closure of the pipeline and the suspension of commercial links with Iraq. However, he was also aware that Turkey would come under immediate pressure of its Western allies to act against Iraq and prevent it from exporting crude oil. So, rather than waiting for the West to exert pressure on Turkey, he swiftly decided to give full support for the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq.

Ozal was also in favor of Turkey's active military involvement in the war. He had urged the government to ask for war powers from the Turkish parliament, and send Turkish troops and naval ships to the Gulf. Ozal's call for active

military involvement resulted in mixed interpretations both in Turkey and abroad leading to controversies over whether or not Turkey would open a "northern front" and send troops to northern Iraq. The parliament, political parties and public opinion were divided over the issue of Turkey's direct involvement in the war, which would imply the end of Turkey's traditional foreign policy toward the Middle East, i.e., strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of the countries of the region. As a compromise between those in favor of traditional policy of neutrality and the advocates of active involvement of Turkish military, the Turkish parliament passed, on August 12, a bill that allowed the government to send troops abroad only in case Turkey was attacked and to receive foreign troops on Turkish soil. [Ref 32:p. 686]

In the absence of a physical attack by Iraq on Turkey, the involvement of the Turkish military in the war remained limited to raising the prospect of opening a "northern front" by the deployment of over 100,000 troops along the Iraqi border which forced Iraq to deploy substantial troops to the north.

Meanwhile, Ozal's ambitious plans that envisaged an active role for Turkey and his determination to use every political and military opportunity to enhance Turkey's relations with the United States had strained the relations between him and foreign policy establishment as well as the military. On October 11, 1990 both Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer and Defense Minister Safa Giray resigned. [Ref 97:p. 315] Three weeks later on, on December 3, 1990, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Necip Torumtay, also announced his resignation. [Ref 13:p. 36] While the resignation of Foreign Minister Bozer was connected with Ozal's attempts to formulate Turkish foreign policy without adequate consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Torumtay's resignation was believed to have stemmed



from Ozal's pressure on the government to open Incirlik Airbase to the use of the United States Air Force for military missions against Iraq. However, following the decision of the Turkish parliament, after a long internal debate, to allow the use of Incirlik and other military bases by the coalition forces, the first allied air attack was launched on January 18, 1991, against Iraq. [Ref 32:p. 687] Bombing sorties from Incirlik Airbase by coalition planes continued until the time of ceasefire in the Gulf.

The resignations of Ali Bozer, Safa Giray and General Torumtay, long debates in the Turkish parliament over the government's request for war powers, and the use of Turkish soil and air space by the coalition forces against Iraq had not only resulted in Ozal dropping his ambitious plans in the face of heavy criticism, but also indicated the large scale domestic opposition to Turkey's direct involvement in interstate conflicts of the Middle Eastern countries.

In response to his critics Ozal stated that:

As I have always reiterated, my conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy. The reason I made this call is because we are a powerful country in the region. . . . There are conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to these passive policies. The reason these circles accuse us of dragging the country into an adventure is because I generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country. [Ref 32:p. 691]

However, it should also be stated that the developments in the Gulf War quickly showed Turkey the difficulties of pursuing a dynamic policy. First of all, Turkey has come to the frustrating realization that NATO's protective umbrella may not work as effectively as it worked during the Cold War years, as can be inferred from the internal debate that emerged among NATO members when Turkey officially asked for

the defensive deployment of NATO AMF-A in southeast Turkey. Second, international compensation from the Western powers and oil-producing countries for the financial losses that Turkey has been incurring has remained far from compensating these losses. The financial support of the West has continually shrunk and eventually Turkey has been left on its own with a continuing income loss of \$500 million dollar every year due to closure of the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline. Third, Turkish calculations that Turkey's pro-Western stance and the assistance that it provided in the Gulf War would consolidate Turkey's strategic importance in the eyes of Europeans and thus help it overcome the barriers to Turkey's full membership in the EU have backfired. Turkey's active involvement in Middle Eastern politics has resulted in the definition of its strategic importance largely in Middle Eastern terms rather than European, and the European countries have become increasingly reluctant to carry the borders of the EU to the volatile and unstable Middle East, which Turkey's full membership in this organization would imply. Turkey's problematic relations with Syria and Iran have reinforced the European belief that Turkey's membership in the EU would expose the EU to this unstable region in an undesirable manner as conflicts between Turkey and its southern neighbors emerged.

While these considerations have strengthened the position of those who advocated the adoption of a more neutralistic approach by the Turkish government during the war, the death of Ozal, a visionary politician, and the election as president of Suleyman Demirel famous for his pragmatism and emphasis on domestic issues, has signaled the beginning of a period of a more cautious Turkish policy toward the Middle East. Combined with the fact that Tansu Ciller's government has become largely occupied with the country's deteriorating economic condition and the domestic instability stemming from the prolonged Kurdish problem, it is expected that Turkey's future

policies toward the Middle East will most probably be formulated in line with its conventional approach to the region rather than an approach that envisages active Turkish involvement in the Middle Eastern politics.

Turkey continues to provide bases for the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq (Operation POISED HAMMER) and to enforce economic sanctions against Baghdad. Today, the highly armed and authoritarian regimes of Iraq, Iran and Syria, which have been long disturbed by Turkey's traditional pro-Western orientation and its democratic, secular regime, also look on Turkey as a Trojan Horse which serves the United States and NATO in the establishment of a permanent Western presence in the region. Although the Iraqi quest for hegemony has been defeated, elimination of Iraq from the regional military balance has opened the door to another rivalry for hegemony in the region, between Syria and Iran, with whom Turkey has problematic relations.

Turkey's relations with Syria have long been adversely affected by the historical dispute over Turkey's Hatay province. Ideological differences between the two countries have further strained the bilateral relations throughout the Cold War years. However, Syrian support of political movements hostile to Turkey has been the main source of concern for Turkey. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Syria had provided support to the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Turkish Marxist-Leninist terror organization DEVRIMCI GENC (Revolutionary Youth) which carried out subversive operations and terrorist attacks against the Turkish state. In the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention which almost completely ended terrorist activities by these two groups, Syrian support of anti-Turkish organizations has continued, particularly with the PKK which fled to Syria in the face of purge operations of the Turkish security forces. While PKK recruits were given Syrian identity documents and taken to the training camps in the Syrian-

controlled Beka'a Valley in eastern Lebanon, Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, was allowed to reside in Damascus. Despite all diplomatic visits and warnings by Turkey, Syrian support of the PKK has continued as the main instrument used by this country to weaken the Turkish state.

As the construction activity in Turkey's South Anatolia Project (GAP) was accelerated by the government in the second half of 1980s, the tension in the bilateral relations has been further exacerbated with the emergence of the "water problem." The GAP, which includes 13 sub-projects (seven on the Euphrates River and six on the Tigris River), has become a serious concern for Syria which is highly dependent on the Euphrates River for drinking water, irrigation, industrial uses, and hydroelectricity. The \$32 billion dollar GAP project with its 19 hydroelectric dams that will produce 26 billion KWH of electricity, and 22 irrigations dams that will irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land, gives Turkey the ability to reduce the flow of the Euphrates to Syria by up to 40 percent. [Ref 98:p. 9]

When Turkey reduced the flow of the Euphrates on January 13, 1990, for one month to partially fill the reservoir behind the Ataturk Dam, Syrian-Turkish relations had become very tense. Although Turkey offered to compensate Syria and Iraq for the month-long loss of Euphrates water by boosting the river's flow between November and January, and gave assurance that it will remain loyal to the accord that Turkey and Syria signed in 1987, by which Turkey guarantees not to reduce the flow of the Euphrates to Syria below the average of 500 cubic meters a second, these have not been sufficient to alleviate Syrian concerns and suspicions that Turkey will use water as an instrument of pressure on Syria to prevent it from giving support to the PKK.

Turkey, while stating that it will not restrict water flow to Syria to force it to withdraw support for the PKK, has continued to exert pressure on Syria through diplomatic means.

However, in the face of continuing Syrian support for the PKK, the use of water as an instrument of pressure on Syria has come to be discussed in an increasingly greater manner in Turkish political and military circles. After the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Syria reportedly set certain limitations on the activities of the PKK operating out of Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley in eastern Lebanon, including cross border operations into Turkey from Syria. [Ref 29:p. 56] The Arab-Israeli peace process initiated in October 1991 has also put pressure on Syria, and forced it to ask the PKK in 1992 to vacate the training camps in the Beka'a Valley in response to the pressures exerted by Turkey and the United States. Rather than being perceived as a country supporting terrorism while the peace talks with Israel were taking place, Syria has preferred to keep a low profile and reduce its support for the PKK. Aware of increasing pressure on Syria to join the Middle East peace process, Turkey has increased its pressure on Syria to withdraw its support for the PKK completely. However, Turkish efforts remain far from yielding tangible results. This became particularly apparent when it was revealed that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan had fled from northern Iraq to Syria on March 19, 1995, only 24 hours before Turkey launched a military campaign against the PKK camps in northern Iraq. [Ref 60:p. 1] Turkish Foreign Minister Erdal Inonu, in his visit to Washington to give information to the United States administration about the military operation launched by Turkey in northern Iraq, expressed Turkish concerns about the continuing Syrian support for the PKK, and asked for the assistance of the United States in exerting pressure on Syria. [Ref 99:p. 1] Today, Syria, while trying not to be seen to be openly supporting the PKK, keeps the channels with this group open. As Graham Fuller puts it:

. . . Syria will continue to gauge the positive and negative values of maintaining this instrument of pressure against Turkey--including the broader costs or enhancements to its image, interests, and relations with the United States and Turkey. It can always resuscitate support to the PKK . . . [Ref 29:p. 56]

While ideological differences between Syria and Turkey are expected to be resolved or put into the background with the end of Cold War, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the events in its aftermath have shown that Syria continues to see Turkey as a hostile, anti-Syrian and pro-Western presence in the region. Turkey's pro-Western stance in the Gulf War, and particularly its continuing support for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/ POISED HAMMER have raised Syrian concerns that Turkey is helping the West, particularly the United States, in establishing a military presence in the Middle East. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/POISED HAMMER is seen by Syria, in the words of Stephan Blank of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), "as a thinly contrived effort on the part of Turkey and the United States to establish a permanent NATO military presence in the region, targeted on the Gulf." [Ref 47:p. 32]

If the Arab-Israeli peace process, which started to give its first fruits with the limited autonomy agreement between PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1993, and the peace accord signed between King Hussein of Jordan and Yitzhak Rabin in 1994, yields an agreement between Syria and Israel as a first step toward a long-term settlement of the standing disputes between the two countries, particularly of the dispute over the Golan Heights occupied by Israel, Syria may adopt a much more moderate stance in its relations with the pro-Western countries of the region, including Turkey. However, in the absence of a Syrian moderation, Turkey's relations with this country seem to continue to depend largely on the evolution of the "water problem" and the "Kurdish problem."

Turkey's relations with Iran were adversely affected when the Islamic revolution took place in Iran in 1979. Before the Islamic revolution that led to the fall of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the two countries had developed close relations, the foundations of which were laid by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah Pahlavi, father of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Iran and Turkey had joined in various Northern Tier security arrangements such as the Baghdad Pact and CENTO against the threat of spread of Soviet influence over the Middle East.

The Islamic revolution in 1979 created strains in Turkey's relations with Iran because of new regime's efforts at "exporting the Islamic revolution" to Turkey. The regime of Ayatollah Khomeini opened a disturbing campaign against the secular and democratic regime of Turkey, while declaring Mustafa Kemal Ataturk "godless" and an "enemy of Islam."

The 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq prevented further deterioration of relations between Iran and Turkey, which pursued a careful policy of neutrality. Both Iran and Iraq needed Turkey as an economic lifeline and transportation link to the world, and refrained from taking actions that would lead to a change in Turkish policy of neutrality. However, when Turkey entered into the "hot pursuit" accord with Baghdad with which Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkey to enter Iraq in order to launch military operation against the PKK camps in northern Iraq, Iran protested the agreement and accused Turkey of siding with Iraq. For Iran, Turkey was helping Iraq to police the northern parts of the country and defend both Iraqi territory and the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, vital for the export of Iraqi oil to the world markets, against Iraqi Kurdish groups backed by Iran in an attempt to weaken the regime in Baghdad. Iran's suspicion about Turkey grew when Turkey notified Tehran that if Iraq were defeated by Iran and the state were to disintegrate, it would demand the return of Mosul-Kirkuk-a claim which dates back to Turkey's loss of the region in 1926. [Ref 13:p. 45]

It was during this period that Iran reportedly stepped up its assistance to the various anti-Turkish groups. For example, Iran offered to provide the PKK with a base along the Iranian-Turkish border at Urmia while allowing the ASALA to open an office in Tehran. [Ref 47:p. 37]

Following the end of the war between Iran and Iraq, with the ceasefire of August 1988, the relations between Turkey and Iran further deteriorated. While the Iranian embassy refused to lower the Iranian flag to half-mast to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Ataturk's death in November 1988, Iranian insults comparing Kenan Evren, then President of Turkey, with Salman Rushdie, caused additional offense, especially to the army. [Ref 3:p. 55] The Iranian regime also provided support to Turkey's own radical Islamist groups. When the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled, in 1989, against the wearing of the headscarfs by woman students on university campuses, the extreme religious groups organized mass demonstrations which are believed to have been largely provoked and funded by Iran. [Ref 100:p. 178] While marches of support were held also in Tehran, the Iranian ambassador to Ankara, Manoushehr Mottaki, gave very provocative speeches on the issue, and declared that Iran was considering economic sanctions against Turkey. [Ref 3:p. 56]

While the death of Khomeini in 1989 considerably slowed down "the export of Islamic revolution" to Turkey, the election of moderate Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as president provided an opportunity for the normalization of the relations between the two countries. However, with the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and developments in its aftermath, the two countries have entered a period of mistrust, preventing normalization of relations.

Turkey's active involvement in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM had resulted in growing Iranian concerns that Turkey might take advantage of the defeat of Iraq by the coalition forces to seize the oil-rich northern parts of Iraq,



including the Mosul-Kirkuk region. Iranian concerns were also heightened by Turkey's suggestion that the UN should take over territory in northern Iraq to provide a "safe heaven" for the Kurdish refugees trying to escape operations of Iraqi military toward the establishment of the state authority in northern parts of the country. Iran waited for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to end, but when this did not happen and the operation dragged out under the name of Operation POISED HAMMER, it accused Turkey of serving the Western powers, particularly the United States, to spread their influence throughout the region. In parallel to these developments, a considerable increase in Islamic violence was observed throughout Turkey. Prominent authors, journalists and university professors recognized for their loyalty to the Kemalist ideology and the struggle that they launched with their pens against Islamic fundamentalism were assassinated in 1992-1993. The responsibility for the attacks was assumed by radical Islamist groups operating in Turkey and believed to get clandestine support from Iran. Following the murder in January 1993 of Turkey's well-known anti-fundamentalist journalist, Ugur Mumcu, mass demonstrations were organized throughout Turkey as a symbolic defense of secularism, and in all of these demonstrations Iran was held responsible for the Islamic violence in Turkey and the assassination of Turkey's secularist intelligentsia.

The Use of Iranian territory by PKK for hit-and-run attacks against Turkey has been another source of tension between the two countries. Following the military campaign that Turkey launched in October-November 1992 in northern Iraq, one of the six military operations launched by the Turkish armed forces under the "hot pursuit" accord of 1984 with Iraq, a considerable number of PKK militants moved to Iran and began using Iranian territory for incursions into Turkey. [Ref 101:p. 13] The use of Iranian territory for hit-and-run attacks by the PKK, in addition to incursions by this

group into Turkey from northern Iraq, has exacerbated Turkish concerns about escalating PKK violence and the security of Turkish border towns and villages. In the face of increased Turkish pressure on Iran against the use of Iranian territory by the PKK, Iran accepted the establishment of the bilateral Security Commission in September 1992 and agreed to cooperate with Turkey over border security. [Ref 101:p. 14] Although both countries expressed a desire for increasing cooperation on the issue of terrorism, and a commitment to ensure that their lands will not be used by groups working against the other country, the use of Iranian territory by the PKK has continued.

In the aftermath of attacks by the PKK against 29 Turkish embassies and missions throughout Europe on June 24, 1993, Turkey formally accused Iran of supporting the PKK to weaken the Turkish state. [Ref 47:p. 32] The attacks came only one day before the Turkish parliament voted to extend permission of the United States to use Incirlik Airbase for overflights of Iraq in connection with the Operation POISED HAMMER. Although Iran has continually asked Turkey not to extend the mandate for the operation, it has been repeatedly renewed by the Turkish parliament in six-month installments since June 1991. [Ref 32:p 688] The scope of the PKK attack of June 24 against the Turkish embassies and intelligence reports have also contributed to the Turkish belief that Iran was behind these attacks. In this regard, Dr. Stephen Pelletiere of SSI states that:

It is not possible that the PKK could have performed an operation like this on its own. . . There would have had to have been an infrastructure on which the protestors could have relied, and the PKK does not have such a network. Moreover, the operation would have required considerable funding. . . Iran has the infrastructure in place throughout Europe to assist in attacks of this nature. . . In crude terms, Tehran has the modus operandi for a job like this. [Ref 47:p. 50]

Among the factors that prevent normalization of relations between the two countries, the rivalry over establishing a zone of influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, the ideological contradiction that exists between Iran, an Islamic state, and Turkey, a secular democratic state with a pro-Western orientation, and the support that Iran gives to Turkey's radical religious groups and the PKK remain the most important ones.

In his recent visit of June 1994 to Iran, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel made clear that mutual respect for each others' differing social and political systems and close cooperation between the two countries on matters of terrorism and border security are the two a priori conditions for improved and enhanced relations between the two countries. Iranian officials, on their part, have stated that Turkey attaches too much emphasis to security issues and not enough on cooperation in the political, cultural, social and economic fields. [Ref 101:p. 13-14] Demirel stated that he could not characterize the results of his talks with Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's spiritual leader who took over from Ayatollah Khomeini, as having paved the way for a "new chapter" in Turkish-Iranian ties. [Ref 101:p. 13]

## **2. Turkey Between the Arabs and Israel**

For the last three decades, Turkish policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has been centered on maintaining a balance between two objectives: (1) maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel and (2) politically supporting the Palestinian cause and developing relations with the Arab countries. Turkey sees the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip as a condition for stability in the Middle East. On the other hand, its support for the Arab countries in this regard has not developed to the point that will severely harm its relations with Israel and the West, particularly the United States, because of its overall policy objective of

establishing all kinds of relations with the democracies of the West.

During the late 1940s and 1950s, Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries were approached from the unidimensional perspective of East-West tension as the Soviet threat represented, during this period, the exclusive concern that Turkish strategy was designed to contain. Thus, as a part of its pro-Western foreign policy aiming at establishing all kinds of alliances with the West against this threat, Turkey recognized the state of Israel on March 28, 1949, and established diplomatic relations with this country in January 1950 by sending its chargé d'affaires to Tel-Aviv. [Ref 102:p. 92] During this period Turkey's relations with the Arab countries remained subordinate to its commitments to the West, particularly the United States.

As Turkey's relations with the West were weakened in the 1960s, Turkey began distancing its Middle Eastern policy away from that of the United States. Although, Turkey did not let these developments immediately affect its relations with Israel, Turkish attempts at developing close economic and political relations with the Arab and other Muslim countries in the 1970s in order to overwhelm the economic crisis that it fell into with the 1973-1974 oil crisis, and to gain their support with respect to the Cyprus problem particularly in the aftermath of its military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the ensuing arms embargo on Turkey by the United States, paved the way for a greater pressure by the Arab and other Muslim countries on Turkey to sever its ties with Israel. Therefore, the 1970s and the early 1980s witnessed a change in Turkish foreign policy in the direction of support for the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

During the October War of 1973, Turkey did not allow American use of Turkish bases to resupply Israel while Soviet overflights of Turkish airspace were being tolerated. Turkey also supported Arab resolutions at the UN General Assembly,

including the resolution of November 1975 that declared Zionism a form of racism. [Ref 20:p. 80] Turkey established bilateral relations with the PLO in 1975, and at the seventh meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in May 1976, Turkey declared that its government had decided to approve the charter of the OIC to become a full member and permit the opening of a PLO office in Ankara. [Ref 20:p. 79-80]

However, the general principles of Turkish foreign policy have put a certain limitation on these political concessions, which, in turn, prevented the development of Turkey's relations with the Arab countries fully at the expense of its relations with Israel and the West. Turkey added a reservation to the 1976 declaration of the OIC that Turkish approval of the OIC charter would extend only to those points that remain in conformity with secularist principles of the Turkish constitution. Turkey also added a reservation that its approval of the final declarations of the OIC would be conditional on their conformity with the general principles of Turkish foreign policy [Ref 102:p. 99] The PLO office was not opened in Turkey until 1979, more than three years after Turkey announced for the first time at the 1976 summit of the OIC that permission would be given. Furthermore, when the office was opened in Ankara in October 1979, Turkey decided that the head of the PLO office would have, not the rank of ambassador, but the same rank as the Israeli representative had in Ankara, i.e., chargé d'affaires. [Ref 20:p. 80] It was only after July 1980, when Israel declared that "Jerusalem is the united and permanent capital of Israel," Turkey, protesting the Israeli declaration, withdrew its chargé d'affaires in Tel Aviv and reduced its representation to the level of second secretary in August 1980. [Ref 3:p. 79]

Relations between Turkey and Israel had grown closer once more by the middle of the 1980s. As a result of the improvement in European-Turkish relations following the

gradual release of limitations on political activity, imposed by the military junta in 1980; the decline of the Middle East markets in Turkey's trade as a result of the decrease in the oil prices, the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq, and the reorientation of Turkish marketing efforts toward Europe; Turgut Ozal's government's economic policies which helped the country to recover from the economic crisis that it fell into in the second half of 1970s, Turkey's dependence on the economic and political cooperation of the Middle Eastern countries had largely reduced which, in turn, paved the way for closer relations between Turkey and Israel. By 1986, Israel and Turkey had restored the diplomatic relations to the level it had been before 1980. Turkish-Israeli trade jumped from \$29 million in 1986 to \$140 million in 1990. [Ref 20:p. 81] While the economic activity between the two countries was increasing, Turkey and Israel also began cooperation in the area of intelligence, particularly on Turkey's initiatives due to increased PKK activity in Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley in Lebanon. With the development of close relations with Israel, Turkey began pursuing a much more balanced policy in the Middle East with respect to Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it recognized the new Palestinian state declared in November 1988, it avoided raising the status of its diplomatic relations with the PLO to the ambassadorial level. Turkey also abstained in the UN General Assembly vote of December 16, 1991 which repealed the UN General Assembly resolution of November 1975 describing Zionism as a form of racism. [Ref 102:p. 107] With the beginning of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians for the first time at the Middle East Peace Conference convened in Madrid in October 1991, Turkey upgraded its diplomatic relations with both the PLO and Israel simultaneously on December 19, 1991 to ambassadorial level. [Ref 20:p. 81]

Turkey views the Arab-Israeli peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991 as a very important opportunity that

will contribute to the stabilization of the Middle East. The importance of the peace process for Turkey also stems from the fact that, as the number Middle Eastern countries that are at peace with Israel increases, this simultaneously frees Turkey to further develop its economic and political ties with the West while preventing deterioration of Turkey 's relations with the Middle Eastern countries because of its relations with Israel and its pro-Western orientation. Despite the considerable decline in the share of the Middle Eastern countries in Turkey's total trade since 1982, the Middle East continues to be an important trade partner for Turkey. Turkish exports to the Middle Eastern countries still account for 17-19 percent of its total exports, while the imports from the Middle Eastern countries make up 13-15 percent of Turkey's total imports. [Ref 28:p. 26-27] This trade volume, when combined with the substantial construction and service contracts that Turkish businesses undertook throughout the region, demonstrate the continuing necessity for Turkey of maintaining good relations with the countries of the region.

Using the opportunity that arosed with the first fruits of Arab-Israeli peace process, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller paid a visit to Israel in November 1994, and became the first Turkish prime minister visiting Israel since its establishment in 1948. During her visit to Israel, Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the area of intelligence was formalized with the signing of Turco-Israeli accord on cooperation against terrorism. [Ref 31:p. 13] During the visit, Ciller and Yitzhak Rabin also agreed to the finalization of the negotiations toward a free trade agreement between the two countries as soon as possible, and to the exploration of other areas of cooperation, particularly the sale of drinking water from Turkey to Israel. [Ref 31:p. 15] This is a highly sensitive issue in Turkey's relations with the Arab countries and Israel. Israel has long been interested in buying water from Turkey, and with the rapprochement between the two

countries in the second half of 1980s, they had began exploring the technical aspects of the transportation of water from Turkey's under-utilized rivers emptying into Mediterranean to Israel. In 1990 the technical aspects of the sale were completed, and the transportation of the water by tanker ships or in large floating bags to be hauled by ships was determined to be feasible. [Ref 103:p. 9] However, the water deal between Turkey and Israel had met with Arab resistance. While Libya reneged on its promises to service its debts to Turkish contractors and held up payments to Turkish workers employed in Libya to prevent realization of the sale, Iraq had resorted to holding up Turkish lorries at the northern border, resulting in Turkey and Israel shelving the project. [Ref 3:p. 82]

Aware of the growing importance of water in the Middle East, Turkey, the only country in the region which enjoys abundant groundwater resources, has seen water both as a marketable commodity and a strategic resource that has the potential of greatly affecting the interstate tensions in the Middle East. These considerations have resulted in Turkey drawing up a water pipeline scheme, envisaging the transportation of Turkey's water to eight Arab countries.

This pipeline scheme, which became known as the "Peace Pipeline," was brought up by Ozal for the first time in 1987. Ozal had seen the free exchange of goods, capital, services and labor as essential to the economic order in the Middle East, and offered the project as an economic and political cooperation mechanism that would contribute to the stability and development of the region as a whole.

The "Peace Pipeline" project, feasibility studies of which were performed by an American consulting firm, Brown and Root, at a cost of \$2.7 million, envisages exploitation of two of Turkey's medium-sized rivers, the Seyhan and Ceyhan, which empty into the Mediterranean, and the transportation of water southward through Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to the Gulf.



[Ref 104:p. 28] The Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers carry about 39 million cubic meters (cum) of clean water per day, and Turkey has offered to export 6 million cum/day southward through two massive water pipelines that will be constructed within the framework of the project. [Ref 105:p. 13] The first and largest pipeline, known as "Western Pipeline," would supply water from Turkey to Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and have a daily capacity of 3.5 million cum. [Ref 3:p. 97] The smaller and second pipeline, known as "Gulf Pipeline," would have to cross Iraq then move down the west side of the Gulf, supplying water to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, with a daily capacity of 2.5 million cum of water. [Ref 3:p. 97] Altogether the project could bring drinkable water to more than 15 million people at a construction cost of \$20 billion. [Ref 104:p. 29] Although Israel does not appear in the blueprints, Israeli and American water consultants have made plans to extend to Israel a spur from Amman. [Ref 105:p. 13]

Philip Robins explains the notion behind the project as follows:

. . . by the end of the century pressure on water resources will be so acute in the region that conflicts may erupt as states seek to expand and secure their own supplies. The construction of extensive pipelines which supply large volumes of cheap water on a reliable basis, regardless of the season, to all the needy states of the region will . . . lessen the pressures on existing natural water resources, and hence head off any possible conflicts. [Ref 3:p. 98]

The Gulf states have shown reluctance to commit themselves to the project for a variety of reasons. First, Arab states, particularly Syria, have feared increasing their dependence on Turkey. Second, the countries located toward the end of the pipelines have expressed their concerns that states upline would have greater leverage over them, and might exert

political pressure or extract concessions by preventing the flow of water downstream. The reluctance of the Arab countries to commit themselves to the project resulted in the cancellation of a Middle East Water Summit which Turkey planned, in cooperation with the World Bank and the UN Development Program (UNDP), to convene in November 1991. [Ref 104:p. 33] Turkey's desire to have Israel participate in the conference and Israel's acceptance of Turkey's invitation had also contributed to the Arab countries' decision not to participate in the conference.

Turkey has not given up promoting the project as a mechanism that will create a new regional economic order in the Middle East, and contribute to the prevention of possible conflicts between the countries of the region over this valuable and scarce resource. The Arab-Israeli peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, and the signing of Oslo accords in September 1993 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasir Arafat, have given Turkey an opportunity to revive the "Peace Pipeline" project which became dormant, particularly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At an international water conference in Ankara in September 1993, the importance of the project as a stimulus to the Arab-Israeli peace process was emphasized by Turkey in the hope of bringing the project back to life. As Turkish Minister of State Mehmet Golhan states:

As Israel and Palestine bury their swords, Turkey believes that a reassessment of the Peace Pipeline project should be made by all the countries it would serve. The true meaning of the project is to prove that water can be an element of cooperation by creating a mutual dependence on water, thus contributing to peace and stability.[Ref 106:p. 31]

The future of Turkey's "Peace Pipeline" project remains uncertain. However, it is a fact that water is becoming an essential component of political power in the Middle East and

an object of increasing competition. Although Turkey has repeatedly stated to the countries of the region that water will not be used as a political weapon, today water has become a powerful leverage to which Turkey can resort in foreign policy implementation.

### **C. TURKEY AND THE BALKANS**

Peace and stability in the Balkans are of great importance for Turkey for a variety of reasons. The ongoing crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina which threatens the territorial integrity and of the Muslim population of this country has been a source of grave concern for Turkey. Furthermore, if the aggression by Serbs spreads to the Kosovo region of Serbia or to Macedonia, the entire Balkan Peninsula may find itself in a conflict which may quickly escalate to a region-wide war. Greece, Bulgaria and Albania may feel compelled to become directly involved in the conflict to protect their national interests and this may result in Turkey's direct involvement in support ethnic Turks and Muslims living in the region despite all possible adverse effects of this kind of Turkish involvement on Turkey's integration with Europe.

The importance of the Balkans for Turkey stems from both historical and contemporary reasons. First, Turkey is the successor state to the Ottoman Empire which dominated the Balkans from the end of 14th century until the beginning of the 18th century. The Ottoman Empire had continually retreated from the Balkans throughout the 18th. and 19th. centuries, and finally as a result of its defeats in the two Balkan Wars (1911-1912 and 1913-1914), its Balkan territory was restricted to a small area in Thrace. Thus, Turkey is a Balkan country both historically and geographically. Second, the Balkans constitute a link between Turkey and Western Europe, which has vital importance for Turkey. Considering the fact that over 2.5 million Turkish citizens live in West Europe, and that West European countries account for more than 50 percent of

Turkey's total exports and over 40 percents of its imports, the Balkans acquire a strategic importance for Turkey. Furthermore, according to Turkish sources, the number of people of Turkish ethnicity living in the Balkans exceeds two million while the total number of Muslims living in the region is exceeds seven million. [Ref 107:p. 92]

When Yugoslavia began disintegrating in a civil war in the middle of 1991, Turkey originally adopted a low-key stance and favored keeping Yugoslavia's federal structure intact. Turkey even criticized Germany's decision to recognize the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, on the grounds that such a move would only hasten Yugoslavia's disintegration and result in the intensification of violence. Once the disintegration further continued and seemed irreversible, the Turkish position began to change. Turkey extended diplomatic recognition to the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina on February 6, 1992, in the belief that their integration with the international community would help restoration of peace and stability in the region. [Ref 62:p. 84] As the aggression by Serbs intensified in the spring of 1992 and the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina began suffering heavy casualties accompanied by large losses of territory in the face of Serb attacks, Turkey hardened its stance and moved to try to raise the consciousness of the international community for the protection of the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and of the lives of Bosnian Muslims from the "ethnic cleansing" campaign of Serbs.

In the spring of 1992, a Bosnian Muslim delegation, consisting of high-level representatives of the Muslim-based Democratic Action Party (Stranka Demokratske Akcije -SDA), one of the three big parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina's National Assembly, paid a visit to Ankara and requested Turkey to activate the Council of Europe, the CSCE and the UN Security Council to take action. The delegation also suggested that if such measures failed to stop the Serbs, Turkey should

intervene militarily or send arms and financial aid. [Ref 23:p. 214] Following the visit of the SDA delegation, on August 7, 1992, Turkey elaborated the details of an Action Plan to be implemented by the UN Security Council, which called for a series of non-military measures and, in the event that these measures failed to stop Serbian aggression, proposed stricter measures such as limited military involvement by the international community in order to enforce the UN sanctions and strike the Serbian military targets. [Ref 48:p. 69]

On August 25, 1992, the Turkish General National Assembly (TGNA) noted that it would not accept any forcible changes to the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stated that:

The TGNA will consider it a humanitarian duty to take every kind of step to stop the Serbian attacks for the protection of the people and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina in case the international use of force is delayed. [Ref 47:p. 19]

At this point it should be stated that Turkey has refrained from unilateral use of force from the very beginning, and persistently declared that bringing the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an end was the responsibility of the UN. While refraining from unilateral action, Turkey has also stated that it would make every kind of contribution to enforcement actions mandated by the international community to end Serbian aggression. In this spirit, in April 20, 1993, Turkey joined NATO, with 18 F-16s, in the implementation of the UN Resolution 816 prohibiting overflying of Bosnian airspace. [Ref 62:p. 87] Turkey has also sent two MEKO-200 class frigates to the Adriatic Sea to join the Operation SHARP GUARD, enforcing UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in accordance with the UN Resolution 820. [Ref 47:p. 19] After lengthy negotiations, Turkey and the UN have agreed on the participation of Turkey in the UNPROFOR, and 1,500 Turkish

troops were finally deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina in July 1994. [Ref 48:p. 69]

At the multilateral level, Turkey called the OIC to an extraordinary session in Istanbul in June 1992 and tried to form a pressure group among its 52 members to act in the UN on the side of Bosnian Muslims. [Ref 62:p. 87] At the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the OIC held on 17-18 June 1992 in Istanbul, a nine-member Contact Group was formed to speak for the OIC in the UN, and an overall strategy to be pursued by the OIC in the UN regarding the question of Bosnia-Hercegovina was determined: the repeal of the arms embargo against Bosnian government and the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN to stop Serbian aggression. [Ref 48:p. 70] In various OIC meeting that have been held since 1992, member countries have reaffirmed the wish for the deployment of troops from OIC states to protect the "safe areas," renewed their call for air strikes by NATO on Serbian military targets, and issued threat of economic sanctions against countries backing the partitioning of Bosnia-Hercegovina. [Ref 48:p. 70-72]

While the high-level diplomatic activity conducted under the OIC has remained far from achieving success, even Turkey, one of the most active countries within the OIC and Contact Group, has been constrained from direct intervention in support of the Muslim population in Bosnia-Hercegovina despite all kinds of close ties between Turkey and this country. Turkey has refrained from unilateral action largely because of concerns that this kind of involvement would irreparably set back Turkey's integration with Europe and severely damage its relations with Washington. Furthermore, possible repercussions of any kind of Turkish return to the Balkans, over which the Ottoman Empire had absolute control between the end of 14th century and the beginning of the 18th century, such as a region-wide Slav-Muslim confrontation, have also constrained Turkey's direct involvement.

Direct intervention aside, Turkey's return to the Balkans even as part of a multilateral force has created suspicion among many Balkan and European countries. For example, Turkey's desire to participate in the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina created serious debate within NATO, and particularly Greece objected any kind of Turkish involvement in the war between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. Because of Greek opposition, Turkey was prevented from active participation in the operation and Turkish F-16s were transferred to Italy as an operational reserve. [Ref 108:p. 33] Similarly, the deployment of 1,500 Turkish soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the command of the UNPROFOR was approved only after a lengthy debate within the UN, and Turkish soldiers were deployed to Zenica without any specific mission. [Ref 109:p. 9]

Apart from participating in the UN enforcement missions, Turkey has actively encouraged a Muslim-Croat dialogue. Franjo Tudjman of Croatia paid a visit to Turkey in April 1993 and the Turkish Foreign Minister was invited to witness the signing of the Sarajevo Joint Declaration, of November 12, 1993, between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, on the cessation of the fighting between Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia. [Ref 48:p. 70] Turkey also actively supported the dialogue between Muslims and Croats that led to the Washington Agreement of March 1994, bringing Bosnian Muslims and Croats together under a federation. Four months after the March agreement, a tripartite meeting between Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, was held on the Adriatic resort island of Brioni at which the three countries expressed their desire to consolidate the relationship and cooperate among themselves. [Ref 109:p. 9]

However, the inability of the Turkish government to pursue a policy of active involvement in the war, the ineffectiveness of the UN, NATO and the EU in stopping Serbian aggression

which resulted in heavy Bosnian Muslims casualties, and the occupation of more than 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Serbs, have been sources of grave concern for the Turkish people. In addition to the resentment among the Turkish public against Serbian aggression, the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina has also resulted in Turkish frustrations over the lack of UN and European action to protect Bosnian Muslims. As indicated earlier, today there is a growing perception among the Turkish people that the West Europeans see no place for Muslim Turkey within Europe, and that its application for membership in the EU is being denied because of racial, religious and cultural differences between the Turkish people and the Europeans. The inaction of the West in Bosnia-Hercegovina in the face of Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" campaign, has added a new dimension to this perception.

Particularly Islamist groups, aware of collective concern and frustration in Turkish society, have successfully used the tragedy in Bosnia-Hercegovina to discredit the West. Necmettin Erbakan of the WP, has also used the war in Bosnia to discredit Turkey's Western-oriented regime and accused the government of having left the case of Bosnian Muslims in the hands of Western-dominated institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. While trying to mobilize public support by emphasizing the religious aspects of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, i.e., the Slav versus Muslim confrontation, Erbakan has demanded a more active approach, including direct military intervention, from the government. The public appeal by the Bosnian government and Muslim leadership for Turkish support, and the daily coverage by the mass media of the Serbian aggression, have contributed to the mobilization of public opinion, and the rallies organized by the WP in Istanbul and Ankara to show Islamic solidarity on the side of Bosnian Muslims have turned into anti-Western demonstrations where the Western governments and institutions are accused of applying double standards regarding the respect for human



rights, and openly allowing Serbs to continue their aggression in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

It is a fact that Turkish frustrations over lack of European and UN action to protect the Bosnian Muslims have been building, and should the war spread to the Serbian-controlled autonomous region of Kosovo, or Republic of Macedonia, and this, in turn, results in the escalation of the conflict, engulfing other countries of the region, such as Albania, Greece or Bulgaria, Turkey may be drawn into the war in order to protect its national interests.

Despite the withdrawal of Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's Army from Macedonian territory in April 1992, and the positioning in Macedonia of various CSCE and EU monitoring missions as well as over 1,200 UN peacekeepers, including 320 American troops, Macedonia continues to be threatened by Serbia, which has historical claims on that country as Southern Serbia. [Ref 110:p. 34] Greece is strongly against a Macedonian political entity because of its serious concerns over the possible effects on Macedonian independence on its own Macedonian minority. Greece, which claims that the name "Macedonia" implies territorial claims on its own northern region, has warned Turkey and Bulgaria that recognition of Macedonia would adversely affect stability in the Balkans and their relations with Athens. Bulgaria, on its part, considers itself to be Macedonia's guardian from Serbia and Greece. Indeed, Bulgaria participated in four wars in the last century (the Balkan Wars of 1911-1912 and 1913-1914, World War I and World War II) in failed attempts to incorporate Macedonia into "Greater Bulgaria." Turkey has supported the independence of Macedonia, and had extended recognition to the republic on February 6, 1992. One third of Macedonia's population is Muslim, and has close ties with Turkey. Shortly before his death, Ozal visited Skopje in February 1993 and gave assurances that Turkey would remain committed to the protec-

tion of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia. [Ref 47:p. 20]

The situation in the province of Kosovo, an autonomous province of the republic of Serbia, is potentially more explosive. Nearly two million Muslim Albanians who make up 90 percent of the total population in Kosovo have been put under oppressive martial law with the occupation of the province by the Serbian Army following the 1990 decision of Belgrade to place both Kosovo and Serbia's other autonomous province, Vojvodina, directly under central control. [Ref 29:p. 146] Following the declaration of Republic of Kosovo on October 19, 1991 by an ad hoc provincial legislative body, and the recognition of the republic by Albania have further exacerbated the tensions between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. Even should the Serbs not initiate an action similar to one against Bosnian Muslims, the Albanian majority has become so oppressed and the secessionist demand toward amalgamation of Kosovo with Albania among them has grown so strong that, Kosovar Albanians may take actions which, in turn, could precipitate Serbian action. This Serbian action may bring responses from other Balkan countries, especially Albania, and trigger a region-wide war.

In the words of Daniel Nelson of Old Dominion University:

. . . it will take only one or two deaths, Albanian or Moslem, in Kosovo or Macedonia to precipitate the endgame of the Yugoslav wars: a far wider conflict in the south. If fighting envelops Kosovo and Macedonia, neighboring states will become involved in the fighting. Such a final step-a true Balkan War-can be expected in the next decade or so. [Ref 111:p. 36]

At this point, Turkey's relations with Bulgaria and Albania deserve brief comment. Turkey's relation with Bulgaria were severely strained when a campaign of forced assimilation of Bulgaria's Turkish minority began in the mid-1980s. Under

the Todor Zhivkov's forced assimilation campaign, 900,000 ethnic Turks, comprising approximately 10 percent of the Bulgarian population, were forced to change their Turkish or Muslim names to Bulgarian or Christian ones, to end all Islamic religious teaching and practice, and to migrate to Turkey within the framework of an overall Bulgarian policy of securing "ethnic purification" of Bulgaria. [Ref 1:p. 299] It was estimated that toward the end of 1989, more than 300,000 ethnic Turks had migrated to Turkey in the face of harsh anti-Turkish measures of the Bulgarian government, which brought Turkey's relations with this country to the verge of a complete breakdown. It was also during this period that Bulgaria had established a close alliance with Greece, motivated largely by common fear of, and hostility toward, Turkey and Turks.

Only after the fall of Todor Zhivkov in November 1989 and the official rescinding of anti-Turkish measures, did Turkey's relations with Bulgaria begin to improve. While the change of regime brought over 150,000 ethnics Turks who sought asylum in Turkey back to Bulgaria, the two countries initiated attempts that aimed at improving mutual trust. In addition to the Sofia Agreement signed in 1991 on confidence-building measures, the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security was also signed by the prime ministers of both countries in May 6, 1992. With the treaty, which stipulates multidimensional collaboration and confidence building measures, the two countries pledged to discuss all security problems and solve them without resort to force. [Ref 23:p. 213] Meanwhile, economic activity between the two countries has shown similar improvement as the trade volume increased from \$46 million in 1990 to \$329 million in 1993. [Ref 28:p. 27]

However, the improvements in the bilateral relations have not been sufficient to eliminate the deep-rooted anti-Turkish bias in Bulgarian society. The rapid growth rate among the

ethnic Turks continues to be a source of concern for the Bulgarian government. While attacks by Bulgarian nationalists against the election campaigns organized by the Turkish-based Movements for Rights and Freedoms Party (MRF) have demonstrated the continuing ethnic tensions, the success that the MRF achieved in the 1991 general elections has exacerbated the concerns of some Bulgarians, i.e., the extreme right-wingers and some of the socialists, about the growing strength of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. [Ref 23:p. 213] Turkey, on its part, continues to treat Bulgaria with suspicion that it will renew its alliance with Greece if its interests so dictate. Although Bulgaria's relations with Greece began deteriorating following the recognition of Republic of Macedonia by this country in January 1992 and Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement, both Bulgaria and Greece do not want the spread of Turkish influence in the Balkans. [Ref 112:p. 36] In the words of James Brown, "Turkey [is] likely to remain the big problem for both countries, ensuring, therefore, that they would not move too far apart." [Ref 29:p. 150]

Turkey's relations with Albania have developed in a remarkable way within the last a few years. Albania's rapprochement with Turkey is an important part of Albanian President Sali Berisha's foreign policy of attracting as many allies as possible. Because of its geographical position and the historical ties between the two countries, Turkey has found it expedient to develop bilateral relations as well. Especially when Albanian's relations with Greece began deteriorating following the forced repatriation of Albanian migrants in Greece in late 1991 and the expulsion of a Greek Orthodox cleric from Albania in the summer of 1992, close ties with Turkey have acquired greater importance for Albania. [Ref 113:p. 30] The current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the prospect of the spread of violence to Kosovo, and tense Serbian-Albanian relations have further contributed to Albanian efforts at developing close relations with Turkey.

Aware of the threat of conflict with Serbia over the issue of Kosovo, Albania has applied for membership in NATO, and asked Turkish assistance in establishing link with NATO.

The June 1992 visit by Suleyman Demirel, then the prime minister of Turkey, to Albania, and the February 1993 visit by Turgut Ozal, then the president of Turkey, have shown Turkey's determination to develop close relations with Albania. Turkey provided Albania with humanitarian aid amounting to \$22 million, the highest foreign contribution after Italy's, between January 1991 and December 1992. [Ref 114:p. 31] Turkey has also provided scholarships to Albanian students for higher education in Turkey, both civilian and military. The number of Albanian military cadets sent to study in Turkey, is reportedly twice as large as the combined number of Albanian military students studying in Italy, Germany, the United States, France and other countries. [Ref 114:p. 31]

The first high-level meeting between Turkey and Albania has taken place in Ankara in July 1992, and a military cooperation agreement was signed between the countries on July 29, 1992. [Ref 114:p. 30] The agreement calls for bilateral cooperation in the production of military and technical equipment, the exchange of military delegations, and the participation of each country's military in maneuvers in the other's country.

Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement and the strengthening of relations between Turkey and Albania are viewed with alarm in Greece and Serbia. While Greece, which does not want to see any kind of Turkish return to the Balkans, views these developments as Turkish attempts to isolate Greece in the Balkans, Serbia is particularly worried about the military cooperation between Turkey and Albania. Following the January 1993 visit of Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhuhali, the Serbian media quickly spread the rumor that Albania had requested tanks from Turkey and that Ankara had propbed

sending two armed brigades to Albania to defend Kosovo. [Ref 114:p. 32]

It is true that Turkey seeks alliances in the Balkans to protect its national interests, and thus wants to develop close relations with as many Balkan countries as possible. However, this does not necessarily mean that in case the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina spreads to the Kosovo autonomous region, or Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia find themselves in a conflict over Macedonia, Turkey will become directly involved in the conflict in order to protect its national interests. As in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Turkey has displayed tremendous patience and refrained from taking unilateral action. However, it should also be stated Turkey did not hesitate to intervene in Cyprus in 1974 despite the opposition of its Western allies. Similarly, at a very critical stage in the integration process with the EU, Turkey launched, in March 1995, a military operation in northern Iraq, which is almost equal in size to the military intervention in Cyprus, risking the ratification the EU-Turkish Customs Union Agreement by the European Parliament. For the time being, rather than taking unilateral action in the Balkans and jeopardizing its overall goal of integration into Europe, Turkey seems to prefer to adopt a low-key stance. In case the war expands beyond Bosnia-Hercegovina into Kosovo or Macedonia, drawing other countries of the region into conflict, Turkey may be forced to weigh its options again and feel compelled to intervene, whatever the political costs.



## V. CONCLUSION

With the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey's strategic importance as a bulwark against the military and ideological threat of communism has been greatly reduced in the security calculations of the West. However, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey's strategic and political significance has acquired a new regional dimension, considering the turbulence and instabilities in the Balkans, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The turmoil and uncertainty that exist in these regions surrounding Turkey have created a vacuum that has the potential of drawing Turkey into itself. The policies that will be pursued by Turkey toward these regions may act as destabilizing force or a force for moderation depending on whether or not Turkey sufficiently restrains itself from getting involved in regional conflicts. The whole international system benefits if Turkey continues to pursue a constructive approach to those areas and does not add to the instability of these regions.

While Turkey expected that such a redefinition of its political-strategic importance might provide a fresh incentive to correct the underlying tensions in its relations with its Western allies, it has become clear that the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have largely deprived Turkey of its chance to become an organic part of the Western Europe. The profound changes in East-West relations have forced the members of the European Community to focus on these historical changes, and gave an additional impetus to the Community to take control over the social, economic and political affairs of Europe. In this atmosphere, the West Europeans--who became preoccupied with issues such as German unification, the task of assisting the economic and political reconstruction of the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty within the



EU, and domestic economic problems that stem from the prolonged recession in Europe--have given less attention to the issue of Turkey's membership, and found it expedient to defer this problematic issue without giving a specific date. Furthermore, the European countries have become increasingly reluctant to accept Turkey's membership in the EU, which would mean carrying the borders of the union to the volatile and unstable regions of the world such as the Middle East and Transcaucasus, fearing that they could become entangled in regional disputes in an undesirable manner as conflicts between Turkey and its neighbors emerged. At a moment when Europe was moving toward union, Turkey has remained excluded from the European political and economic processes and interactions. Today, Turkey perceives that as soon as the common enemy, i.e., Soviet Communism, disappeared, it was pushed aside by its Western allies and excluded from the political and economic processes and interactions that are shaping the new Europe.

However, even though the feeling of frustration over the attitudes of the West is widespread among the Turkish people, Turkey cannot push aside the West as easily as its Western allies pushed aside Turkey. Turkey had made the political decision to become a part of the West at the foundation of the republic more than 70 years ago. Since then, all of the mainstream parties that came to power have pursued a pro-Western policy aimed at establishing all kinds of economic, military and political ties with the democracies in the West to promote Turkey's economic and social modernization. These parties have always been able to mobilize Turkish society along Western ideas and ideals, and received more than 70 percent of votes collectively in all of the general elections that have been held since the beginning of the multi-party politics in Turkey. Membership in the Council of Europe, the OECD, NATO, and the continuous struggle to gain full membership in the EU and WEU exemplify the conviction and

determination of Turkey to become fully integrated into the Western world, and to be seen and perceived as being European. In parallel with the socio-economic development of the country, in which the political and economic assistance of the West has had a great share, Turkey's exposure to and its interactions with the West have gradually increased within the past seven decades. Today, more than 50 percent of Turkey's total trade is with the Western markets, the EU and the United States in particular. The investment by the United States and the EU countries make up more than 75 percent of the total foreign direct investment coming to Turkey every year. While in 1970s Turkish industrialists were divided over the issue of Turkey's membership in the EC, today they see the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement as an historic opportunity for Turkey's drive toward an industrial economy despite all kinds of difficulties that they are expected to face in the short-run due to the increased competition with the European firms. Turkey continues to depend on the West not only economically, but also militarily. Because of its geostrategic location and centrality to the regions of crisis, Turkey still needs the security guarantee of the West as well as its military assistance. Considering the financial difficulties that Turkey faces in the modernization of its armed forces, the military assistance of the West and the security umbrella of NATO and the WEU acquire additional importance for Turkey.

Mainly because of these reasons, Turkey does not see the Middle East and Central Asia as real alternatives to the West despite its marginalization in the Western calculations. It's true that with the recent profound changes in the East-West relations Turkey's security and foreign policies have evolved to take a far greater account of regional considerations. In order to limit the damage that regional conflicts might eventually inflict on its own domestic stability and welfare, Turkey has undertaken broadly linked political, cultural and economic initiatives to spread Turkish influence and win many

points of influence or leverage in the conflict-ridden regions stretching from eastern and southern Europe through the Black Sea region to Central Asia. However, these have not aimed at shifting Turkey's pro-Western orientation, but rather at enhancing its security by increasing political interaction with the countries of the region, and to find alternative sources of economic cooperation. Its primary objective has remained preserving and further strengthening the old ties that it built with the West during the Cold War years.

Central Asia remains far from generating the visions, values and hopes that the Western alternative has provided Turkey since the foundation of the republic. Furthermore, it has also become clear that Turkey's economic, political, and military ways and means are not sufficient to realize its policy objective of establishing a zone of influence in Central Asia. Turkish drives to build a zone of influence have met an increasingly greater Russian resistance that aims at preventing the Central Asian republics from diversifying their relations with countries other than the Russian Federation, and halting the spread of Turkish influence in the region. The pressure on the Central Asian republics by the Russian Federation has been successful to a certain extent and resulted in these republics adopting a cautious policy toward Turkey. Turkey has also recognized that neither the Turkish economy nor the technological capabilities of Turkish industry are sufficient to satisfy needs of these countries. After more than 70 years of Soviet rule and centralized economic planning, the external financial aid that the Central Asian republics received from Turkey remains far from ending the dependence of the economies of these countries on the Russian Federation. Today, Turkey recognizes that Central Asia's economic, political and military ties to Russia cannot be replaced easily and that the needs of countries of the region are far more than Turkey can provide.

In the long run, Turkey may look to Central Asia and its natural resources as a commercial ground. If the Central Asian republics can successfully exploit their hydrocarbon resources and, in turn, achieve socio-economic development, this may create new marketing opportunities in Central Asia for the Turkish exports.

Particularly in the Transcaucasus, vital for the spread of Turkish influence over Central Asia and the reorientation of the Central Asian republics' economies from Russia to Turkey, Turkish policies have failed. Russia, through overt and covert efforts, has compelled all three Transcaucasian states to join the CIS, and secured agreements to maintain military bases in Armenia and Georgia. The fall of Ebulfaz Elchibey, the pro-Turkish president of Azerbaijan, and the subsequent decision of Azerbaijan to join the CIS, has been a big blow for Turkish policies and brought its ability to realize its policy objectives in both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia under question.

The war over the NKOR, increased Russian influence and pressure on Azerbaijan have also made it almost impossible for Turkey to realize its vital economic and energy goals and investments in Azerbaijan. While the finalization of plans for the construction of the Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline has been delayed, Russia has succeeded in obtaining a considerable part of Azerbaijan's oil economy by compelling Baku to transfer 10 percent of the profits of oil exploration in the Caspian Sea. Moreover, Russia has successfully promoted its alternative route of Baku-Novorossiysk and seriously challenged Turkey's desire to play a leading role in the transportation of Azeri and Central Asian oil to Europe.

Considering Russia's proximity to Turkey, the increased presence of the Russian military in the Transcaucasus, and Russian attempts toward the upward revision of the quantities of troops and armored vehicles it may station in the Caucasus under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Turkey

needs to pursue a controlled policy toward the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and refrain from taking actions that will bring it into a open confrontation with Russia. The erosion in the cohesion and solidarity of NATO, and unwillingness of the Europeans to extend the security umbrella of the WEU to Turkey also put pressure on Turkey to defend its sovereignty rather than undertake actions that will antagonize Russia. It is clear that this situation will not be conducive to allowing Turkey to freely develop its economic, cultural, political relations with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, and to pursue policies that aim at preventing the resurgence of Russian power in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

Similarly, Turkey does not see the Middle Eastern dimension of its foreign policy as an alternative to its relations with Europe, but rather a complementary factor to further its national interests. Despite the geographical proximity and decades of coexistence with the independent states of the region, Turkey has not built a solid, working relationship with any of the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey's pro-Western orientation, its secular, democratic regime, Ottoman past, and the problematic relations with Syria, Iran and Iraq stand as barriers between Turkey and the Middle East. Turkey's membership in NATO, its association with security schemes such as Baghdad Pact and CENTO have alienated Turkey from most of the Arab states, which perceived Turkey as serving interests hostile to many of the general interests of the Arabs. Turkey has learned that it cannot be both a part of the European and Western state systems and an active participant in Middle Eastern politics with close relations with the countries of the region. Its attempts at developing close relations with the Arab countries of the region in order to gain their support with respect to the Cyprus problem and to overcome the economic crisis that it fell into with the two oil crisis of the 1970s, paved the way for a greater Arab

political pressure on Turkey to distance its Middle Eastern policy from that of the West, particularly on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, presenting Turkey with an uneasy situation. During the 1970s and early 1980s Turkey responded to these pressures positively only to the extent required for the protection of its national interests while paying attention not to severely damage its relations with West severely. In the second half of the 1980s, with the improvement in European-Turkish relations, the decline of the Middle East markets in Turkey's trade, and the general recovery of the Turkish economy from its economic crisis, Turkey's dependence on the economic and political cooperation of the Middle Eastern countries had largely been reduced.

Until the Gulf War of 1990-1991, Turkey has preferred not to be involved in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of the countries of the region. This policy has both helped Turkey prevent escalation of existing problems with its Middle Eastern neighbors, and served Turkey's economic interests. The Gulf War of 1990-1991, during which Turkey departed from its traditional policy of non-involvement in the interstate conflicts of the region, has increased suspicion and hostility in Syria, Iran and Iraq toward Turkey, reinforcing the Turkish belief that its economic involvement in the region would be less provocative to its neighbors than its military involvement. Combined with the fact that Turkey's pro-Western stance in the war and the assistance that it provided the coalition forces have remained far from elevating its relations with the Europeans, and that the initial momentum that Turkey's pro-Western involvement in the war gave to Turkish-American relations has quickly faded as the relations between the two countries became strained, in the aftermath of the ceasefire in the Gulf, over the issues of military and economic aid to Turkey by the United States and Turkey's human rights record, particularly in relation to the Kurdish problem, it can be said that Turkish involvement in

the Gulf War created more problems for Turkey than it solved. Today, it is expected that Turkey's future policies toward the Middle East will most probably be formulated in line with its conventional approach to the region rather than an approach that envisages active Turkish involvement in the Middle Eastern politics.

Furthermore, considering Turkey's determination to fully develop the South Anatolia Project (GAP) and the consequent reduction in the flow of the Euphrates, which has already been reduced, the "water problem" is expected to continue destabilizing Turkey's relation with Syria and Iraq in particular and other countries of the region in general. After having spent more than ten years and investing \$11 billion in the project, Turkey is determined to complete the project as soon as possible. The intensification of violence in the south-east in relation to the Kurdish problem has given Turkey an additional impetus to accelerate the construction work in the project in order to transform the proposed benefits of the project into reality. As the flow of the Euphrates lessens in parallel to the development of the project, the tension in Turkey's relations with Syria and Iraq will be further exacerbated. Syrian and Iraqi attempts to mobilize the support of the Arab states on the water issue have already resulted in a growing perception among the Middle Eastern countries that Turkey is utilizing water as a political pressure tool on these two countries. When combined with the Turkish attempts of selling drinking water to Israel, Turkey's rich water resources have increasingly become a source of friction between Turkey and the Arab states of the region as can be inferred from the opposition of the Arab states to Turkey's "Peace Pipeline" project.

The Arab-Israeli peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991 is an important opportunity for the improvement of Turkey's relations with the countries of the region in general. It may even help Turkey to improve its relations with

Syria if this country participates in the process and thus feels compelled to further moderate its stance. However, it seems that this will take time. Furthermore, the positive effects of these developments on Turkey's relations with the countries of the region may be felt much more later. Even if the Arab-Israeli peace process results in Syrian moderation and has a positive impact on the general climate of the Middle East, Turkey's problematic relations with Iran and Iraq may continue to stand as a barrier between Turkey and the Middle East. Today, Iran perceives Turkey as an American-sponsored competitor seeking to limit its influence among the newly independent Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. Iran is also suspicious that Turkey is helping Azerbaijan to break up Iran. Iraq, on the other hand, may seek revenge for Turkey's role in the Gulf War and its continuing support for Operation POISED HAMMER, which automatically contributed to Iraq's losing state authority over the northern parts of the country.

The Middle East will remain for Turkey a market deserving continued attention. Even here, many Turkish businessmen have reservations about developing long-term business relationships. Volatile and unpredictable politics of the region adversely affect Turkish business activities while making long-term planning a difficult task. Dependence of the economies of the Middle Eastern countries on a single commodity, i.e., oil has always been a complicating factor in Turkey's trade relations with these countries as the amount of money available for them has fluctuated with the change in oil prices. These factors have gradually driven Turkish businessmen toward the more stable markets of Europe, resulting in a considerable decrease in the share of the Middle East markets in Turkey's total trade since the mid-1980s.

Unable to achieve both of its policy objectives in the post-Cold War era, i.e., elevating its relations with the West



and spreading its influence in the regions surrounding itself, Turkey today finds itself politically and militarily alone. The most important challenge awaiting Turkey in the next decade is to maintain its people's commitment to the Western ideas and ideals at a time when Turkey receives exclusionary signs from Europe. And this challenge comes at a time when the country faces severe economic problems and its whole stability is threatened by the Kurdish problem.

Turkey should take measures that will remedy the structural difficulties of its economy and put the economy on a stable track that will help reduce the existing socio-economic disparities between Turkey and the Western societies in the long run. The announcement of April 5 Austerity Measures constitutes an important step in this direction. Particularly, the government's decision to reactivate the privatization program is the most important element of the package. Although the program is not popular, the government should transfer the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) which became "money eating monsters" to private hands as soon as possible to eliminate their financial burden on the state budget. The SEEs, which account for almost 75 percent of the country's budget deficit, are continuously fueling the public-sector borrowing requirement, and have become the main reason behind the persistently high rate of inflation. Considering the employment opportunities that SEEs create, the privatization program is politically unpopular for every ruling party and, thus, requires wholehearted commitment by the government. Every government that has come to power has promised to reactivate the program, but then has forgotten about it. The same mistake should not be repeated.

Furthermore, the Turkish tax system, which puts the burden on wage and salary earners should be reformed in a manner that will prevent the growth of income differences which continuously fuel social unrest among Turkish society. The controls are lax and the tax evasion is widespread. Rather

than reforming the system, all the governments that came to power have preferred the easy way, i.e., collecting the tax from the wage and salary earners.

Another issue that no ruling party has ever thought of giving serious consideration to is Turkey's extremely high rate population growth, which stands at almost 2.5 percent annually, ten times the EU average. Although Turkey has shown that its GNP can grow at 6 to 9 percent a year, the high rate of population growth has consumed substantial portions of these growth rates, leaving very little or none for improvement in the living standards of the Turkish people.

These are not easy steps, but should be taken to save the Turkish economy from further deterioration, which is one the most important barriers to the realization of Turkish objectives and initiatives both at home and abroad. Deterioration of the economy also threatens the domestic stability of the country, fuels social unrest, and helps the Islamist forces to establish closer relations with the poor population groups at an increasingly greater speed and scale. The West's economic and political assistance are of great importance for Turkey in fighting these problems. It is a fact that the EU's rejection of Turkey's request for accession to the union has been a big blow to Turkey's secularist mainstream parties, which have aimed at establishing all kinds of economic, military and political ties between Turkey and the democracies in the West, and played into the hands of the Islamist forces, which pose the greatest threat to Turkey's pro-Western orientation. Although the majority of the Turkish people still remain loyal to the basic goals of modernization and have a westward orientation, frustration over European attitudes toward Turkey have been building. The realization that Turkey does not have a chance to become a part of the evolving Europe around the Maastricht Treaty within a meaningful time period is likely to result in increased anti-Western, particularly anti-European, feelings in Turkey, and,

thus, provide the Islamist forces with a tremendous opportunity to mobilize greater portions of Turkish society against Western ideas. The Welfare Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan, has already stepped up its anti-Western attitude in such a climate and used every opportunity available to it, such as the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to discredit both the West and Turkey's secularist mainstream parties in an attempt to enlarge its support base.

On this point the ratification of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement by the European Parliament is of great importance in terms of both the release of assistance funds allocated to Turkey by the EU and defusing the growing perception among the Turkish people that Turkey has no chance to become a full member of the EU. At a time when Turkey is receiving exclusionary signs from Europe, ratification of the agreement would provide Turkey with new hopes that there may be a revitalization of EU-Turkey relations.

Turkey proves that a predominantly Muslim country can preserve a secular, parliamentary democracy where Islam is integrated into competitive politics without destabilizing the state, and can achieve substantial technological, industrial and economic growth with a free-market economy. It is true that neither democracy nor secularism in Turkey are complete by Western standards. However, it is also true that there are few examples of Muslim countries that have shown continuous commitment to the principles and institutions of a secular, democratic state for decades and proudly defended its choice of Western liberalism, capitalism and democracy. At a time when the international system is in need of a pro-Western, relatively developed Muslim state with a democratic and secular regime and a market oriented, liberal economy to be shown as a model and proof that the Muslim East does not necessarily "clash" with the Christian West, the spread of anti-Western sentiment in Turkey is not a good sign.

Apart from the threat to the secular Turkish state from resurgent Islam, today Turkey's once dormant Kurdish problem has come to threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey as well as the stability of the whole state. The problem does not only threaten the territorial integrity of the state, but also adversely affects Turkey's relations with its Western allies. As a result of heavy pressure exerted on Turkey by the United States and its European allies with respect to the Kurdish problem, the Turkish people has come to perceive a serious conflict between Turkey's national interest and the interests of its Western allies. In case this perception grows in Turkey, it may become much more difficult for the Turkish government to develop policies that are more acceptable to the West in the handling of the problem. Intensification of violence threatens Turkey's domestic stability and socio-economic development, while increasing Turkey's prospect of getting involved in a conflict with its Middle Eastern neighbors, particularly with Syria which exploits the problem to weaken the Turkish state. More important, it threatens to mobilize Turkish nationalism against that of the Kurds. The PKK-led violence has not exacerbated tension between Turks and Kurds in the cities, as many feared. However, the polarization of society along the ethnic lines has begun and may get worse. If the West wants to see a domestically stable Turkey and does not want Turkey to embrace more nationalistic policies or get involved in a regional conflict with Syria or Iran over the Kurdish problem, it should help Turkey to deal with that problem. However, before asking the cooperation of the West, Turkey should restart attempts at finding a political middle ground for the problem and take measures that are currently available to it, such as reforms that will provide the Kurdish population with increased cultural and educational rights. If these measures are delayed, their effectiveness in preventing the alienation of Turkey's Kurdish population from the state is greatly diminished.

Turkey needs the West's assistance not only for its domestic stability but also for the protection of its territorial integrity and independence against external threats. Because of its geostrategic location and instabilities in the regions surrounding it, Turkey continues to place great importance on collective security organizations, i.e., NATO and the WEU. Particularly erosion in the solidarity of NATO has emerged as a very disturbing fact for Turkey, as some European allies have expressed, in the wake of the Gulf War, concerns over involvement in "out-of-area" operations. Growth of the debate about "out-of-area" operations and whether or not Turkey's Middle Eastern borders are "in-area" responsibility has potential for both increasing the instability in the Middle East and undermining Turkey's commitment to NATO. First of all, the "out-of-area" debate increases Turkey's vulnerability, and, thus, may lead Turkey to transfer greater portions of its financial resources to defense spending in order to increase its self-sufficiency in defending its territories. Considering the fact that particularly Syria and Iran have already become highly armed, and do not have smooth relations with Turkey, the participation of Turkey in the arms race, even for a defensive posture, adversely affects the general climate in the Middle East. Second, the developments during and in the aftermath of the Gulf War have strengthened the position of those who advocate the adoption of a more neutralistic approach by the Turkish government toward the Middle East. If Turkey perceives that it cannot benefit from NATO's solid security guarantee even though it fulfills its responsibilities, it may show reluctance to provide assistance to NATO in a future conflict in the Middle East.

Like the growing debate over "out-of-area" operations, the WEU's hesitation to accept Turkey into the organization has emerged as another disturbing reality for Turkey. As indicated earlier, Turkish calculations that its pro-Western

stance and the assistance that it provided in the Gulf War would consolidate its strategic importance in the eyes of Europeans and thus help it overcome the barriers to full membership in the EU and WEU have backfired. Turkey's strong pro-Western stance during the Gulf War has resulted in its strategic importance being assessed largely in its Middle Eastern rather than European context, and the European countries have become increasingly reluctant to carry the borders of the EU to the volatile and unstable Middle East, which Turkey's full membership in this organization would imply. Turkey's problematic relations with Syria and Iran, the Kurdish problem that has the potential to draw Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq into a regional conflict, regional rivalry with Russia, the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the NKOR and Turkey's involvement in the mediation process have reinforced the European belief that Turkey's membership in the EU would expose the EU to these unstable regions of the world in an undesirable manner as conflicts between Turkey and its neighbors emerged.

However, if Turkey continues to be excluded from European processes and interactions toward economic, political and military integration under the EU and WEU, the chance of Turkey being pulled into regional crisis and disputes gradually increases. Turkey's direct involvement in a crisis carries the instability much more closer to Europe. First of all, an important restraint on Turkey's policy formulation -- i.e., not to take actions that will give damage to Turkey's relations with its Western allies and, thus, set back its integration into Europe--gradually disappears as it becomes increasingly clear that Turkey will not be given the chance to become a member of the EU irrespective of whether it limits its actions to those approved by its Western allies. Thus, Turkey may show less reluctance to get involved in conflicts where its national interests are at stake.

If Turkey perceives itself isolated and concludes that the support that it expects to get from the West is not coming, it may take stronger, more independent positions than its Western allies have been accustomed to. As Turkey begins to act on its own and pursues a more independent policy, the actions that it took may not be always consistent with the interests of its Western allies. Throughout the Black Sea region, Transcaucasus and Central Asia, Turkey has pursued policies that are largely complementary, or at least not contradictory, to the interests of its Western allies. Through regional cooperation schemes such as the BSECZ and ECO, Turkey has attempted not only to limit the damage that regional poverty and conflict might inflict on its domestic stability and welfare, but also to increase the chance of the East European countries and the former republics of the Soviet Union to integrate into the world economy, which, in the long-run, could translate into greater overall instability in these regions. In Central Asia, with limited financial resources Turkey has done its best to prevent the resurgence of Russian power and the spread of Iranian-type fundamentalism. In the Balkans, Turkish interests seem to be contradictory to those of its Western allies as Serbian aggression threatening the existence of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, continues in the absence of a strong UN, NATO or EU action. However, even here Turkey continues to act as a positive force for moderation by restraining itself from direct involvement in the conflict. For Turkey to continue to act as a positive force for moderation and modernization and to successfully coordinate regional cooperation schemes, it needs to know that it can count on the support of its Western allies.

Moreover, as in the case of the erosion of the solidarity and cohesion of NATO, the exclusion of Turkey from the WEU increases its vulnerability and thus the prospect of Turkey getting involved in a conflict. Turkey's membership in the WEU, combined with its membership in NATO would play a

deterrent role and force potential aggressors to think twice before attacking Turkey. In the absence of such a collective security guarantee, even in a symbolic form, Turkey becomes vulnerable, increasing the prospect of Turkish involvement in a conflict. The repercussions of such a conflict will probably be much more severe for the overall stability of Europe than the destabilizing effects of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As this study has tried to explain, Turkey today still needs the political, economic and military assistance of the West in order to preserve its domestic stability and continue its socio-economic development. Irrespective of whether the West provides Turkey with the cooperation and assistance that it seeks, Turkey shall try to overcome its economic crisis, protect its territorial integrity and independence, develop its industrial and technological base, and improve the living standards of its people. In the absence of Western assistance, Turkey's ability to achieve these goals remain questionable. Keeping Turkey at arm's length and leaving it on its own in dealing with all of these difficulties would be a shortsighted and easy option for the West. It is based on the assumption that the West, particularly Western Europe, can limit the damage that a domestically unstable Turkey in the pursuit of new policies different from its traditional moderate, pro-Western ones can inflict on Europe's own stability and welfare. Turkey may have failed the test in the eyes of the West. But if the West continues to push Turkey aside, the West will soon understand that it also has failed a test--the test of a broader vision.





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